The Fallacy of Peace Process in Afghanistan
The People's Perspectives

Omar Sadr

Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies

The Fallacy of Peace Processes in Afghanistan

The People's Perspectives

Peace studies IV

Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies

---

9 789936 807020

Contents

ILLUSTRATIONS

TABLES

III

FIGURE

Acronyms

APRP	Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program
BND	Bundesnachrichtendienst(Germany's Intelligence Service)
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CSO	Central Statistics Organization
FTO	Foreign Terrorist Organizations
HPC	High Peace Council
IDLG	Independent Directorate of Local Governance
ISAF	International Security Assistance Forces
ISKP	Islamic State of Khurasan Province
NUG	National Unity Government
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
OP	Office of the President
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PTRO	Peace Training Research Organization
PPRCs	Provincial Peace and Reintegration Committees
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SIGAR	Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
TTP	Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

FOREWORD

This monograph is published under the aegis of AISS's Peace Studies research series. Other publications under AISS' Peace Studies series include *Afghan People's Attitude and Perceptions toward Peace Talks between the Government and the Taliban* (2016); *Four Decades of Efforts for Peace and Reconciliation in Afghanistan* (2017); *Modalities of Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan: A negotiated Settlement Scenario* (2018); and a series of papers on trends in radicalisation in different sectors in Afghanistan, including universities, *madrasas*, the Afghan National Police, and social media.

Research for this study was undertaken and completed over a 10-month period from January 2018. The findings of this study have been enriched by various formal and informal consultations and deliberations with various scholars and experts. In the course of conducting this study, I also had an opportunity to participate in an informal conference on Afghanistan's peace processes, organised in Oslo, Norway, in March 2018, by New York University's Centre on International Cooperation (CIC) and the Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution (NOREF). During the 10-month period, I was also responsible for conducting interviews for the other ongoing research undertakings at AISS, such as for the *Modalities of Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan: A Negotiated Settlement Scenario* (2018)—which indirectly contributed to my knowledge on the peace process.

There are many who helped with conducting this study, and to them, I am extremely grateful. I owe a particular debt to Dr Barnett Rubin,

X

Introduction

This study explores and analyses peace process in post-2001 Afghanistan. It attempts to understand public perception towards the peace process including the levels of people's awareness and satisfaction, and their assessment of the successes and failures of the peace processes. It also examines the peoples' attitudes towards the Taliban's character, popularity, and stance regarding the peace process. Based on a nationwide survey conducted between March and May 2018, this study provides the opportunity to understand public opinion regarding Afghanistan's peace processes.

This monograph is divided into four chapters. The introduction presents the rationale and the methodology of the study. Chapter I provides an overview of the peace processes in Afghanistan in the post-2001 period. Chapter II is devoted to the levels of awareness among the people on the peace process. Chapter III examines public perception on the character and popularity of the Taliban. Chapter IV presents the people's attitudes and perceptions regarding different approaches to Afghanistan's peace process. These include the people's assessment of: the current peace process; possibility of peace with the Taliban; proposed peace solutions, the Taliban's stance; conditions for peace with the Taliban; role of women; the Hekmatyar peace model; reintegration of the Taliban; venues for holding talks; role and effectiveness of the High Peace Council (HPC); and spoilers and facilitators of the peace processes. Finally, drawing on the findings of this study and conceptual debates on the peace process within Afghanistan, the conclusion identifies, contextualises, and articulates key fallacies of the processes attempted so far.

Theoretical Framework and Rationale

The study employs Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba's political culture approach to analyse the attitudes of the people. They define political culture as "political orientations – attitudes towards the political system and its various parts, and attitudes towards the role of the self in the system" (Almond and Verba 1989, 12). Borrowing Persons and Shils's classification of political orientation, Almond and Verba define political orientation as the internalisation of a political system in terms of evaluations, feelings, and cognition by the people. Accordingly, this study specifically looks at attitudes and orientations of the people of Afghanistan towards the peace process in three dimensions:

(1) **Cognitive orientation:** knowledge and awareness among the people on the peace process in general, and on the standpoints of the government of Afghanistan, the US, and the Taliban in particular.

(2) **Affective orientation:** the sentiments of the people with regard to the Taliban, the US, and the policies of the government of Afghanistan.

(3) **Evaluative orientation:** the judgments of the people on the peace process. This includes values standards such as the role of women in the peace process, and the moral judgment on the behaviours of the parties.

With regard to the objects of political orientation, unlike Almond and Verba's work—which looked at the attitudes of the people towards the political structure—this study analyses the attitudes of the people towards the policies of the parties to the conflict in Afghanistan (particularly those of the governments of Afghanistan and the US, and the Taliban); the overall peace process; and finally, on the 'self' as political actor.

Exploring and understanding public attitudes is critical for several reasons. This study subscribes to James der Derian's ideas on the significance and necessity to know and understand public opinion:

> to read the technostrategic discourse provides an important message for students of war and peace: as the image becomes more credible than the fact, as time displaces space as the more significant strategic "field," and as the usefulness of our ultimate power, nuclear weapons, is increasingly called into question, the war of perception and representation deserves more of our attention and resources than the seemingly endless collection and correlation of data on war that goes on in the field of international relations (der Derian 1990, 308).

There is no doubt that the current war in Afghanistan is a war of perceptions and representations. All the parties to the conflict try to understand and control public perceptions. It has often been claimed that the Taliban has been successful in monitoring public attitudes and winning the 'trust and confidence' of the people as compared to the government or the international forces (Johnson 2017; Hirose Imai and Lyall 2017). Therefore, it is extremely crucial to explore and understand the attitudes of people and analyse their perceptions regarding peace with the Taliban.

Second, the changes and shifts in political and policy issues at local, national and international levels necessitate this crucial national level survey. These changes and shifts include: changes in the HPC's leadership and structure; adoption of the new strategic plan for the HPC; the Taliban's leadership and structure; the US's Afghanistan and South Asia policy; a series of informal peace talks (discussed in the subsequent sections); the Taliban's 14 February 2018 letter to the American people; the National

Unity Government's (NUG) 28 February 2018 peace offer to the Taliban; and the temporary ceasefire of June 2018.

Third, the nature of current peace process is shaped much by a diversity of opinions and views, on both societal and political levels, some of which are biased and uninformed(Snow 2016; Osman and Gopal 2016; Osman 2018; Ibrahimi 2018). The political significance of this study is its contribution towards fostering informed and evidence-based decision making, particularly towards peace-building efforts. The findings of this survey provide policymakers at the HPC and the NUG, international partners, and peace-builders at the grassroots level with data to design policies and programs better. To that end, this monograph aims to shape the national discourse and stimulate a conducive atmosphere for discussions regarding peace at societal and political levels to take place with enhanced clarity.

Fourth, although there have been several studies on the attitudes of the Taliban as a party to the conflict in the recent years (Osman and Gopal 2016; Osman 2018), there have been fewer scientific assessments of the peoples'[1] attitudes regarding the peace process in Afghanistan. The first survey to map people's opinions on peace was conducted in 2016 by AISS (Karimi and Ebrahimi 2016). The Asia Foundation conducts an annual survey of the people of Afghanistan, which studies issues ranging from security to economy, development, governance, migration, and gender; but it does not provide an in-depth analysis of the perceptions of the people of

---

[1]The term 'people' refers to the citizens of Afghanistan, albeit a huge bulk of the Taliban (excluding their transnational terrorist allies) too are citizens of Afghanistan. It is possible that the survey might have covered the opinions of a number of Taliban members or their sympathisers, as the target sample was selected randomly.

Afghanistan regarding the peace process. As the scope of the Foundation's survey is broad, the section on peace and reconciliation usually covers merely three to five questions. Other surveys conducted by the media or Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) are either event-based or do not follow a scientific method. For instance, *Hasht-e-Subh*'s opinion poll studied people's perceptions regarding the NUG's February2018 peace offer to the Taliban (Delawar 2018). Similarly, some NGOs surveyed the public opinion regarding the June 2018 ceasefire between the government and the Taliban (Neda 2018). There is, thus, a need for in-depth research and analysis on the issue, and this study attempts to bridge the gap.

This study also complements the findings of *Public Support for Peacebuilding: Attitudes towards Peacebuilding and Dialogue with Armed Groups in UK, US and Germany,* which was conducted by Conciliation Resources and the Alliance for Peacebuilding in June and July 2017. Given the involvement of the respective countries in peace efforts in Afghanistan, it is important to understand public attitudes of those at the receiving end of the peace-building efforts. The findings of the abovementioned survey highlighted the support of the citizens of the US, UK, and Germany towards their respective country's engagements in the peace processes and most importantly towards dialogue with armed groups at the international level. However, it lacked a key element—i.e., public opinion in the country whose citizens suffer the violence of armed groups and terrorists first hand. The fact is that for a long time, public opinion in conflict and terrorism affected countries in Asia has been neglected while framing international peace-building policies. The voices of these people have remained unheard, as they are at the margins of the efforts for peace.

Methodology

In addition to historical analysis of peace process post-2001 Afghanistan (see chapter I), this study employs survey as a method to examine and assess public attitudes. The survey employs a cross-sectional approach and aims to examine and estimate the characteristics (in this case, attitudes) of the target population based on the sample of population and data collected through questionnaires. The sample population was asked to answer specific and identical numbers of questions.

First, a preliminary study was conducted to prepare a conceptual framework for the survey. Based on the preliminary study, a questionnaire was designed to collect data in Persian, Pashto, and English languages in the second stage. The questionnaire was designed and reviewed in consultation with the AISS research team, survey experts, experts on Afghanistan's peace process, and respective international stakeholders, through direct contact and/or focus group meetings. The questionnaire comprised 38 structured multiple choice questions (with 15 additional sub-questions) and respondents had the option to choose one answer each for most.20questions had the provision for choosing multiple answers. Once the questionnaire was drafted, it was put to test through a small-scale pilot study in Kabul to check its validity and reliability. Based on the feedback from the pilot study, few terminologies and phrases were changed and the questionnaire was finalised.

In the third stage, the statistical population and sample size was determined. The target population of the survey was citizens in all 34 provinces of Afghanistan (See Annex 1, Table 2 and 3) who were 18 years of age and older. The Central Statistics Organization's (CSO) Afghanistan

Statistical Yearbook 2016–2017 estimated the total population of Afghanistan to be approximately 29.2 million.[2]To identify an accurate and representative sample size, the survey employed the Survey Monkey sample size calculator, which gave us the sample population of 1,849 with a 99% confidence level and a 3% margin of error. Due to dire security challenges, field researchers were unable to cover all districts in every province, including the Taliban controlled areas.[3]Safety and security of AISS' field researchers are of utmost importance to the Institute, and therefore, we chose not to put them at risk by sending them to these areas. After the data was collected in the first round in March and April 2018, we added 177 more people to the sample size to achieve a more representative sample of the population. Thus, the survey interviewed 2,026 adults aged 18 years of age and above across the country. The demographic characteristics of the surveyed population (See Annex 1, Table 2) are explained below:

---

[2] As a national census has not been conducted in Afghanistan, we do not have the exact numbers of the total population. However, based on the 2017 World Population Prospects,, the total population of Afghanistan is estimated to be at around 35,530,081, of which, approximately 19 million are under the age of 18.

[3] The SIGAR report states that, "As of January 31, 2018, 229 districts were under Afghan government control (73 districts) or influence (156) …This brings Afghan government control or influence to 56.3% of Afghanistan's total districts. There were 59 districts under insurgent control (13) or influence (46), an increase of one district under insurgent influence since last quarter. Therefore, 14.5% of the country's total districts are now under insurgent control or influence, only a slight increase from last quarter, but a more than three percentage- point increase from the same period in 2016. The remaining 119 districts (29.2%) are contested—controlled by neither the Afghan government nor the insurgency" (SIGAR 2018: 86). The findings of BCC from August to November of 2017 indicated that the Taliban threaten seventy percent of Afghanistan. Government's full control is only over 30% of the territory (Sharifi and Adamou 2018).

1. **Age**: Over half the respondents (53.3%) were in the age cluster of 18 to 28 years. The other two clusters were: 29 to 39 years (27.8%); and over 39 years (18.9%).

2. **Education**: Less than half the respondents (44.8%) were undergraduate students or had a degree. Of the remaining respondents, 25.5% had a high school diploma or less; 14.1% were illiterate; 13.8% had received primary education; and 1.9% had received seminary education.

3. **Gender**: 42.9% were female, and 57.1% were male.

4. **Nationality:**[4] Over two-thirds of the respondents were Pashtun and Tajik (36.6% and 32.4% respectively). Hazara, Uzbek, and other minor nationalities accounted for 14.7%, 10.2% and 6.1% respectively.

5. **Occupation**: Artisan/craftsman (2.7%); civil activist (2.4%); civil servant (13.1%); employee (6.9%); entrepreneur/self-employed (16.7%); female homemaker (10.3%); unemployed (9.3%); labourer (3.5%); peasant (3.9%); student (15.8%); and university lecturer and schoolteacher (12.6%).

6. **Martial-status**: Two-thirds (63.8%) of the respondents were married and one-third (33.8%) were unmarried. The rest were widows[5] (2.0%) and divorced (0.2%).

7. **Geography**: This survey categorised Afghanistan's provinces into the following six zones (Table 4):

   a. **North:** Badakhshan, Baghlan, Balkh, Faryab, Kunduz, Samangan, Sar-e Pul, Takhar, and Jawzjan (30.4%)

---

[4] This study avoids using the term ethnicity usually referred to group identity in Afghanistan. Ethnicity was falsely invented by anthropologists in 20th century to characterise social-cultural groups, and does not capture the entire indigenous notions of group identity. Historical, some group such as Tajiks does not associate themselves with the term ethnicity. The term ethnicity also does not have conceptual capacity to capture other forms of group identity such as religious groups like Sayyid/Sadaat, Hindu and Sikh, or caste like Bari of Nuristan. For more information on politics of ethnicity in Afghanistan see Schetter 2005.

[5]The study did not cover widowers.

b. **Central:** Bamyan, Daikundi, Ghazni, Kapisa, Logar, Panjshir, Parwan, and Wardak (15.5%)

c. **East:** Khost, Kunar, Lagman, Nangarhar, Nuristan, Paktika, and Paktia (15.1%)

d. **The Capital:** Kabul (14.9%)

e. **West:** Badghis, Farah, Ghor, and Heart (12.8%)

f. **South:** Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, Uruzgan, and Zabul (11.5%)

The sampling method was based on multistage probability. In this method, samples are not predetermined. Instead, they are chosen randomly in order to make sure that the samples are selected by chance, and to provide equal opportunity for all the samples to be selected. Samples for this study were determined in three stages: In the first stage, the sample size was divided into 34 provinces based on probability-proportional-to-size (PPS). Simultaneously, within each province, the sample size was stratified into urban and rural stratifications in accordance with the CSO's data. In the second stage, within each province, districts served as the primary sampling unit (PSU). Observing cultural sensitivity, each PSU was divided into two sampling points: one male and one female. In the third stage, through simple random sampling, settlements within districts were selected. In urban spaces, towns and neighbourhoods, and in the rural spaces, villages, were used as the secondary sampling unit (SSU). In each SSU, five different random locations (northern, eastern, southern, and western and centre) were provided to the interviewers. The interviewers began conducting interviews from a landmark such as a mosque. After approaching the sampling point, the interviewers followed random intervals to select subsequent

households. Within each household, Kish grid method were used to randomise the targeted individual respondents.

Fieldwork for this study was carried out between March and May 2018 by AISS field interviewers under the supervision of the Kabul team. As an established think tank, AISS has a network of field researchers who have worked on previous studies undertaken by the Institute. In each province, a minimum of two field researchers (including one female researcher per province) and a maximum of six field researchers were hired. Most of the field researchers were additionally trained directly by the Institute's research team in person or through phone or Skype conversations. In these tutorial sessions, AISS researchers read all the questions of the questionnaire one by one to clarify ambiguity/vagueness. Additionally, to ensure that the questions in the questionnaire were clear and easy to comprehend, the interviewers themselves answered them first. Through this, several follow up questions and ambiguities coming from the field interviewers were identified. Following this exercise, the questionnaires were revised by the research team. It also helped the team test the field researcher's abilities and discretion in conducting the survey. While conducting fieldwork, field researchers read each question and the corresponding multiple choice answers to the respondents and provided clarifications to respondents where necessary. They then asked the respondents to choose either one option or multiple options based on the guidelines developed to support the questionnaire.

STATA was used to analyse the data collected through field research. The data was analysed through both bivariate and multivariate analysis. Regression was run to examine the causal relationship between

dependent and independent variables while other variables were controlled. The data was analysed based on several variables such as levels of education, gender, nationality, and zonal division of the country. However, we were unable to analyse the data based on the urban/rural factor due to several reasons. While the questionnaire did ask the place of residence, a sociological distinction between the city (urban space) and the village (rural space) is quite challenging in Afghanistan's case. On one hand, continuous waves of to-and-fro migration to cities and villages have made this binary division problematic; and on the other hand, there is not much socio-cultural variation among the rural areas and many cities.

The questionnaire for this study was sent to the field in early March 2018 and public opinion was collected throughout March, April and May 2018. Thus, the data reflected in this study does not cover the developments that took place after that period, such as the June 2018 ceasefire or the shift in the US policy with regard to talks with the Taliban.

Chapter One

Afghanistan's Peace Processes Post 2001

Think, in particular, of the marginal instances of…the peace activist for whom a fearsome narrative of a future universal "end of time" calls into question "nationalistic" narratives of state survival, but for whom, also, the latter narratives continue powerfully to displace a narrative of "universal peace" (Ashley and Walker 1990, 260).

Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of peace processes in post-2001 Afghanistan. [6] First, it provides an overview of development of Afghanistan's current political order through the Bonn process. Second, it outlines three phases of peace processes that unfolded since 2001: (1) the phase of uncertainty; (2) a two-pronged approach: high-level political negotiations and low-level reintegration efforts; (3) hasty efforts for a political agreement with the Taliban. While there are no clear boundaries between these phases and they are not mutually exclusive, they help us better understand the development and shifts in the peace process. The last section of this chapter explores different proposals for the peace process in Afghanistan.

---

[6] For the pre-2001 peace processes in Afghanistan, see another AISS study, titled *Four Decades of Efforts for Peace and Reconciliation in Afghanistan* (Wafayezada and Ebrahimi 2017).

Bonn Conference and Question of Order

Identifying the most suitable political order has remained a challenge in Afghanistan for several decades. Historically, political settlements in Afghanistan have not resulted in an end to violence and conflict, and have instead only changed the shape of conflict. This is because little attention has been paid to conflict transformation methods where all aspects of violence would be addressed in a systematic manner. Instead, the goal has been to achieve a short-term political agreement between parties to the conflict. In his 1968 book, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Samuel P. Huntington asked a fundamental question with regard to political decay in most of the Asian, African and Latin American countries: what is the reason of political instability and violence in these countries? He proposed "rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions" (Huntington 1968, 4) as the reason for political decay. In the past four decades, Afghanistan has witnessed social transformation and rapid mobilisation of ethno-national groups. Undoubtedly, the cause of violence and instability in Afghanistan has been because of the lag in the development of political institutions, exacerbated by the external actors and developments.

The political settlement achieved with the post-Bonn agreement in 2001 established a new political order in Afghanistan and introduced new political institutions. However, these new political institutions did not correspond with the socio-political realities on the ground. The highly centralised political system designed in the 'Bonn process'[7] was unable to

---

[7] By the Bonn Process, I refer to the state-building process that was kick-started by adopting the agreement, titled *Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan*

accommodate the cultural and moral diversity [8] of the society in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the centralised system increased bureaucratic hurdles, thereby slowing down the pace of service delivery, leading to increased levels of corruption and public dissatisfaction (See Shahrani 2001; Shahrani 2003; Cameron 2001). The fundamental error of creating a centralised political system occurred due to the lack of knowledge of the country's political culture and attitudes of Afghanistan's diverse peoples, as well as an over-emphasis on "stability." "UN, the US and international facilitators have given preferences to "stability" to the determinant of "Justice" ever since the first Bonn Conference" (Maass 2006, 27). With that in mind, to avoid a repeat of past mistakes, this study was undertaken with a particular focus on Afghanistan's peace process. The findings of the study contained in this monograph document and contextualise the political attitudes of the people of Afghanistan with regard to peace in the country and the Taliban.

Historical Phases of Peace Process in the Post-2001 Period

In the post-2001 period and post the second uprising of the Taliban, a series of peace processes have taken place between the Taliban and the governments of Afghanistan and the US. Since then, multiple peace-making attempts have been put forward and followed by both domestic and

---

Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, at the 2001 Bonn Conference, till the adoption of the new constitution in 2004.

[8] From a liberal perspective, moral diversity refers to divergence and disparity of ideas, values and notions of good life. For instance, John Rawls in his theory of justice talks about the moral diversity in the context of different conceptions of justice. Similarly, there are divergent opinions and ideas on the types of political systems, prospects of peace process with the Taliban, and notions of good life in Afghanistan.

international actors. Many of these initiatives and programs had been at odds with each other. Resultantly, they did not lead to a tangible outcome towards conflict transformation and lasting peace. At the conceptual level as well, there has been a multiplicity of visions with regard to prospects of the peace process in Afghanistan. While some envision a grand peace agreement with the Taliban, others like Ahmad Rashid argue that peace in Afghanistan would take place through localised confidence-building measures and piecemeal negotiations with distinct factions of the Taliban. Other analysts such as Harun Mir suggest a second international conference on the lines of the 2001 Bonn Conference as a possible mechanism to negotiate with the Taliban (Mir 2018). So far the past 17 years peace processes in Afghanistan entailed five different programs and initiatives:

a. High level talks: such as Murree in 2013 and recent Zalmay Khalilzad talks in Qatar.

b. Talks for talks: such as contacts with intermediaries to establish communication channels with the Taliban.

c. Reintegration programs: such as Commission-e Tahkim Solh in 2004 and Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program in 2010.

d. Track-2 and Track 1.5 initiatives: such as Doshisha University and Chantilly Conferences in 2012; and Pugwash meetings.

e. Local peace agreements with the Taliban: such as Helmand province in 2006 and 2007 and Dahana Ghori, Baghlan Province in 2015.

The above mentioned initiatives would be discussed in details below. Since its inception in 2001, Afghanistan's peace process has gone through three phases.

1. Phase One: Uncertain Stage

The first phase of the peace process in Afghanistan was characterised by a lack of clarity between the national and international actors on how to deal with the Taliban. Afghanistan's President, Hamid Karzai, the National Shura of Afghanistan, and the international partners followed their respective approaches. The programs and policies of these actors were at odds with each other. This phase began with the Bonn Agreement in Germany and the Shah Walikot Agreement in Kandahar in 2001, and ended with a number of Local Peace Agreements in Helmand Province in 2007.

The post-2001 peace processes began in November 2001 with an international conference called the Bonn Conference. Backed by the international community, the Bonn Conference brought various constituencies of Afghanistan to agree on the re-establishment of a new political order for the country. While the Bonn Conference is widely considered an international state-building conference, it was also a conference that brought together various warring sections to foster a consensus on a peace agreement. Throughout the time the conference was ongoing, the war against the Taliban was ongoing in various provinces, particularly in Kunduz and Kandahar. By signing the Bonn Agreement on 5 December 2001, Taliban leaders in Kandahar—comprising Syed Tayyab Agha (special assistant to Mullah Omar), M. Hasan Rahmani (the Taliban's governor for Kandahar), Obaidullah Akhund (Mullah Omar's deputy and the Taliban's defence minister) and Mir Ahmed Agha—reached an agreement with Hamid Karzai (who was agreed upon in the Bonn Agreement to lead the interim administration) which is famously known as the Shah Walikot Agreement (Dawn 2001;Coll 2018).The agreement

stipulated that the Taliban surrender Kandahar and its neighbouring provinces, turn over their arms and ammunition, and return to their homes. It was also agreed that the Chief of Taliban, Mullah Omar, would be allowed to live in Kandahar. Unlike the Uzbek leader, Abdul Rashid Dostum, who boycotted the Bonn Agreement citing that Uzbeks were not fairly represented, the Taliban leaders did not claim any representation or participation in the Bonn Conference. Instead, they demanded amnesty and opted to go to their homes (Knowlton and Tribune 2001).

However, even though the Taliban was defeated military and ideologically, the Bonn process left the possibility of political participation to individual Taliban members to take part in Bonn Agreement processes such as the June 2002 Emergency *Loya Jirga* (Grand Assembly); the December 2003 Constituent Assembly; and the 2004–2005 presidential and parliamentary elections respectively. Without popular support, most Taliban candidates faced widespread defeat in the elections. Discredited and dismantled as a political force in late 2001, the Taliban re-emerged as an insurgency in late-2005.[9]

Both the government of Afghanistan and its international partners have maintained a degree of communication lines with the Taliban since 2002 and have tried to negotiate with them. Immediately after the Bonn Conference, two divergent policies emerged with regard to the Taliban. On one hand, the US's policy considered the Taliban as terrorists and hence not eligible to be negotiated with until they renounced terrorism. US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, stated on the eve of Mullah Omar's

---

[9] At this stage, the Taliban were characterised as Neo-Taliban (See Giustozzi 2007).

surrender of Kandahar that Omar would be considered "a combatant against the United States" (Knowlton and Tribune 2001), and "it remained American policy toward the Taliban 'to bring justice to them or them to justice'" (Coll 2018). The US's policy of coercion continued throughout the term of US President George Bush's administration.

On the other hand, Karzai adopted a sympathetic policy towards the Taliban by considering them as victims. The early efforts of the government of Afghanistan to bring the Taliban back into the political process began with the National Security Council (NSC) under President Karzai in 2003. These efforts were carried out in great secrecy by the Deputy Director of the NSC, Ibrahim Spinzada Nurzai (Keene 2011). To provide an official cover for these efforts, Afghanistan's government established a reconciliation commission called the Commission-e Tahkim-e Solh (Strengthening of Peace Commission) to reintegrate Taliban members into the society in 2004 (Sajjad 2010). Much like former Afghan President Mohammad Najibullah's1986 National Reconciliation Policy (NRP), Program Tahkim-e-Solh (PTS) offered economic concessions and immunity to the insurgents in exchange for renunciation of terrorism. It also administered a reintegration program for the insurgents released from US detention camps in Bagram and Guantanamo. In 2008, the Commission claimed to have reintegrated over 6000 insurgents.

In September 2005, Karzai also requested the delisting from the sanctions list established by the UN Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999) of 20 ex-Taliban leaders who, according to him, either renounced violence or accepted peace through the aforementioned programs of the government. However, Russia did not accept the delisting of names. Like

the early US policy of non-negotiation with the terrorists, Russia was opposed to outreach efforts. Russia assumed that delisting the Taliban would set a precedent for other terrorist groups and that it would encourage similar insurgents in Central Asia. During this period, some other Western states began secret contacts with the Taliban with the aim of exploring the possibility of negotiations with them. For instance, in July 2005, Germany's intelligence service, *Bundesnachrichtendienst* (BND) arranged a meeting with two mid-level members of the Taliban leadership who were believed to be close to the Quetta *Shura* in Zürich. The BND's aim with regard to this meeting was "to know whether or not the Taliban were prepared to withdraw from al-Qaida's embrace" and to find if there was a moderate and reasonable Taliban inclined towards peace. After 10 weeks of negotiations, these talks failed as the Taliban refused to disassociate themselves from the other terrorist groups such as al-Qaida, and because the Taliban delegation were "unable to prove it was negotiating in the name of Mullah Omar and the Quetta Shura" (Gebauer and Stark 2007).

Likewise, Afghanistan's National *Shura* (parliament) ratified an amnesty bill titled, *The Charter for Compromise and National Reconciliation,* on 31 January 2007.So far, this bill is the only initiative undertaken by the National *Shura* on the peace process. However, the reconciliation committee that the bill proposed was not established. The Charter aimed to provide immunity to those who were suspected of having committed war crimes. This initiative was thus not a genuine peace effort, because it was a reaction to the transitional justice strategy endorsed by the government and an attempt to bypass the strategy.

By late 2007, the rhetoric that "the war cannot be won by military means alone" gained momentum. Foreign troops with tacit agreement from some officials in Afghanistan's government concluded a number of local peace agreements in exchange for territory in the southern province of Helmand. These agreements include the first Musa Qala and Nawzad districts agreements in 2006 and the Girishk district and the second Musa Qala agreements in 2007. Furthermore, Michael Semple, the deputy to the European Union's Special Representative for Afghanistan, managed to speak with high-ranking Taliban leaders in 2007. As Afghanistan's government was not informed and did not have a role in these talks, it expelled Semple from the country (Wormer 2012). Lack of agreement over the mechanism of these agreements and contacts led to distrust between Afghanistan's government and its international partners, eventually culminating in the declaration of these diplomats and some UN officials as *persona non-grata*. With this, the first stage of the peace process in Afghanistan met its end. This stage of the peace process in Afghanistan is marked by chaotic, uncoordinated and disorganised initiatives by both national and international actors.

2. Phase 2: A Two-Pronged Approach: High-level Political Negotiations and Low-Level Reintegration Efforts

The turbulent end of the first phase highlighted two critical issues: Afghanistan's ownership of the peace process, and the need for a military-aligned and civilian-resourced strategy. By early 2008, the governments of Afghanistan and the US agreed on an Afghanistan-owned peace process as well as three principle red-lines: denouncement of violence by the insurgents; respecting the constitutional order; and dismantling of ties with

terrorist groups such as al-Qaida (Keene 2011). These red-lines transformed the earlier US policy of non-negotiation with terrorists into a policy of possible negotiation. The new US administration led by President Barack Obama changed Washington's policy by categorising the Taliban into good and bad Taliban. The need for a two-pronged approach of low-level reintegration and high-level political reconciliation resulted in: (1) the adoption of the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP); (2) the convening of the Consultative Peace *Jirga*; and (3) the establishment of the High Peace Council in 2010.

To institute a comprehensive Afghanistan-led, Afghanistan-owned peace process, the government of Afghanistan initiated the APRP in June 2010. The program included a joint secretariat of the APRP and Provincial Peace and Reintegration Committees (PPRCs). The joint secretariat was composed of the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Rural Development, Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), UNAMA and the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) as members, and was chaired by Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai. At the macro level, the program was mandated with the task of carrying out reintegration with apolitical dimension; and at the provincial level, it was mandated with the task of carrying out public outreach, mediation, and grievance resolution. ISAF also established the Force Reintegration Cell to facilitate ISAF's partnership in the APRP in 2009.

To cultivate professional grievance resolution activists and mediators at both national and provincial levels, the APRP began a training program on monitoring, mediation and grievance resolution. This program was conducted by the Peace Training and Research Organization (PTRO),

formerly known as the Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU). PTRO aimed to train mediators and grievance resolution professionals.

The HPC was established in September 2010, based on the recommendations of the June 2010 Consultative Peace *Jirga*. The Council consists of an executive committee and other six standing committees. The executive committee consists of ten members including the chairperson, three deputy chairpersons, and two women. The primary aim of the Council is to foster a consensus at the national level and carry out political reconciliation.

The other characteristic of this phase is exclusive and contradictory efforts for peace by multiple actors. Some contacts with the Taliban were established by both national and international actors. For instance, in September 2008 and February 2009, Saudi Arabia hosted two rounds of talks between the Taliban and Karzai's brother Qayum Karzai as a representative of Afghanistan's government at the request of the government of Afghanistan. In the first meeting, the last Foreign Minister of the Taliban, Ahmad Wakil Mutawakil, and the Taliban's former Ambassador to Pakistan, Abdul Salam Zaeef, participated; and in the second meeting, Agha Jan Mutassim, Mullah Omar's son-in-law and the former chairperson of the political committee of the Taliban's leadership council, participated (Wormer 2012).

Several rounds of talks were held between Kai Eide, former UN Special Representative to Afghanistan, and high-ranking Taliban leaders including Abdul Latif Mansur (the secretary of the Leadership Council) from the spring of 2009 to January 2010. These contacts broke off as the Pakistani

intelligence services arrested Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar (Mullah Omar's deputy) in Karachi and Latif Mansor in February 2010 (Wormer 2012). Subsequently, in July 2011, an informal round of talks took place between two representatives from the government of Afghanistan, the HPC, and high-ranking Taliban officials, in Dubai. Afghanistan's government agreed to recognise the Taliban as an 'independent party to the conflict' and also requested the UN Security Council to do the same (Safi and Ruttig 2018). After the breakup of contacts following the assassination of HPC Chairperson, Burhanuddin Rabbani, two rounds of talks took place (in Dubai in December 2012, and in Doha in May 2013) between the government of Afghanistan, the Taliban's political commission, and the US, and was mediated by the Norwegian government. At these meetings, the Taliban agreed to have an international third-party mediator and also reiterated their demand to be recognised as a party to the conflict (Safi and Ruttig 2018). Later, in March 2015, Norway invited three Taliban leaders and a group of representatives of the Afghanistan government for a seminar on the importance of ceasefire in Oslo (The Foreigner 2015).

Simultaneously, Germany began mediating between the Taliban, the US, and the government of Afghanistan. A round of talks took place between Germany's BND and Tayeb Agha (Mullah Omar's former personal secretary) in Doha in early 2010. Two other follow up talks took place in Munich in November 2010 and May 2011, between Agha, German representatives, and diplomats and intelligence personnel from the US. The outcome of these talks was the agreement on the establishment of a liaison office for the Taliban in Qatar in June 2013 (Wormer 2012). The diplomatic failure following the Taliban's hoisting of the group's flag over its liaison

office in Qatar in 2013 led to further mistrust between the government of Afghanistan and the US. The Karzai government considered the hoisting of the Taliban flag as the violation of Afghanistan's sovereignty (Spanta 2017). Subsequently, as of 3 February 2014, the *New York Times* reported that Karzai had initiated his own direct secret contacts with the Taliban, which did not result in any positive breakthrough.

Parallel to these efforts, some initiatives and proposals by NGOs have also been explored. These include Track-2 and Track-1.5 processes as well as training and trust-building measures. While the Taliban has not presented their political programme in a categorically articulated manner and in written form, the Track-2 and Track-1.5 meetings have provided more knowledge and information about their stances and demands. In addition to formal statements by their spokespersons and publications, the Taliban has expressed its viewpoints in these exploratory talks. For instance, the statements of the Taliban representative at the Chantilly meeting has been noted by some researchers for elaborating the Taliban's stance on several issues such as their take on the political system, election, women's rights, etc. Such initiatives undertaken over the past couple of years include:

(1) The June 2012 Kyoto "academic conference" hosted by the Graduate School of Global Studies at Doshisha University: Members of the Taliban's political commission and Afghanistan's HPC attended this meeting.

(2) The Chantilly Track-1.5 Meeting: On 20–21 December 2012, *Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique* (the Foundation for Strategic Research), a Paris-based research centre, organised an informal interaction titled 'intra-Afghan consultations', between

Taliban members, HPC representatives, pro-government figures, leaders of the 'political opposition', and three female parliamentarians, with the support of the French government. The Taliban presented their stance on various issues as a speech at an academic conference in France (Ruttig 2012).

(3) Pugwash Track-2 Talks: Since 2012, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs has organised a series of Track-2 meetings on Afghanistan between different parties (Pugwash 2018).

(4) Peace Training and Research Organization (PTRO) trained mediators for the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP) to do mediation for resolving the conflicts at provincial level.

(5) The Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies (CAPS) provided legal services to suspected terrorists detained in the Pul-e Charki and Bagram prisons. This program was titled 'Trust Building Measures and Paving Road for Dialogue'.

This phase of the peace process also ended in the failure of both the APRP's low-level reintegration program as well as the high-level effort for direct negotiations with the Taliban. For example, the APRP program was suspended in 2016. Writing about the phase, Lisa Schirch (2011, 3) concluded that:

> Current negotiations to end the war in Afghanistan fail to build on lessons learned from peace processes in other countries. Exclusion of key stakeholders, especially diverse sectors of civil society, and exclusion of key issues underlying the current conflict create a recipe for failure. In addition, the exclusive focus on either top-down negotiation

> between armed groups or bottom-up reintegration based on financial incentives is insufficient.

To conclude, while the government of Afghanistan drafted some programmes such as APRP and attempted to foster consensus on the peace process through a Consultative Peace Jirga, the peace process at this stage was characterised by multiple contradictory and uncoordinated measure by different actors.

3. Phase 3: A Hasty Rush for a Political Deal

The third phase of the peace process is characterised by hastiness in the delicate process. In the current phase, the governments of both Afghanistan and the US are aiming for a high-level peace negotiation to achieve a quick settlement.

After the formation of the National Unity Government in 2014, the peace policy of the government of Afghanistan changed. President Ashraf Ghani stated that Afghanistan and Pakistan are in a state of undeclared war, and that therefore, any negotiation should be with the government of Pakistan and not the Taliban. Ghani's direct rapprochement with Pakistan resulted in a round of talks between the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban.

In May 2015, following mediation by Pakistan, Afghanistan's Acting Minister of Defense, Masoom Stanekzai, met with three Taliban members: Abdul Jalil (the Taliban's former deputy foreign minister), M. Hassan Rahmani (the Taliban's former governor for Kandahar and current member of the leadership council), and Abdul Razzaq (the Taliban's former minister of interior) in Urumqi. Later, the Taliban refused to continue with the next

meeting and argued that their Qatar Office was the channel for negotiations. Subsequently, in July 2015, a fresh round of Pakistan-facilitated talks between Taliban representatives and those of the government of Afghanistan took place in Murree, Pakistan. This round of talks has been widely considered as the first round of formal talks between the Taliban and the government of Afghanistan at the highest level. The Taliban delegation was comprised of Abdul Latif Mansor (secretary of the leadership council), M. Abbas Akhund (member of the political commission), and Ibrahim Omari (Haqqani Network founder Jalaluddin Haqqani's brother). The government of Afghanistan was represented by an eight-member delegation comprised of representatives from both sides of the NUG.[10] The US, China and Pakistan participated as observers. This process collapsed soon after when the news of Mullah Omar's death was leaked. However, more than the revelation of Omar's death, it was the disagreement between the Taliban's political office in Doha and the Taliban leadership based in Quetta, over Pakistan's role as a mediator in the talks and the conditions of the talks that played an important role (Osman 2015).

The acceleration of suicide attacks throughout 2015 and early 2016 transformed the government of Afghanistan's policy towards full suppression of terrorism and non-negotiation with them for a short period.[11]

---

[10] Azizullah Din Muhammad, a senior HPC member (who is close to President Ghani); Deputy Foreign Minister, Hekmat Khalil Karzai; the Governor of Parwan, Muhammad Asim, (who is close to CEO Abdullah); the Advisor to the First Deputy CEO, Muhmmad Nateqi (who is close to Muhammed Muhaqeq); Daikundi MP, Assadullah Sadati(who is close to former Second Vice President Muhammad Karim Khalili);HPC's Farhadullah Farhad; and Chief of Staff of Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostum, Faizullah Zaki.

[11] However, Afghanistan's intelligence agency, the National Directorate of Security (NDS), maintained secret contacts with the Taliban. In September and October 2016, another round of secret meetings took place in Qatar between Abdul Manan Akhund (the

The failure of these processes indicates how the hastiness in the attempts to strike a peace deal has little chance to succeed. Lisa Schirch has comprehensively contextualised this scenario. She argues,

> ...rushed peace processes that limit or exclude public participation and interests are more likely to fail than those that build a solid foundation fora sustainable peace. Too often international diplomats seem to throw all of their eggs in one basket with high-level peace negotiations to achieve a quick settlement. When these efforts fail to produce immediate outcomes, the stakeholders return to the battlefield convinced that diplomacy was tried and exhausted (Schirch 2011, 5).

One can observe the same trend with US President Donald Trump's 2017 South Asia Strategy and Ghani's February 2018 peace offer as well. Following Trump's order for a comprehensive review of all strategic options, the US announced a conditions-based military presence in Afghanistan, more pressure on Pakistan, and strategic partnership with India in August 2017. Trump stated that the "fundamental pillar of our new strategy is the integration of all instruments of American power— diplomatic, economic, and military—toward a successful outcome. Someday, after an effective military effort, perhaps it will be possible to have a political settlement that includes elements of the Taliban in

---

brother of former Taliban Chief Mullah Omar), Mohammed Masoom Stanekzai (NDS chief), and a senior US diplomat (Yousafzai, Boona and Rasmussen 2016). Similarly, on 14 January 2018, a group of 15 Taliban members held informal talks with the representatives of the government of Afghanistan and the HPC in Turkey. Maulawi Abdul Rauf (the Taliban's former governor for Khost Province, and the head of the Taliban delegation at the three rounds of informal talks in Turkey) stated that he was representing the Taliban movement in general, excluding those who want negotiations through Americans (Tolonews 2018). On 16 January 2018, the Farsi webpage of the Taliban's *Voice of Jihad* website dismissed reports of the peace talks in Istanbul and refused to admit that the talks took place.

Afghanistan" (The New York Times, 2017). In response to the strategy, on 14 February 2018, the Taliban wrote a "Letter of the Islamic Emirate to the American people!" in which it offered to negotiate with the US. The letter stated that "the Islamic Emirate had asked America from the very beginning to solve her issues with the Islamic Emirate through talk and dialogue" (VoJ 2018a).

Finally, during the February 2018 Kabul Conference, the NUG also offered the Taliban a peace proposal with no preconditions (OP 2018a), to which the Taliban did not respond. As a part of a confidence-building measure, Ghani also declared a unilateral ceasefire from 12–17 June 2018—Eid holidays—and extended it for an additional 10 days. The Taliban only reciprocated to the initial three-day truce during the Eid days.

Frustrated with the duration of war in Afghanistan and fascinated by the June 2018 ceasefire, the US opened up options for a negotiated settlement of the conflict with the Taliban. In less than a year since the US announced its South Asia Strategy, the Trump administration changed its policy towards the Taliban by adopting the policy of direct talks with the Taliban in June 2018 (Mashal and Schmitt 2018). This policy shift came not long after the Taliban's demand for direct negotiation with the US in their February 2018 letter to the American people; Ghani's February 2018 peace offer; and the Eid ceasefire in June 2018. In the light of Washington's new policy, US Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asia, Alice Wells, met the Taliban delegation in Qatar in July 2018 (Donati and Nissenbaum 2018). The Taliban delegation demanded free movement between two provinces as well as participation in the government, by which they probably meant power-sharing. On the other side, the US's demand

was the Taliban's acceptance of its military bases in Afghanistan (Ahmad and Sediqi 2018). The current development is the fruits of a series of unoffical efforts and by two retired officials of the US: Former Assistant Secretary for South Asia, Robin Raphel; and Chris Kolenda, a veteran who served in Afghanistan (Ackerman 2018). Finally, on 21 September 2018, the US Department of State appointed Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad as the 'Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation' to lead US efforts on Afghanistan's peace process. Khalilzad asked both the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban to introduce their negotiating team. He carried out a round of talks with the Taliban delegation in Qatar office. As a result of Khailizad efforts Pakistan released Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar. Later the Taliban appointed five senior leaders of the group who were released from Guantanamo in 2014 to Qatar office. These include Mohammed Fazl, former Taliban army chief; Khairullah Khairkhwa, former governor of Herat province; Norullah Nori, deputy intelligence chief Mullah, and Nabi Omari, a governor and telecommunications chief.

So far, it is clear that hasty measures to sign an agreement with the Taliban do not result in any positive tangible outcome. Several of the aforementioned proposals, initiatives, and platforms have been exclusionary and non-comprehensive. Consequently, they not only failed to result in substantive talks between the parties to the conflict but also failed to foster a consensus regarding the themes, procedures, parties, mediators and representatives for the negotiation process. Prominent outcomes of much of the aforementioned initiatives have been some exploratory talks and abortive confidence-building efforts. There are critical issues with regard to inclusivity and transparency of the process. In

addition to a political settlement at the high level, the multi-layered and complex conflict also requires mid-level public consultations, community-level dialogues and a consensus among political elites. The efforts, instead, should be towards constructing a comprehensive peace process.

Divergent Models of Peace

Unlike what has been claimed, there is a certain level of dissension among different constituencies in Afghanistan with regard to peace process and political settlement. As mentioned earlier, although there is a consensus on the necessity of a political process to end the conflict in Afghanistan, disagreements remain on the route to achieving peace. The differences of opinions have reflected both in the multiplicity of peace modalities as well as the views regarding the nature of the Taliban. In addition to Ghani's February 2018 peace proposal, the divergent proposal on peace models could be classified into four approaches contextualised below:

Power-Sharing approach: This approach proposes a power-sharing arrangement to include the Taliban in the central government. Karzai offered high-level central government positions to the Taliban during his tenure (NBC 2007). While Karzai offered Taliban positions in the central government, he was against sharing power at the provincial level in the southern provinces. Rangin Dadfar Spanta, National Security Advisor to Karzai, in his memoir, quotes the Karzai's peace plan in a tripartite negotiation with UK and Pakistan in 2013 as: "what can we do to provide an opportunity to the Taliban to participate in the elections. We cannot grant autonomy to the Taliban inside Afghanistan. However, as we have

appointed governors from other political parties, we can have from the Taliban as well. We can appoint their members in the government and the judiciary. The chief justice position is vacant; we can introduce one of their members to this position" (Karzai as quoted in Spanta 2017, 717). A possible reason why Karzai rejected ceding southern provinces such as Kandahar, Helmand or Uruzgan to the Taliban (comprised mainly of Panjpai Durranis and Ghilzais) is that such step would have weakened the power of Karzai's tribal confederacy, the Zeeraks, in these provinces.

Peace in exchange for territory for the Taliban: this approach has been presented by different and conflicting political elites: notorious jihadist, Gulbudin Hekmatyar, and a federalist politician, Abdul Latif Pedram. Presenting his proposal in an interview with *The New York Times* on 4 March 2018, Hekmatyar stated that a local autonomy should be granted to the Taliban in certain regions/provinces under the title of "secure regions." According to him, while these regions remain an integral part of Afghanistan, the Afghan National Army should withdraw from them. However, Pedram has argued that any form of cession of regions to the Taliban should be through a constitutional federal order, for otherwise it will lead to a fragmentation of Afghanistan. In two separate interviews (with *BBC Persian* on 15 August 2009 and with *Sputnik Afghanistan* on 31 July 2018), Pedram argued that the Taliban should not 'surrender' to the state and that they could instead be accommodated in a federal order through negotiations. According to him, the Taliban represents a fundamental ethno-cultural difference in Afghanistan which could only be accommodated in a constitutional federal order. If people in the Taliban strongholds, i.e.in the southern region, elect the Taliban as their

administrators, that should be accepted. Nazif Shahrani also presents the same solution as a non-Pashtun perspective to peace in Afghanistan.

> If strategies to address violence in Afghanistan are to gain sustainable traction, they need to acknowledge and account for northern resistance to Pashtun influence and its association with both Kabul and external intervention. A priority from this perspective is to revise commitments to centralised authority enshrined in the 2004 constitution in favour of devolved decision-making to regional institutions (Shahrani 2018, 41).

Peace in exchange for recognition of rights and democracy: proposed by some Tajik political elites, this approach argues that the Taliban could be negotiated with and reintegrated via the same procedure that other militant parties were reintegrated in the post-2001 period. This includes the same Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program applied on the Jamiat-e Islami, Wahdat-e Islami and Junbish-e MilliIslami parties in post-2001. However, the Taliban can remain as a political force under the constitution. The fundamental principle of this approach is the point that the Taliban should accept democracy, fundamental rights of citizens, and the constitutional order. This approach also prescribes that military force should be used against them until they accept this roadmap (Saleh 2014, 190–191).

Reconfiguration of Democratic Political Order: The Taliban's model of peace is fundamentally different from the aforementioned models. As an ideological movement, the Taliban aspire for the establishment of a "pure Islamic government" as it was recently reiterated in their statement at the end of June 2018 ceasefire (VoJ 2018b). For this purpose, the Taliban does not want to accept political accommodation under the current political

order. Instead, it wants "to replace the current system" (Osman 2018, 6). They have also rejected the Gulbuddin Hekmatyar peace agreement as a model of peace (Osman 2018, 24). The Taliban's model is a two-step model. First, negotiate with international forces. Second, reconfigure the entire post-2001 political order and the current constitution to establish a Sharia-based government (Osman and Gopal 2016). The Taliban members have stated "that even after a political settlement the Taliban would remain an armed group for a long time" (Osman 2018, 6; Farid 2018, 7). This stance of the Taliban has been reiterated by a number of political elites in Kabul as well. While there are less sympathetic sentiments among Persian-speakers and non-Pashtun groups about the Taliban, one can observe contrary sentiments among the Pashtun elites. These "Kabul-based Taliban apologists" are called "necktie-wearing Taliban" (Moradian 2016). This approach considers the Taliban as victims.

To conclude, it is clear that the so-called consensus on peace process does not exist. Women, religious minorities, and democratic constituencies of Afghanistan want peace but not at the cost of compromising their fundamental rights, liberties and a democratic multicultural accommodative Afghanistan. The ethno-nationalists want peace but not at the cost of their majoritarianism. The Taliban want peace but not at the cost of their desired 'Islamic Emirate' and their disarmament. The Great Powers and Regional Powers want peace but not at the cost of compromising their geopolitical interests.

Chapter Two

Level of Awareness on the Peace Process

The study examined the citizens' awareness on four aspects: Awareness on the overall peace process; Awareness on the conditions laid down by the Taliban; Awareness on the conditions laid down by the government of Afghanistan; and Awareness on the US's South Asia Strategy. This is a self-assertion level of analysis. The respondents were asked directly about the extent to which they were aware of the respective issues. Contrary to the common perception in Afghanistan that the people of Afghanistan are politics-oriented and that they have high levels of awareness about the political changes, this study found that 51.6% of the people have little awareness and 14.5% have no awareness on the important issues with regard to Afghanistan's peace process. Only 33.9% of the respondents said they had knowledge about the current peace process (See Table 5). By gender, women, and by nationality, the Persian-speaking communities such as Tajiks and Hazaras had less awareness on the stated issues. Male respondents were more aware of peace talks with the Taliban. For instance, 39.6% of the male respondents reported high awareness on the peace process compared to 26.4% female respondents (See Table 6). Similarly, Uzbeks, Pashtuns, and Tajiks claimed high awareness (49.5%, 38.5% and 31.3% respectively) compared to Hazaras (18.8%) (Table 7). This relationship held after controlling for education and gender except for Tajiks. When controlled for education, it was found that Tajiks did not have a significant relationship with awareness. The level of awareness elevates by the increase in the level of education of the people. Regression analysis

findings suggest that females, respondents in the Central zone, and less educated, were more likely to report less awareness of the peace process. Meanwhile, males, respondents in the East zone, and more educated, were more likely to report more awareness (Table 111). The more educated people were, the more they claimed to be aware of the peace process (See Figure 4). A comparative analysis of the level of awareness of the people on the peace process between the current phase and two years ago shows that the level of awareness of the people has declined compared to 2016– AISS' 2016 survey had found that only 9% of the people said they do not follow the issue about peace (Karimi and Ebrahimi 2016).

Secondly, the level of awareness of the citizens with regard to the positions/conditions of the Taliban was also low. Around 44.1% of the people reported that they were not aware of the Taliban's conditions for peace (Table 8). As in the previous case, awareness among females was lower than among males. For instance, nearly 20.8% of the females (as compared to 30.4% of males) reported being aware of the Taliban's conditions (Table 9). In terms of nationality, Pashtuns were significantly (32.4%) more likely to report awareness of the Taliban's conditions for peace, compared to Uzbeks (25.9%), Tajiks (23.2%) and Hazaras (15.8%) (Table 10).

The Taliban has put forth several conditions for peace in Afghanistan. During the December 2001 Shah Walikot talks with Hamid Karzai, they demanded amnesty for their leaders. Subsequently in 2007, during the secret talks in Zurich between Germany's intelligence service (BND) and two Taliban representatives, the latter demanded recognition as a political front in Afghanistan on the lines of the recognition given to the

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). During the September 2008 and February 2009 talks between the government's representatives and the Taliban in Saudi Arabia, the Taliban discussed the issue of power-sharing. However, overall, they laid down two conditions in exchange for ending their armed struggle: withdrawal of international forces; and the establishment of an Islamic government with Sharia rule (Wormer 2012). The findings of this study indicate that 26% of the people thought the withdrawal of foreign forces; 16.8% thought having a share in the central government; and 16.1% thought the amendment of the constitution based on Sharia law were the Taliban's conditions for ending their armed conflict (Table 11).

Thirdly, compared to the two earlier issues, the level of awareness is slightly higher on the matter of the government of Afghanistan's conditions regarding peace. For instance, 37.7% of the people said yes as compared to 34% saying no awareness (Table 12). In terms of ethno-national groups, the awareness was highest among Pashtuns (almost 48%), and lowest among Hazaras (almost 27%) (Table 13).

Prior to recent direct US contacts with the Taliban, the international community and the government of Afghanistan had three fundamental conditions for peace with the Taliban: discarding their relations with al-Qaida and other terrorist groups; laying down their arms; and accepting the constitutional order of Afghanistan, which has been the basis of political developments in the last couple of years. While President Ghani made an unconditional peace offer to the Taliban, the proposal highlighted four points (OP 2018a):

a. Ensuring rights and duties of all citizens, particularly those of women, based on the constitution;

b. Accepting Afghanistan's constitution, including its own provisions for amendments;

c. Ensuring activities of the civil services and the security and defence forces based on the law and;

d. Dismantling any armed group which is linked with foreign terrorist networks and foreign destructive organizations.

However, it is unclear whether the aforementioned points are preconditions or end conditions for the peace talks, and public awareness on the government of Afghanistan's conditions reflect the same: 44.2% said accepting the constitution of Afghanistan; 38.6% said terminating Taliban's relations with Pakistan; 37.4% said ending anti-government activities; and 35.9% said terminating relations with the al-Qaida and other terrorist groups (Table 14).

Fourthly, given how the US is a party in the conflict in Afghanistan, this study made an attempt to understand the level of awareness among the people on the US's South Asia Strategy. The findings suggest that the respondents were less aware of the US strategy. Over half the respondents (53.9%) reported that they were unaware of the US's South Asia Strategy (Table 15). Tajiks and Hazaras were less aware of the US's South Asia Strategy (Table 16). Multivariate analysis also demonstrates that the association was strong after controlling for demographic and other attitudinal factors. By gender, male respondents were significantly more likely to report awareness on the strategy compared to female respondents (27.8% males vs. 12.0% female) (Table 15). The relationship held even

after using multivariate analysis and controlling other demographic factors like age, education, ethno-nationality, and income.

The low frequency of knowledge and information among the citizens—on the overall peace process, decisions and policies of the governments of Afghanistan and the US, and conditions of the Taliban—indicates that the dominant political culture of the people in Afghanistan is a parochial political culture. Given the traditional structure of society in Afghanistan, the low levels of awareness about national issues such as the peace process, especially amongst the women, is understandable. The high level of awareness among the people in the east of the country indicates that President Ghani's tribal confederation, the Ghilzai Pashtuns, members of which are based mainly in the east of the country, have a close association with and keenly follow national politics.

Chapter Three

People's Perception of the Taliban

Character of the Taliban

16 years after the re-emergence of the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, the understanding and knowledge of the nature and character of the Taliban are contested and ambiguous. Two different perspectives prevail regarding the structure of the Taliban. The first perspective characterises the Taliban as a 'government-in-waiting' that possesses a sophisticated and elaborated parallel governance structure. According to this perspective, the shadow government of the Taliban comprises provincial governors, military and civilian commission and district bodies (Figure 1). This perspective argues that the Taliban has fundamentally transformed from a 'scrappy insurgency' into an 'armed political movement' and finally to a coherent and organised shadow government. Two stages could be identified in this transformation. First, although the Taliban insurgency re-emerged in 2003, the first transformation took place around 2006 when commissions governing the Taliban's military, financial and cultural affairs were established and the military positions slowly become "civilianized," as they were directed by civilian leaders of the Taliban. At this stage, the Taliban came up with their first *Layha*, the code of conduct to bring order in their rank and file. Second, as the Taliban gained more territory, by 2009 and 2010, they updated the *Layha* with more rules on the governance structures and accountability of their foot soldiers (for more information on *Layha*, See Johnson 2017). This stage coincided with Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour's ascendance to power as a *de facto* leader in 2010 after the arrest

of Mullah Baradar. It is argued that Mansour transformed the Taliban both ideologically and structurally. According to Ashley Jackson, by enhancing the authorities of the governing commissions and centralising finance, Mansour re-moulded the movement into a 'government-in-waiting' (Jackson 2018: 9). The June 2018 ceasefire was not only indicative of the command and control in the Taliban ranks but also demonstrated the "scrappy insurgency of the Taliban" (Jackson 2018, 9).

Figure 1 The Taliban governance structure (Source: Jackson 2018, 12)

The second perspective claims that like many other insurgent groups, the Taliban of post-2001 is a fragmented, mainly decentralised and network-based terrorist organisation. The fragmentation of the Taliban is a manifestation of internal disputes and disagreements. The two main instances demonstrating fragmentation are: the Miran Shah *Shura*'s disobedience towards the Quetta *Shura* in 2007; and the Peshawar *Shura*'s

2009 declaration of independence (Ahmad 2018). Such disagreements have manifested themselves in the following forms:

1. Dispute over membership and composition of the central leadership in the Quetta *Shura* among different Pashtun tribes
2. Establishment of different and parallel bodies of governance and control
3. Establishment of independent relations with other insurgent groups like the 'Islamic State' 'Khurasan Province' (ISKP)
4. Disagreements over negotiations with Kabul

After the revelation and subsequent acceptance of Taliban Chief Mullah Omar's death in 2015, disputes and disagreements among the Taliban leadership intensified. On 31 July 2015, the Taliban's website announced their new leadership team. Following new appointments and accommodation of disaffected factions, the two *Shura*s—the Miran Shah *Shura* under control of the Haqqani Network and the Peshawar *Shura*—re-joined the Quetta leadership. The same year, Sirajuddin Haqqani was promised the position of the Taliban chief's deputy. The Peshawar *Shura* too reconciled as a result of financial challenges in 2016 (Ahmad 2018).

Figure 2 The Taliban structure after revelation of Mullah Omar's death, July 2015

Figure 3 The Taliban structure since May 2016

After Mansour's death in a US airstrike in 2016, the struggle for power and monopoly of the leadership *Shura* was ongoing between the new leaders, Haibatullah Akhunzada, Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour's cousin Obaidullah Ishaqzai, and his deputy Sirajuddin Haqqani. On the other hand, Mullah Abdul Rassoul disintegrated from the Quetta *Shura* as a result of the fight over succession in November 2015. Rassoul established his own High Council of the Islamic Emirate, which accounts for 10% of the total number of the Taliban (Giustozzi 2017). Similarly, the Peshawar *Shura* too underwent a split by the end of 2017 as the Northern *Shura* disintegrated from it. However, a number of these factions were splinter groups funded by the government of Afghanistan. For instance, the Mullah Rassoul faction has received assistance from the government (Donati and Totakhil 2016). The efforts are part of Kabul's gambit to bring certain factions into the peace process.

Table 1 Regional factions of the Taliban

No	Name of *Shura*	Founder	Successor
1	Quetta *Shura* (Rahbari *Shura*)	Mullah Omar, Ihsanullah Rahimi, Gul Agha Ishaqzai Abdul Ghani Baradar	Akhtar Mohammad Mansur (July 2015) Haibatullah Akhunzada (May 2016)
2	Miran Shah *Shura*	Jalaluddin Haqqani	Sirajuddin Haqqani (from 2007)
3	Peshawar *Shura*	Qari Atiqullah	
4	Mashad *Shura*		
5	*Shura* of the North		
6	Rasool *Shura*	Mullah Abdul Rassoul	

(Source: Giustozzi 2017)

In January 2018, Akhundzada carried out a reshuffle and made new appointments to the central leadership as well as to the subordinate levels, all of whom were from Pashtun tribes. The reshuffle was a result of the power struggle among different factions and tribes. Consequently, seven shadow governors were introduced for seven provinces of Afghanistan (Yousafzai 2018): Haji Yousef for Ghazni; Abdullah Malakhel for Zabul; Sherin Akhund (a former Taliban intelligence chief) for Kandahar; Muhammad Zahid Akhund for Uruzgan; Naji Nusrat Lalaas for Daikundi; Maulvi Muneeb for Herat; and Muhammad Ayub Badghis for Badghis.

Similarly, new appointments in the commissions include: Hamidullah Akhundzada as the head of the intelligence commission; Haji Najib (a former Taliban minister of justice), as the deputy head of intelligence for the southern zone; Sheikh Nida Muhammad as the deputy head of intelligence for the eastern zone; Maulvi Basir as the chief of the preaching and recruitment commission; Abdul Rahman as the head of prisons and ransom commission; Daud Muzzamil as the first deputy to the

Taliban military Chief, Sadar Ibrahim; and Haji Farooq as the second deputy to the Taliban Military Chief, Sadar Ibrahim.

Seth Jones claims that "overall, approximately 80 percent of the Taliban's top 50 leaders are Pashtuns" (Jones 2018). For instance, Taliban Chief Haibatullah Akhunzada is a Noorzai from Kandahar. Senior leaders such as Sirajuddin Haqqani, Mohammad Yaqub, Abdul Qayyum Zakir, Ahmadullah Nanai, Abdul Latif Mansur, and Noor Mohammad Saqib are from Zadran (Karlanri), Hotak (Ghilzai), Alizai (Panjpai), Ishaqzai (Panjpai), Andar (Ghilzai), Tarakhel Ahmadzai (Ghilzai) Pashto speaking tribes respectively. Barring the Haqqanis, who are from the Karlanri tribal branch, the others are all Panjpai Durrani or Ghilzai Pashtuns;[12] and there are no Zeerak Durranis in the leadership. The Taliban leadership structure is an alliance of Ghilzais and Panjpais–the Pashtun tribes that were not part of the power structure under the Musahiban dynasty (1930-1978) and did not get government jobs or Western education. The tribal affiliations and cleavages among the members of the leadership reveal a lot about the resurgence of the Taliban over the past two decades. In an interview, an aide of the National Security Council of Afghanistan said that one reason for the re-emergence of the Taliban in the post-2001 period has been the inter-tribal feud between the traditionally dominant Zeerak tribes and the marginalized Panjpais. With the ascent of Hamid Karzai (who belongs to the Popalzai tribe of the Zeerak confederacy of Durrani Pashtuns) as the country's president and the ascent of his allies at the provincial level power

---

[12]Anthropologists have characterised Pashtuns as a segmentary descent group who are organised into four different clans: Durrani, Ghilzai, Ghurghusht, and Karlanri. The Durranis are further divided into two branches: Zeerak and Panjpai. Similarly, the other three clans are further segmented into smaller tribes (See Barfield 2010, 25).

structures in the south, the Panjpai tribes faced marginalisation and tribal subjugation. Charged with grievances of marginalisation, a section of the disaffected people re-grouped as the Taliban in the post-2001 period. Hence, part of the Taliban puzzle is an inter-tribal feud among the Pashtuns. However, as the Taliban expanded to Afghanistan's northern and northeastern regions, members from the few other ethno-national groups too joined at the lower ranks of Taliban due to different reasons (Ahmad 2018).

There is a discursive shift regarding the understanding of the character of the Taliban. The dominant discourse in the years of the fall of the Taliban in 2001 was that the group is a terrorist organisation in character as well as by its linkages with al-Qaida. A 2002 US executive order has categorised the Taliban as a 'Specially Designated Global Terrorist Entity'. Subsequently, a Congressional law stated that the Taliban shall be considered as a terrorist group for immigration purposes (Farivar 2017). The domestic and regional sympathisers of the Taliban did much to challenge this discourse. For instance, in 2007, Pakistan's then President Pervez Musharraf claimed that the Taliban were not terrorists. The Taliban has also focused its efforts towards gaining recognition as a political force in Afghanistan. During secret talks with representatives of Germany's BND, the Taliban delegates demanded political recognition similar to that given to Yasser Arafat, the head of PLO (Gebauer and Stark 2007). On the other hand, under President Barack Obama, the US policy did not consider the Taliban as a 'terrorist' group. Instead, by differentiating the Taliban from the Islamic State, it perceived the Taliban as 'armed insurgents' (Koskinas 2015). Currently, although the Haqqani Network and the Tehrik-

e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) are designated as terrorist groups in the US Department of State's Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) list, the main Taliban group is not designated as such. Instead, former Commander in Chief of US forces in Afghanistan, General John Nicolson, referred to the Taliban as 'an enabler of terrorists' (Farivar 2017).

While President Karzai referred to them as 'dissatisfied brothers', the incumbent NUG has an ambiguous policy with regard to how it characterises the Taliban. Moreover, there is a substantial difference in the contents of press releases issued by the Office of the President of Afghanistan in English and Farsi. While the Farsi press releases do not refer to the term 'the Taliban' at all in many cases, the English ones do.[13] There is a multiplicity of terms the NUG has employed to refer to the Taliban. These include terrorists, 'enemies of humanity and Islam', 'enemies of people of Afghanistan', and 'enemies of peace and stability'. Less than a month after the NUG administration took charge, President Ghani referred to the Taliban as a 'political opposition' in his 15 October 2014 speech. He reiterated the same title for the Taliban during the Heart of Asia Summit in China on 31 October 2014. However, Afghanistan's CEO Abdullah emphasised that there should be a clear understanding of the notion of enemy and friends as well as from the threats to national security.

---

[13] For instance, the English press release issued on 28 January 2018 states that, "Enemies of humanity and Islam –the Taliban, Haqqani Network, Daesh and their sponsors – devastated the lives of hundreds of innocent Afghans in the last few days, conducting brutal terrorist activities in Kabul, Jalalabad and Kandahar." However, the Farsi version of the same press release does not name the Taliban or Daesh, and instead merely uses the term 'terrorists'

طی روزهای اخیر تروریستان با انجام حملات جنایتکارانه در کابل و ولایات ننگرهار و کندهار، شماری از '
هموطنان ما را شهید و زخمی کردند و مردم ما را به گلیم غم و ماتم نشاندند. ' (OP, 2018b, 2018c)

When the respondents were asked about 'the appropriate description for the Taliban', almost half the people (44% of the respondents) viewed the Taliban unfavourably and referred to them using negative terms such as: enemies of Afghanistan (17.9%), terrorists (13.0%) and mercenaries (13.3%). The term '*Mujahideen*'—used by the Taliban to refer to themselves—enjoys very little popularity among people. Merely 3.1% of the people recognised the Taliban as *Mujahideen* (Figure 5). However, compared to 2016, support has increased for the title, 'dissatisfied brothers', which is used to refer to the Taliban. In 2016, only 10% of the people called the Taliban 'dissatisfied brothers' (Karimi and Ebrahimi 2016), but that number has increased to 22.8% (Figure 5). Additionally, compared to male respondents, female respondents demonstrated a significantly higher tendency to refer to the Taliban as terrorists and enemies of Afghanistan (Figure 7). In terms of nationality, we observed that fewer Pashtuns (6.4%) called the Taliban terrorists, whereas nearly 58.1% of non-Pashtun respondents (27% Hazaras, 16% Uzbeks and 15.1% Tajiks) referred to them as terrorists. More than one-third of the Pashtuns interviewed referred to the Taliban as dissatisfied brothers (almost 36.2%) and political opposition (almost 28%) (Table 17). After controlling for education and gender, the relationship still held, but only for Pashtuns and Hazaras. This suggests that Hazaras were more likely to say the Taliban were terrorists and Pashtuns were less likely to call the Taliban terrorists. Furthermore, the more educated the respondents were, the higher the likelihood was of them referring to the Taliban as terrorists.

These descriptions for Taliban are important for several reasons. First, it helps us understand the character of the Taliban from the people's

perspective. Second, through these characterisations, we can understand the levels of legitimacy the Taliban enjoy in the eyes of the public. For instance, while the Taliban characterise themselves as *Mujahideen* to gain an Islamic legitimacy, very few people recognise them by the same character. Multivariate regression analysis controlled for factors like demographics and attitudinal also suggests that respondents who reported that the Taliban's behaviour and policies as acceptable were more likely to say that they were *Mujahideen* and less likely to say they were enemies of Afghanistan (Table 18; Figure 6). Lastly, these findings contribute tremendously towards framing policies to engage the Taliban both via the peace process and via counter-insurgency strategies.

Since the emergence of the ISKP (also referred to as Daesh) in Afghanistan in 2015, scholars and policy experts have tried to understand the ideological and organisational linkages between the Taliban and the ISKP. While some view the integrity of Daesh in Afghanistan as a fake phenomenon (Saleh 2018; Moosakhil 2015), scholars like Antonio Giustozzi have provided a nuanced analysis of the emergence of ISKP and its relationship with the Taliban. According to Giustozzi, the Peshawar and Miran Shah *shura*s have good relations with ISKP, whereas the Quetta *Shura* has rejected it. At some junctures, "the leader of Quetta Shura, Akhtar Mohammad Mansur, briefly allied with IS-K against its enemy Mansur Dadullah" (Giustozzi 2017). Moreover, throughout the 2014–17 period, thousands of Taliban commanders, foot soldiers, and cadres from the Peshawar *Shura*, Haqqani Network and other splinter groups left their groups and joined the ISKP. The sense of closeness between some factions of the Taliban such as the Haqqani Network and switch in the loyalty of

many of the Taliban members to ISKP indicates that the Taliban and ISKP are not distinct from each other in terms of ideological inclination—political Islam. Public perception too supports this hypothesis. When it comes to comparison of the Taliban with ISKP, more than one-third of respondents (39.9%) viewed both the Taliban and ISKP as terrorist groups (Table 19). While most of the non-Pashtuns perceived both the Taliban and ISKP as terrorists (47.3% Hazaras, 45.1% Uzbeks, and 42.0% Tajiks), compared to the other nationalities, slightly more Pashtuns (27%) perceived the ISKP as a more radical group than the Taliban. Similarly, compared to other ethnicities, nearly one-third of the Pashtuns (31%) perceived the ISKP more as an international organisation than the Taliban (Table 20).

These findings provide more clarity and thus contribute to a better understanding of the nature of security threats in Afghanistan. It is also important to note that over one-third of the respondents (39.9%) opined that while the Taliban and ISKP are not the same, both are terrorists.

Popularity of the Taliban

A sizeable chunk of existing literature on the Taliban emphasises the Taliban's popularity based on their quasi-government and judiciary system. It is argued that the corruption in the government has allowed the Taliban to address the judicial demands/requirements of the people. However, recent literature on the Taliban challenges the traditional notion and understanding of the Taliban's mode of governance. Ashley Jackson, in her recent study on the Taliban shadow government, claims that post-2016, the Taliban's strategy changed from capturing provinces and cities to a 'creeping influence'. Knowing the labour and resource costs of capturing

the cities, the Taliban prioritised control over people instead of control of the territories. She argues that,

> ...they use governance to keep the population at least marginally satisfied, and this, in combination with their coercive power, helps secure the population in areas under their influence or control. As such, the provision of public goods and strict regulations on personal behaviour are driven by ideology, but are also designed to control the population (Jackson 2018, 25).

Similarly, Barnett Rubin also argues that

> ...the effectiveness of the Taliban's limited institutions and the ruthlessness of their retribution against "collaborators" neutralized much of the Afghan population…there is now a parallel Taliban state, and locals are increasingly turning to Taliban run courts, which are seen as more effective and fair than the corrupt official system (Rubin 2007, 60).

Despite the Taliban's strategy to control people and to keep them 'marginally satisfied', the findings of the current study demonstrate that the Taliban's popularity among the people is low. The Taliban's policies and conduct are not acceptable to the absolute majority (90%) of the people (none 58.2%; very little 15.7%; and little 16.0%) (Table 21). In this case, the level of the unacceptability of the Taliban's conduct has remained relatively the same as 2016 (Karimi and Ebrahimi, 2016). At a consistent level, the majority of the people (73.2%) also assumed that the Taliban will be unable to govern effectively in case they succeed in the war (Table 24). In a bivariate analysis, the study found that attainment of education has an impact on people's perceptions with regard to the Taliban's ability to govern Afghanistan. The lesser education people had, the more they believed that the Taliban can govern Afghanistan. Given the Taliban's traditional background and their religious basis, people who attained

seminary education demonstrated a higher propensity to opine that the Taliban are able to govern (Table 25). However, this relationship did not hold when other variables were controlled.

Jackson also argues that reality is complex as people in the rural areas view the application of traditional and Islamic law as acceptable only in civil cases rather than the criminal and military justice cases. However, the Taliban courts' judgments are seen as arbitrary and extreme (Jackson 2018, 20). If the level of people's support to the Taliban is less, it is important to find out where the Taliban get their social support from. This study found that the degree of the popularity of the Taliban is higher in the South and East of the country (Table 22). Similarly, those who believed that the Taliban are *Mujahideen* or 'dissatisfied brothers' were more likely to say that their conduct and policies are were acceptable, as compared to respondents who referred to the Taliban as enemies of Afghanistan. For instance, 15.9% of those who reported that the Taliban are *Mujahideen* stated that their behaviour was acceptable, compared to merely 1.1% of all those who referred to the Taliban as Afghanistan's enemy (Table 23). The relationship was robust even after controlling for variables like age, gender, income, and level of education.

Additionally, the lesser the popularity of the Taliban was among the respondents, lesser the likelihood was of them accepting the Taliban's conditions for peace. Over one-third (39.8%) rejected the Taliban's conditions for peace (Table 26). The percentage was more among females, Hazaras, and Tajiks (45.5%, 49.0% and 44.1% respectively) (Table 27). After controlling for education, the gender factor held significantly, but ethnicity did not. Interestingly, only those respondents who were satisfied

with the HPC's work were more likely to say that they accept the Taliban's conditions for peace (Table 28). The issue of HPC is discussed in detail in the next section.

If the Taliban does not enjoy popularity among the people; their policies and conduct are not acceptable for a majority of the people; and if the people feel the Taliban will be unable to govern the country, then it is evident that the Taliban is not a popular national movement in the country. The international community and the government should, therefore, be sensitive to what they promise to the Taliban during the peace negotiations. Any form of agreement with the Taliban should satisfy the general sentiments of the people of Afghanistan. For a peace agreement to possess the ability to endure, the general public should be able to feel a sense of the ownership of the deal and its terms.

Chapter Four

Evaluation of the Current Peace Process

This study asked the respondents whether they evaluated the abovementioned efforts for peace a success or a failure. One might argue that judging the results of the peace process might be premature at this stage, given how the efforts are still ongoing. However, to diagnose the current status, it is important to know the fate of past efforts. Public perception perceives the outcome of the past peace processes as a failure. More than 63.3% of the respondents opined that the past efforts failed (Figure 8). In this context, female respondents demonstrated a higher tendency (65.6%) to say that the peace process failed (Table 29). Similarly, Uzbeks (73.3%), Tajiks (70.7%), and Hazaras (73.5%) demonstrated a higher tendency to say that peace efforts have failed, as compared to Pashtuns (49.3%) (Table 30). A multivariate analysis also shows that this association was robust and held after controlling for demographic and attitudinal factors. There is also an association between the perception of those who think the HPC has been ineffective and those who think the peace process has been a failure (Table 32). Conversely, fewer respondents in the eastern and southern provinces (where the Taliban's native homeland and strongholds are located) said the peace process has failed (Table 31). The curve of perception with regard to the failure of the peace process goes up as the level of education increases. The more educated the respondents were, the more they opined that the peace process has failed (Figure 10). Additionally, respondents who said peace is possible were less likely

(61.5%) to assess the peace process as a failure, compared to those who said peace is impossible (75.0%) (Table 33 and Figure 13).

The public views peace efforts as failed for multiple reasons: almost 39% of the respondents perceived the weakness of the government of Afghanistan as a reason for the failure. Additionally, respondents flagged negative interventions of neighbouring countries in the peace efforts (35%); lack of transparency in the peace efforts (32%); and the HPC's ineffectiveness (30%) as the other important reasons for the failure of the peace process (Figure 11). Unlike the claims made by the Taliban, public perception did not consider the presence of international forces in Afghanistan as dominant reason for the failure of peace in Afghanistan. On the contrary, public perception held that the Taliban does not have the intention to make peace (Table 40). This claim has been verified by other studies as well. A June 2018 report by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) explicitly states that the Taliban is not inclined towards "ceasing jihad in return for integration into a system they abhor…the Taliban rank and file are not enthusiastic about peace talks" (Osman 2018, 3).

On the issue of the weakness of the government, the dominant perception (54.0%) flagged the issue of corruption. According to public perception, the lack of and inability to carry out coercive measures against the Taliban (37.8%) and the inability to cultivate a national and international consensus (32.0% and 24.8% respectively) were the other weaknesses of government with regard to the peace process (Table 34). The perception regarding the weakness of the government is directly related to the perception regarding the chances of the Taliban's success in the war. Respondents who said the Taliban stands a chance to succeed in the war

were significantly more likely to say that corruption, inability to foster national consensus, and lack of legitimacy were the government's weaknesses in the peace process (Table 35).

The NUG's selective approach towards corruption, favouritism, the establishment of parallel and overlapping institutions instead of strengthening of existing institutions are the key issue of rampant corruption in the NUG. To overcome the vicious cycle of failure in the peace process with the Taliban, Afghanistan's government must address four main challenges highlighted in the people's perspectives. The first key issue is establishing effective and good governance. Afghanistan requires a functioning state that can provide security and good governance to its people. Sustainability and continuation of the state apparatuses are fundamental to a peace process and for sustaining peace in the country. Peace with the Taliban should not undermine the state structure. Second, it is important to know that if the Taliban does not have the intention to make peace, peace not be purchased by means of appeasement of a violent irreconcilable group, which does not recognise the post-2001 political order and democratic gains. Third, the state should foster and amplify national consensus by ensuring the inclusivity and transparency of the peace process. An inclusive peace process will enhance trust and the sense of ownership on the peace process. Although the NUG attempted to project a degree of consensus, the peace process has remained a monopoly of an exclusionary constituency. Several sections of the people, political parties, and civil society are not genuinely consulted. Lastly, peace attempts should also focus on developing an international consensus. The Great Powers and Regional Powers have different—and in some cases, opposing—

perceptions regarding the security threat from Afghanistan, as well as regarding different formats and initiatives for the peace process in Afghanistan. There are also conflicting proposals on the future of the security arrangement in Afghanistan. An analysis of public perceptions gathered through this study suggests that Afghanistan should take more steps towards multilateralism in order to balance the interests of these actors.

Possibility of Peace with the Taliban

Three important factors must be taken into account while evaluating the possibility of lasting peace with an insurgent group:

a. Whether the insurgent group has a unified command and control structure to deliver on its promises;

b. Whether or not one of the parties to the conflict is exhausted enough to agree for negotiations;

c. Whether or not the parties to the conflict possess the intention to make peace.

There are two different prevailing perspectives in the security studies literature with regard to the first factor. The first perspective holds that as a terrorist group, the Taliban is not an integrated, homogeneous and monolithic organisation. It holds that the Taliban is a network of different terrorist groups with various sources of funding, different levels of radicalism, different techniques of terrorist attacks, and finally, different levels of autonomy from each other. It also holds that the Taliban is not in a position to come for the talks because the group is not cohesive enough to have a unified position and not autonomous from its funding sources. On

the other hand, the offer to establish an office in Kabul is not perceived as a concession by the government and instead as a concession by the Taliban themselves (Giustozzi 2018; Delawar 2018). The failure of the 'Doha track' peace process in 2010 is the best evidence of how a peace process with a terrorist network that does not have cohesion and monolith structure fails (Giustozzi 2017). The Taliban promised to not hoist their flag in the Doha office, but its inability to keep the promise resulted in the failure of the process. That said, post the revelation of former Taliban Chief Mullah Omar's death in July 2015, the Taliban has been divided over the issue of peace with the government of Afghanistan, with some in favour of the peace process and some against it. Baradar, Mansour, and Ishaqzai were in favour of peace talks, whereas the hardliners—Rahimi, Haqqani, and Atiqullah—were against the peace process.

In contrast, the second perspective holds that despite the complicity of the terrorist organisations, negotiation with them is possible (Toros 2008). Following the same logic, some analysts lay trust in the possibility of peace with the Taliban. According to them, the Taliban is a united group, as the Taliban's uniform observance of the ceasefire in June 2018 demonstrated the cohesion of command and control; and that along with the uncertain conditions that exist, there is also a certain hope for peace negotiations. Some observers encourage the US to engage with the Taliban and negotiate with them (Borhan 2018) while the others hold that the Taliban are in a weak position and may agree for talks. For instance,

> in fact, the weaknesses of both the Taliban and the current Afghan government suggest that a stalemate is the most likely outcome for the foreseeable future. Territory may change hands, although probably not

enough to tip the balance in favour of either side. As such, the Taliban's best option now is to pursue a negotiated settlement, since it is unlikely to defeat the Afghan government and its international backers on the battlefield...Faced with such limited prospects, Taliban leaders should begin serious peace negotiations with the Afghan government, something they have been reluctant to do (Jones 2018).

Public perception also does not support the notion that the Taliban has a chance to succeed in the war. Only 7.1% of the respondents believed that the Taliban may succeed in the war (Table 44). This study demonstrates that the few respondents who said the Taliban's policies and behaviours were acceptable were also the ones who believed that the Taliban stands a chance to succeed in the war (Table 45).

On the matter of the possibility of peace with the Taliban, a fundamental issue is that of the intention for peace-making among the parties. This study sought public opinion on the intentions of four parties in the conflict with regard to peace: the Taliban, the government of Afghanistan, the international community, and the people themselves. Public perception held that both the Taliban and the international community do not have the intention to make peace in Afghanistan.

This study shows that half of the respondents (49.7%) were of the opinion that the Taliban does not have the intention to make peace (Table 40). This finding is similar to the findings of other studies such as *Hasht-e-Subh*'s 25 March 2018 survey on the NUG's February 2018 peace offer to the Taliban. The findings of *Hasht-e-Subh's* opinion poll also indicated that 77% of the respondents believed that peace with the Taliban is not possible because the Taliban does not possess the intention to make peace (Delawar

2018). Viewed in the historical context, since their emergence in 1994 and their encounter with both the Burhanuddin Rabbani and Hamid Karzai governments, the Taliban did not settle the conflict in a peaceful manner. Similarly, it has been stated that the Taliban does not have the competence to accept a peace offer as it does not have integrity.

Females compared to males; Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras compared to Pashtuns; and those who were more educated compared to those who were less educated were more likely to say that the Taliban does not have the intention to make peace (Tables 41, 42 and 43). Additionally, controlled for demographic and attitudinal factors, a probit regression analysis suggests that females compared to males; Uzbeks, Tajiks and Hazaras compared to Pashtuns; and those who were more educated compared to those who were less educated were significantly less likely to say that the Taliban has the intention to make peace with the government of Afghanistan.

On the other hand, 42.1% of the respondents were of the opinion that the international community does not have the intention to make peace (Table 36). On the contrary, a majority of the respondents (73.4%) were of the opinion that the government of Afghanistan has the intention to make peace (Table 39). Citing lack of intention in the part of international community—particularly in the US—public perception held that the US wants to achieve its own objectives through conflict in Afghanistan (32.1%), and that making peace in Afghanistan is not the international community's priority (21.7%). However, very few respondents (only 8.1%) said the international community does not make peace with the Taliban because they are a terrorist group (Table 37). There are two possible reasons

for this orientation of the public opinion regarding the international community: first, the US government did not designate the Taliban as terrorist organisation in the State Department Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) list (DOS 2018); and second, the widespread believe in conspiracy theories in Afghanistan such as former President Karzai's anti-Western rhetoric, in which he accused the international community of pursuing hidden agendas in Afghanistan and denying representation of the Taliban in the Bonn Conference 2001 (DWGMF 2018).

This study examined the attitudes of the people in three dimensions: thinking, feeling, and intention. The first dimension was on people's thinking regarding the possibility of reconciliation with the Taliban. Despite the findings of the study—which shows that the Taliban does not enjoy popularity among the people and that several people believe that the Taliban does not intend to make peace—public attitude in terms of 'thinking' supported the possibility of peace with the Taliban by a huge margin (over 80.1%) (Table 46). Women were less likely to opine that peace with the Taliban is possible, as compared to men (Figure 12). Similarly, those who referred to the Taliban using terms like *Mujahideen*, political opposition, and dissatisfied brothers, were significantly more likely (47.6%, 42.2% and 43.5% respectively) to opine that reconciliation with the Taliban is possible, as compared to those who referred to the Taliban using terms such as mercenaries, enemies of Afghanistan, and terrorists (29.1%, 31.5% and 23.9% respectively) (Table 47). Similarly, respondents who said the peace deal with Hezb-e-Islami resulted in a positive impact towards security in their local areas were more likely to indicate that a peace deal with the Taliban is possible (Table 48). Using

OLS regression, the perceptions regarding the possibility of peace with the Taliban was regressed on a set of attitudinal measures/variables, including awareness of the peace process; perceptions regarding the HPC; perceptions regarding the chances of the Taliban's success in war; level of agreement with giving privileges to the Taliban for peace; acceptability of the Taliban's conditions for making peace; whether the Taliban has the intention to make peace; whether the government has the intention to make peace; nationality; and gender. The regression model explained 14.2% of the dependent variable (perceptions towards peace possibility).

Additionally, a multivariate analysis where demographic and attitudinal factors were controlled indicated that women, educated persons, and Hazaras were negatively correlated with the statement that peace is possible, whereas thinking that the peace deal with Hezb-e-Islami had a positive impact on the security of the respondent's area was positively correlated. More citizens who opined that a peace deal is possible were on average more likely to be: aware of the peace process; male; satisfied with the HPC's efforts with regard to negotiation with the Taliban; of the opinion that the Taliban cannot win the war against government; of the opinion that privileges should be given to the Taliban in the peace deal; accept the Taliban's conditions for peace with the government; say that the Taliban has the intention to make peace with government; and say that the government has the intention to make peace with the Taliban (Table 109).

The second dimension of the evaluation of the people's attitudes towards peace with the Taliban was the intention: whether or not the people have the will to make peace. Like in the case with the thinking dimension, a majority of respondents (80.3%) claimed that they have the intention to

make peace with the Taliban. However, women compared to men; and respondents from Kabul compared to those from other zones were significantly less likely to say that they have the intention to make peace with the Taliban (Figure 9 and Table 49 and 50). On the third dimension, the 'feeling' component of the people's attitudes, the study shows that over two-thirds (72.2%) of the respondents felt happy or satisfied about peace with the Taliban (Table 51). Kabul residents were less likely to be happy about peace with the Taliban (Table 52).

These findings demonstrate a complex picture regarding the possibility of peace in Afghanistan. While public perception is that the Taliban's prospects for winning the war are low, it also held that the Taliban does not have the intention to make peace and to begin negotiations with the government of Afghanistan. Drawing from Henry Kissinger's general principle of insurgency and guerrilla warfare, regarding which he said that "the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win," (Kissinger 1969, 214) one can say that the findings of this study suggest that for a terrorist insurgency, a stalemate is a winning point.

Proposed Peace Solution

There is a certain level of consensus on the fact that the majority of the people in Afghanistan demand and desire peace. Nonetheless, what is lacking is a vision on how to achieve a durable peace settlement. This study is aimed at highlighting the public perception relevant to approaches to dealing with the Taliban. Four options were presented in this regard: reconciliation; political negotiation; mediation; and military force. It is important to note that this study has been conscious of the fact that the terms reconciliation and negotiations have been used interchangeably in Afghanistan (Schirch 2011, 5). Knowing the complexity of peace terminologies in Afghanistan, this study endorsed the indigenous concepts which were embedded in the socio-cultural practices of the country. The indigenous term for reconciliation in Farsi and Pashtu is *Ashti*. *Ashti* involves addressing the grievances of the parties and reconciling. Moreover, the Arabic term *Mosaliha* is also used in Afghanistan referring to "indigenous tradition of peace-making after a dispute among various linguistic communities" (Maass 2006, 13). The questionnaire of this study used both *Ashti* and *Mosaliha* together in an option with respect to reconciliation.

This study found that a majority of respondents were in favour of peaceful approaches such as negotiation (37.6%), mediation (17.0%) and reconciliation (56.3%) towards conflict resolution, and only one-fourth (24.5%) of the respondents were in favour of military confrontation with the Taliban (Table 53). Almost half the Pashtuns (48.6%) were in favour of peace negotiations with the Taliban as compared to those (12.0%) in favour of military means (Figure 16). The preference of over half (56.3%) the

respondents favouring reconciliation indicates that people think beyond merely signing a peace agreement with the Taliban. As reconciliation is a process which involves confession by the perpetrator, trauma healing, forgiveness by the victim, and transitional justice, the peace process in Afghanistan needs to consider this factor.

However, when the Taliban reject the peace offers, around two-thirds (60.2%) of the public attitude supports enhancing pressure on the Taliban. Almost 41% of the respondents suggested continuing military action against the Taliban as they reject peace and over 19% supported enhancing pressure on the Taliban through the international community (Table 54). The idea of enhancing pressure on the Taliban in case the peace process fails enjoyed less popularity amongst the Pashtuns as compared to other ethnicities (Figure 14).

The more the respondents viewed the current peace process as failed, the more they tended to opine that military action should continue against the Taliban (Figure 15). Respondents who said the peace deal with Hekmatyar did not have a positive impact on security demonstrated a higher propensity to opine that more pressure should be placed on the Taliban. And those who said it had a positive impact on security in their areas were more inclined to opine that peace talks should be continued with the Taliban (Figure 19).

A Peace Model

This section deals with the different models proposed towards achieving peace with the Taliban. On the nature of the political settlement, the majority of the respondents were in favour of peace in the 'model of exchange.' In his study on different models of peace, Kristian Herbolzheimer classifies one model as the 'model of exchange,' in which parties to the conflict make peace in exchange for concessions. He presents four forms of peace in exchange (Herbolzheimer 2009): The first type is the US and North Korea Model, in which the US committed for non-aggression and North Korea committed to denuclearization. The second form is 'peace for democracy', in which the Maoists of Nepal promised peace in exchange for inclusive elections. The third form is 'peace in exchange for territory', illustrated in the peace in exchange of Sinai Peninsula between Israel and Egypt in 1979. The fourth form is 'peace in exchange of recognition of rights', as seen in the case of Northern Ireland and Basque.

1. **Peace in Exchange: The Taliban Stance**

Any negotiation with the Taliban and subsequent peaceful settlement of the conflict would entail bargaining of claims, chaffering, and exchange. In the past 17 years, the Taliban has demanded multiple concessions in exchange for peace. During the Shah Walikot talks, they asked for a general amnesty. During the Zurich talks, they asked for official recognition as a political force in Afghanistan and not as terrorists. In the later stages, they demanded a traditional Islamic state and amendment of all laws to be based on Sharia.

Power-sharing as a mechanism of settlement has come up several times in the previous attempts for peace. President Karzai offered a few positions in his government to the Taliban. In their study of the Taliban

political leadership's view on the future of the state, Borhan Osman and Anand Gopal state that while the Taliban admits the importance of power-sharing in a possible future state, it does not accept being granted ministerial positions or provincial governorships in the current post-Bonn political order. Instead, they are more inclined to reshaping the entire post-2001 order. The rank and file of the Taliban will also not accept any settlement without considerable concessions. (Osman and Gopal 2016, 6). This issue has come up in several informal talks as well. Taliban vaguely expressed their willingness for their possible participation in the future structure of the government. This issue was flagged in informal talks in Dubai on 23 July 2011. In the same meeting, in addition to their demands for being recognised as an 'independent party to the conflict' and the establishment of an office for negotiations, the Taliban demanded some changes in national security and judicial institutions, and even the creation of an interim government. They also hinted that a discussion is required on the issue of the structure of the government and their participation. At the Chantilly meeting, the Taliban delegation proposed the establishment of a "broad-based Islamic government"—where the representation of all nationalities and political parties should be ensured. The statement proposes that, "in the future Islamic government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the balance of power or participation in the government of by all Afghan parties must be [stipulated] in the constitution…With the blessing of the constitution, the way shall be paved for political power balance and all Afghan parties to participate in the upcoming government" (as quoted in Safi and Ruttig 2018). While the Taliban has not laid out the specifics of or articulated in detail what they envisage the 'board-based

Islamic government' to be and have been more evasive in using these terms, it is apparent that they do not propose a democratic decentralised system. Instead, they envisage a structure within the ambit of a traditional notion of Islam. However, a decentralised state is the form of political system that would ensure a balance of power between different nationalities in Afghanistan. The final issue is the conservative tendencies of the Taliban for amending the laws based on what they consider as Sharia-based laws and social engineering of the gender relations (Osman and Gopal 2016).

This study examined public perception in the aforementioned Taliban stances. While merely 14.3% of respondents strongly agreed and 40.7% agreed to an extent with the idea of providing some concessions to the Taliban, there was less support shown towards fulfilling all demands of the Taliban (Table 65). That notwithstanding, women, Tajik, and Hazara respondents were less in favour of giving concessions to the Taliban (Table 67 and 68). However, the ethno-national groups variable was not significant after controlling for education. The regression analysis suggests that female respondents and respondents in the North zone and Kabul disagreed more with giving concessions to the Taliban, whereas male respondents and respondents in the South agreed more.

On the nature of the political settlement, almost one-third (30.3%) of the respondents were in favour of peace in exchange for power-sharing at the local level as a way out. However, the rest of the Taliban's demands received very less support: only 20.1% agreed with offering amnesty to the Taliban; 18.4% were willing to accept appointing a Taliban leader in the central government; 15.9% agreed with giving financial concessions; and

less than 9.9% were willing to accept an amendment to the current laws in accordance with Taliban views (Table 66).

An OLS regression controlled for demographic and attitudinal factors suggests that respondents who said privileges should be given to the Taliban for peace were significantly more likely to say that peace is possible with Taliban; that the peace deal with the Hezb-e-Islami had a positive impact on security in their area; and that the Taliban can succeed in war. They were also more likely to be satisfied with making peace with the Taliban; the Taliban's behaviour and politics; and the HPC's performance; and more likely to be Pashtun and male respondents (Table 110).

2. Peace in Exchange: People's Demands

The study demonstrates that while there is support for peace with the Taliban, respondents also flagged some conditions such as respect for human rights, citizen rights and women rights; relinquishing violence and killings; respect for Afghanistan's constitution; transparency regarding the talks; and finally, the enforcement of a ceasefire (59.9%, 54.2%, 49.0%, 39.7% and 31.3% respectively) (Table 69). Female respondents demonstrated a greater propensity to flag conditions such as respecting women's rights and human rights, and stopping violence, whereas male respondents flagged transparency in peace talks and enforcement of a ceasefire more as conditions for making peace with the Taliban (Table 70). Similarly, respondents who said women's role in the peace process is important were more likely to say that the Taliban should respect women's and human rights, respect Afghanistan's constitution and stop killings as conditions for making peace with the Taliban (Table 71). Respondents who said they were aware of the Taliban's conditions for peace were more likely

to flag that the Taliban should respect human and women's rights; stop killings; respect Afghanistan's constitution; that the peace talks must be transparent; and that a ceasefire should be enforced. They were less likely to agree to no condition for making peace with the Taliban (Table 72).

The findings of the study demonstrate a high level of support for the government's conditions for peace with the Taliban. Almost two-thirds (65.7%) of the respondents supported the government's conditions (Table 73). For instance, 47.2% stated that the Taliban should end relations with Pakistan; 46.3% said the Taliban should accept Afghanistan's constitution; almost 41.9% said the Taliban should end relations with terrorists; and 40.2% said the Taliban should end anti-government activities (Table 74).

These findings clearly show what the people of Afghanistan desire and expect from a peace agreement with the Taliban. As the fate of any peace agreement depends on the trust of people and their sense of ownership of the peace process, it crucial that Afghanistan and the US take into consideration what people want as an outcome. The respondents' support for the government of Afghanistan's position regarding talks also indicates the political capital that government can count on. However, the current phase of peace talks between the US and the Taliban has violated the abovementioned conditions of the people as well as the government of Afghanistan aforementioned conditions.

Role of Women

Women's participation is a fundamental pillar of an inclusive peace process. Following the exclusion of women in multiple "national peace negotiations," international women's rights activists advocated for the meaningful inclusion of women in peace processes, which ultimately culminated in the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in 2000. On the basis of this resolution, the Directorate of Human Rights and International Affairs of Women at Afghanistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, began consultations with international stakeholders on drafting the National Action Plan for implementation of this resolution. Similarly, the government of Afghanistan claims that it has undertaken fundamental measures to provide women the opportunity to participate meaningfully in the peace process. These opportunities include the participation of 348 women in the 2010 Consultative Peace Jirga and the membership of 11 women in the HPC. However, female members of the HPC have always complained about the marginalisation of women in the HPC's decision-making processes.

In the public perception, women's role is important in the peace process. Over half (57.0%) the respondents said women's role is important in the peace process (Table 75). Attainment of education has a positive impact on the perceptions of the people with regard to the importance of women's roles. The more educated the respondents were, the more likely they were to say women's role is important. For instance, 21.5% of the illiterate respondents stated that the role of women is very important, as compared to 32% of people with undergraduate degrees and above (Table

76). Applying a multivariate regression analysis controlled for demographics and attitudinal variables showed that women, educated persons, and respondents from Kabul were more likely to say that women's role is important in the peace process, whereas those who based in the west zone, those with lesser education, and those who believed the Taliban can govern if they succeed in war were less likely to say the role of women is important.

While public perception supported the role of women in the peace process, it is unclear as to whether or not the Taliban's anti-women policy has changed. For instance, during the Maldives meeting, the Taliban refused to sit with women on the same table.[14] That said, it is important to note that any peace deal with the Taliban should ensure that the Taliban respect the importance of women's role in a democratic society. To familiarise the Taliban with these democratic norms and to highlight the importance of the role of women, the inclusion of women in Track-2 initiatives is helpful. For instance, at the December 2012 Chantilly meeting and in May 2015 al-Khor meeting organised by Pugwash, the Taliban sat around the table with a number of female parliamentarians.

---

[14]In January, May and November 2010, three informal meetings were held in the Maldives between the representatives of the government of Afghanistan, the Taliban, Hezb-e-Islami and the non-militant political opposition, following a proposal by Homyoun Jarir (Hezb-e-Islami Chief Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's son-in-law) (Wormer 2012).

The Hekmatyar Model

President Ghani and his aides have repeatedly highlighted the peace deal with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar as a success and as a model for future peace initiatives. The peace agreement with Hekmatyar entailed some concessions given by the government. The concessions included the lifting of sanctions by international organisations or states against the leadership and members of the Hezb-e-Islami (Article 5); the right to participation in the elections and to political activities as political party for Hezb-e-Islami (Article 7); electoral reform (Article 8); dignifying the leadership of the Hezb-e-Islami through a presidential decree (Article 9); providing security and financial expenses towards residential purposes for the Hizb-e-Islami leadership (Article 10); judicial immunity for the leadership and members of the party for their past political crimes, as well as the release and an amnesty for the prisoners and detainees associated with the party who have not yet been convicted of criminal activities (Article 11); political participation (Article 13); and reintegrating Hezb-e-Islami commanders and members into the security and defence forces (Article 14).

While the rank and file of the Taliban do not favour the peace agreement with Hekmatyar as a model (Osman 2018: 24), nearly half the respondents (45.4% favour; 36.8% agree; and 8.6% strongly agree) view the peace agreement with Hekmatyar as a model for peace with the Taliban. However, fewer female respondents said the agreement with Hetmakyar could be a model for peace with the Taliban (Tables 80 and 82). Similarly, fewer female respondents said the peace deal with Hekmatyar was a good decision (Table 79). On the contrary, respondents who opined that the

Taliban's behaviour and policies were acceptable were more inclined to say that the agreement with the Hekmatyar could be a peace model (Table 83). Similarly, more respondents who said the peace deal with Hekmatyar could be a model for peace indicated that the Taliban were *Mujahideen* and dissatisfied brothers and were less likely to say they were terrorists and mercenaries (Table 84). A multivariate regression controlled for demographic and attitudinal variables revealed that females, those who felt the Taliban cannot succeed in the war, and those who were less satisfied with the HPC were less likely to say that peace deal with Hezb-e-Islami was a good decision. And males, those who felt peace is possible with Taliban, believed the Taliban can succeed in war, and were satisfied with the HPC demonstrated a greater tendency to say peace with Hezb-e-Islami was a good decision.

Public perception is negative with regard to the impact of the peace agreement with Hekmatyar on peace and security in the country. 50% of the respondents were of the opinion that the security situation had not changed at all in their respective areas post the peace deal with Hekmatyar (Figure 21). A multivariate regression analysis controlled for gender, education, and nationality found that those who felt that the Taliban cannot succeed in the war, live in the northern region, and believe peace is not possible were less likely to say that peace with Hezb-e-Islami had a positive impact on security in their area. Those who felt the Taliban can succeed in war, live in the southern region, and believe peace is possible with Taliban demonstrated a greater tendency to say it had a positive impact (Table 112). Additionally, when the variables were controlled, it was found that the nationality factor did not have a meaningful relationship with the level of

satisfaction with the peace deal with Hezb-e-Islami (for a bivariate analysis see Table 81).

Respondents who said the peace deal with Hezb-e-Islami did not improve the security situation demonstrated a greater tendency to describe the peace process with the Taliban as failed (Figure 20). These findings clearly indicate that a lack of tangible and positive changes resulting from previous peace deals—particularly the peace deal with Hekmatyar—is one of the reasons why public perception holds that the peace process is a failure.

On the Reintegration of the Taliban

The Taliban movement [15] is mainly comprised of *madrasa* (Islamic seminary) students. The term 'Taliban' is a plural of the term 'Talib,' which means 'a student of a *madrasa'* (in Persian, Arabic and Pashto languages). The Darul Uloom Haqqania, a *madrasa* run by Pakistani religious scholar and former senator Maulana Sami-ul-Haq,[16] has been contributing to the Taliban *Lashkar* (army of fighters) regularly with the aim of launching *jihad* in Afghanistan. Most students recruited by these *madrasa*s come from rural areas in Afghanistan and Pakistan where access to public education is either severely limited or absent. The outcome of attaining theological education from these *madrasa*s is that the students end up with dogmatic, fundamentalist notions of religion, and those of these students who join

---

[15] The Taliban referred to themselves as movement in their early years in the 1990s, but are now considered a group.

[16] Sami-ul-Haq was killed on 2 November 2018

militant groups thus hold these views. As a result, reintegrating militant Islamists back to society would be a challenge in the peace process.

While the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP) has been followed since 2010, the programme hardly led to success (Sajjad 2010) and was finally suspended in 2016. Aimed at addressing the local grievances and economic needs of the fighters, the program ignored the greed and ideological aspect of the conflict. Lack of good governance also contributed to the APRP's failure. In some cases, reintegrated fighters returned to the battleground. The Taliban's approach to reintegration has been with suspicion. They perceived the APRP as a hostile programme aimed at attracting their members and weakening the group (Osman 2018, 15). For instance, UNAMA Policy Planning Unit paper states, reintegrated Taliban

> were not significant actors and their pledges had a negligible impact on the insurgency. Additionally, due to lack of funding, poor capacity and poor management, the PTS [The Strengthening of Peace Programme] was unable (1) to monitor whether those integrated had actually renounced violence, (2) to guarantee economic integration or (3) guarantee immunity from international forces. These elements have discredited the PTS as a reconciliation tool (Keene 2011, 3).

In his peace offer to the Taliban, President Ghani called on the Taliban to join the political process in Afghanistan as a political party. Some other figures such as the notorious warlord, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, proposed providing the Taliban the opportunity to rule some provinces within the framework of safe zones for them in an interview with the *New York Times* on 4 March 2018. If the government followed the Hekmatyar peace agreement as a model, it would entail four fundamental components: (1)

Power-sharing; (2) Integration of Taliban commanders and foot soldiers into the national security and defence forces; (3) Economic concessions; and (4) General amnesty, release of prisoners and judicial immunity.

However, both President Ghani's offer of allowing the Taliban to establish a political party and the idea of integrating the Taliban into the provincial and national governments and security forces enjoy less popularity (20.5% and 13.3% respectively) among the people. On the contrary, over one-third (44.3%) of the respondents believed that the best way of reintegrating the Taliban would be to get them to put their weapons away and go back to normal life (Table 105). The divergence on the matter comes from a gender standpoint and the characterisation of the Taliban. First, women were significantly more inclined to say that the Taliban should go back to normal life (48.0% women vs. 41.6% men) and join Islamic *madrassa*s (26.9% women vs. 16.5% men); and fewer women were inclined to say they should establish a political party and integrate with security forces and government, as compared to men (Table 106). Similarly, most respondents who termed the Taliban as mercenaries, enemies of Afghanistan, terrorists and insurgents were in favour of reintegrating the Taliban into normal life (54.1%, 55.4%, 58.1% and 51.6% respectively) than them joining *madrasa*s or establishing a political party (Figure 23).

On the International Dimension of the Peace

As the conflict in Afghanistan has an international dimension, the existence of trans-border sanctuaries for insurgents, the presence of international forces in the country, historical contentions, dispute with Pakistan, and the irredentist claims of the Afghan ethno-nationalists have added multiple layers to the conflict. The Taliban has ceaselessly been citing the presence of international forces; the government of Afghanistan has cited the trans-border sanctuaries of the Taliban; and more recently, President Ghani made a statement on the undeclared state of war between Afghanistan and Pakistan, as the various layers of the conflict.

On the international dimension of the conflict, this study evaluated four different proposals regarding approaches to achieving peace in the country:

1. The perception of non-Pashtuns on direct negotiation with Pakistan and resolving the issues of ethno-nationalist irredentist claims on the Pakistan territory. Incumbent President Ghani also favoured this stance during his early days in office.

2. The anti-Taliban constituency's proposal for enhancing pressure on the Taliban by all means.

3. The Taliban's proposal involving the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan.

4. Former President Karzai's proposal on engaging regional countries such as Iran, China, India and Russia in the peace process.

Nearly half the respondents (43.9%) were in favour of direct negotiations with Pakistan and ending the disagreement over Afghanistan's

southern borders with Pakistan (the Durand Line issue) as part of conflict resolution on the international level. Similarly, 41.6% were in favour of enhancing pressure on the Taliban through international organisations as a solution. The UN can definitely play a key role in targeting the financial sources of the insurgency and its trans-border sanctuaries (Table 55). A multivariate regression analysis shows that women were likelier to say that pressure should be intensified to defeat the Taliban whereas those who reported satisfaction with Taliban's conduct and believe that the peace deal with Hezb-e-Islami had a positive impact on security in their area were significantly less likely to say that military pressure should be intensified (for the bivariate analysis see Table 54, Figure 17, and 18).

Contrary to the Taliban's claims, public perception regarding the presence of international forces in Afghanistan is positive. Over one-third (45.2%) of the respondents said the presence of international forces helps the peace process in Afghanistan (Table 56). By gender, women were more in favour of international forces compared to men. Additionally, respondents who referred to the Taliban as *Mujahideen* (12.7%) were less likely to say that the presence of international forces is helpful for peace talks compared to those who referred to the Taliban as insurgents and terrorists (23.0% and 28.0% respectively) (Table 61).

With regard to the presence of international forces in Afghanistan, respondents who believed that the Taliban cannot succeed in the war were more likely to say that presence of international forces is helping peace talks as compared to those who believed the Taliban can succeed in the war (Table 59). Similarly, compared to illiterate (29.2%) and less educated respondents (24.1%), educated respondents (21.2%) demonstrated a lower

propensity to say that the presence of international troops is not helpful for the peace process (Table 60). Controlled for education, nationality did not have a meaningful relationship (for a bivariate analysis of nationality, see Table 57). Region wise, 40.3% of the respondents in the east said the presence of international forces is not helpful (Table 58). As the eastern belt of the country is mostly populated by Pashtun tribes, it is understandable that the last two findings are in sync with each other. A multivariate regression analysis controlled for attitudinal factors also indicates that respondents who were of the opinion that the Taliban can succeed in war, were Pashtuns, males, and less educated, were less likely to say that the presence of international forces helps the peace process, whereas Hazaras, females, and more educated respondents were more likely to say their presence helps.

The prolonging of the conflict has created a large number of international stakeholders. Diplomatic dialogues of several countries such as Norway, Germany, UK, the US, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Turkey, Iran, Russia and China with the Taliban have further complicated the process and have reduced the prospects of consensus for peace in Afghanistan at the international level. The government of Afghanistan and the US as parties to the conflict have not been able to foster a consensus among the international actors.

The two best examples of this assessment are the Moscow Format[17] and divergent Central Asian Republics' policy toward peace in

---

[17] An initiative by Russia to host regular rounds of regional talks on Afghanistan between senior officials from 12 countries Afghanistan, China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan(MFARF 2017).

Afghanistan. In January 2018, Russia urged for urgent and direct negotiations between the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban. Moscow stated that it can facilitate and host these negotiations (MFARF 2018). Russia also invited Taliban representatives to the Moscow Format for talks scheduled for 4 September 2018, which was subsequently postponed (Ramani 2018). Russia and China desire to increase the stake of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Afghanistan's peace process through the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group.

Central Asian countries also did not have a common policy towards Afghanistan as a region. Multiple divergent initiatives and proposals by the Central Asian Republics includes: Tajikistan's quadrilateral meeting proposal in Dushanbe[18] (2009); Kyrgyzstan's Bishkek Initiative (2009); Kazakhstan's proposal for a United Nations hub in Almaty for Afghanistan (2012); Uzbekistan's proposal regarding a 6+3 Contact Group [19] (Kassenova 2014, 23–26), and the 2018 Tashkent Conference.

While this study shows that a majority of respondents consider the US as the most effective actor in the peace process (Table 108), the US has not been able to improve public support for its South Asia Strategy. This study shows that the levels of agreeability with the US's South Asia Strategy are not so high. Nearly half the respondents (45.6%) were unsure whether or not to agree with the US's Strategy (Table 62). Those who indicated that the Taliban can succeed in the war were less inclined (22.5%) to support the US's Strategy towards the Taliban as compared to those who

---

[18]Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Russia.

[19] Afghanistan's six neighbours—China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan—plus NATO, Russia and the US.

believed the Taliban cannot succeed (28.8%) (Table 63). On the contrary, those who indicated that the role of women is important were more likely to say that they agreed with the US's Strategy towards the Taliban (Table 64). Also, this relationship was robust and persisted even after using a multivariate analysis and controlling for gender, education, nationality, and other attitudinal factors.

Locations of Talks

One of the crucial components of a peace process design is the identification of (and agreement on) an appropriate and suitable location for conducting the negotiations. Different countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Qatar, UAE and Saudi Arabia have been proposed for hosting the talks, and some preliminary contacts and exploratory talks have even taken place in these locations. However, the majority of the people of Afghanistan (56.5 %) were in favour of Afghanistan as the location to conduct the negotiations (Figure 24). This finding suggests that there is public support for national ownership of the peace process. The emphasis on Afghanistan as the location for the peace process is an endorsement of the public sentiment that the process should be administered by the people of Afghanistan and should be devoid of the influence of other countries. The divergence of opinions on this matter arose in the following four contexts:

First, in terms of nationality, Pashtuns were significantly more in favour of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan as locations for negotiations as compared to the rest (Table 85). Second, more respondents who were of the opinion that the Taliban does not have an intention to make peace said Afghanistan is the best place to hold peace talks. Those who held that the

Taliban has the intention to make peace demonstrated a higher inclination to say that Saudi Arabia and Qatar are the best placed as venues to conduct the peace talks (Table 86). Third, more respondents who referred to the Taliban as *Mujahideen* identified Pakistan (21.7%) and Saudi Arabia (25.0%) as the best countries to conduct peace talks with the Taliban, while simultaneously reporting the least (36.7%) support for peace talks to be held in Afghanistan. Those who referred to the Taliban as mercenaries and terrorists demonstrated a greater tendency to say Afghanistan is the best place to host peace talks (69.1% and 63.5% respectively) (Table 92). Fourth, significantly more respondents who felt the Taliban cannot succeed in the war said Afghanistan is the best destination for peace talks, whereas those who believed the Taliban can succeed in the war demonstrated a greater tendency to say Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Pakistan are the best places for peace talks (Figure 22). The robustness of this relationship was verified through regression analysis as well. After controlling demographic and attitudinal factors, it was found that respondents who believed that the Taliban can succeed in the war were more likely to say Pakistan is the best place to host the peace process.

As majority of the respondents are in favour of Afghanistan as a location for talk and in the contrary only 11% is in favour of Qatar as location for talk, the current contact and talks in Qatar does not have public support and popularity.

In December 2017, with the objective of facilitating the talks in Afghanistan, the Head of the HPC's Secretariat, Mohammad Akram Khpalwak, proposed opening an office for the Taliban in Kabul (on the lines of the office established for the Hezb-e-Islami). This study found that

public perception regarding this proposal is divided. While almost 50% of the respondents agreed with the proposal (34.1% agreed, and 16.4% strongly agreed), the other 50% either disagreed or claimed they were unsure (Table 87). Women, Tajiks and Hazaras (45.4%, 44.4% and 58.0% respectively) were less agreeable with establishing an office for the Taliban in Afghanistan (Table 88 and Table 90). On the other hand, respondents from the southern provinces and those who said peace with the Taliban is possible (43.5% and 36.3% respectively) were more agreeable to this proposal (Table 89 and 91).

Additionally, after controlling for factors like age, gender, and nationality, the results of the multivariate regression analysis suggests that two combinations of factors may play a more significant role towards support for opening a political office for the Taliban in Afghanistan. The first combination—female; educated; Hazara; of the opinion that women's role is important in the peace process; of the opinion that the peace deal with Hezb-e-Islami did not have a significant impact on security; and of the opinion that the Taliban cannot succeed in war—accounts for less support for opening a political office for Taliban in Afghanistan. The second combination—male; less educated; Pashtun; of the opinion that women's role is not important in the peace process; of the opinion that the peace deal with Hezb-e-Islami did have a significant impact on security; and of the opinion that the Taliban can succeed in the war—accounts for more support for the proposal.

High Peace Council

The High Peace Council was established to create and strengthen national consensus on the issue of peace amongst the political elites and public.[20] Notwithstanding the emphasis of the HPC Strategic Plan (1 January 2017–31 December 2020) that the Council "must also become more effective at distinguishing between the high policy issues of Kabul and provincial elites, and the more diverse social issues that ordinary Afghans raise in the cities and countryside. Both must be brought into discussion" (HPC 2017, 7), a considerable section of the public is of the opinion that the HPC has been ineffective. The findings of this study suggest that 30% of the people not only think that the HPC is ineffective (Figure 11), but the same percentage of the people also feel the government has been unable to foster national consensus on the issue of peace.

The HPC's Strategic Plan itself identifies the Council's weakness. It states that "in recent years the Council has lost focus and suffered from a lack of strategic leadership. Its membership become too large, and distortions induced by "projectization" created interests that were no longer aligned with its original mandate and function" (HPC 2017, 7). The HPC's failure to create a national consensus on the issue of peace has led to the reduction of the political capital required to make the peace process inclusive. The lesser the national consensus on the issue of peace with the Taliban, the lesser the inclusiveness of the peace process would be. The lack of national consensus is mentioned in the earlier section on evaluating

---

[20] The HPC's Strategic Plan notes: "The High Peace Council plays a critical role in preparing for Peace. It has developed good communication with diverse segments of the population, and it has conducted a broad range of consultative forum to identify people's aspirations and concerns about the peace process" (HPC 2017: 7).

the current peace process. According to public perception, lack of independence and competence, and foreign intervention in its affairs, have been three of the HPC's main shortcomings (46.5% and 43.1% respectively) (Table 93).

Since 2014, the HPC's independence has been further curtailed due to President Ghani's interference in its policies, affairs, and appointments. Ghani appointed one of his close aides, Mohammad Akram Khpalwak, as the Executive Secretary of the Council, with more capacity and authorities than those enjoyed by the chairman of the Council. The HPC's Strategic Plan outlines the secretary's authorities as:

> on the basis of the Presidential executive order No 199 (of 1 April 2017), the CEO of the ESPRP was assigned to participate in cabinet and national security council's meetings, lead technical and financial affairs of HPC, lead the implementation of any peace agreements between the government of Afghanistan and armed opposition groups, coordinate all peacemaking efforts undertaken by Ulema as well as political and influential figures within HPC's mandate, execute and monitor the reconciliation process of armed opposition groups, and provide, financial, administrative and technical support to peace negotiations. ESPRP will also be responsible for creating inter-government coordination and will report back to H.E the president, the NSC and HPC General Assembly on monthly basis. ESPRP as a leading coordination and execution body for the government's peace processes will focus on restructuring and reforming its structure and professionalism, technical expertise, transparency and accountability would be amongst its top priorities (HPC 2017, 27).

The HPC's lack of competence and its ineffectiveness have resulted in a reduced sense of satisfaction with the HPC among the public. The

findings of this study indicate that over 60% of the people are not satisfied with the HPC's work (36.2% not satisfied; and 25.3 % highly dissatisfied) (Figure 25). The level of dissatisfaction was higher among the women than men (39.9% vs 33.4%) (Table 94); and Uzbeks, Tajiks and Hazaras than Pashtuns (41.7%, 37.6%, 39.5% and 32.4% respectively) (Table 95). Furthermore, the more educated the respondents were, the less satisfied they were with the HPC. A large section (42.6%) of respondents from the illiterate section expressed that they were satisfied but those from the educated category (undergraduate, postgraduate, and above) expressed less satisfaction (29.8%) (Table 96). Moreover, there was consistency in the attitudes and perspectives of respondents on the issue of failure of the peace process and dissatisfaction with the HPC. Respondents who said the peace process is a failure expressed greater dissatisfaction with the HPC (Table 97).

Respondents who were satisfied with the HPC were those who were of the opinion that the peace deal with Hekmatyar had a positive impact on the security situation in their local area. Respondents who said the peace deal with Hezb-e-Islami had a positive impact on the security situation in their local area also expressed greater satisfaction with the HPC's work (Table 98). A regression analysis controlled for demographic and attitudinal factors showed that these relationships were robust. Respondents from the southern region; less educated; who opined that the peace process has been successful; and who said the peace deal with Hezb-e-Islami had a positive impact on the security situation in their local area demonstrated significantly greater propensity to express satisfaction with the HPC's work. Conversely, respondents from the northern region; more educated;

who opined that the peace process has been a failure; and who said the peace deal with Hezb-e-Islami did not have a positive impact on the security situation in their local area demonstrated much lower propensity to express satisfaction with the HPC's work.

Spoilers and Facilitators of Peace Process

Usually, there are two other categories of actors involved in the peace process in addition to the parties to the conflict. They are identified as facilitators and spoilers to the peace process. Identifying the facilitators and the spoilers, and their needs and interests is a key step towards developing a conflict resolution framework. According to John Stephen Stedman, there are four fundamental issues to be understood with regard to spoilers in a particular conflict: numbers of spoilers; types of spoilers; the position of these spoilers; and the locus of spoilers. Identifying and understanding the aforementioned aspects will help peace facilitators or peace-makers formulate a suitable strategy for managing the spoilers (Stedman 2000). A multi-layered, complicated and prolonged conflict such as the one in Afghanistan has many potential spoilers. These include both internal and external processes that have a different set of goals and different power bases. Lack of knowledge about these could result in flawed strategies for managing spoilers, which in turn can potentially lead to an outcome more catastrophic than the prevailing situation. However, one must to pay attention to the politics of labelling. To marginalise their opponents, politicians usually label them as spoilers. Neglecting and marginalising legitimate demands of a segment of the population by branding them as spoilers will only reinforce the exclusionary nature of politics, and will reduce the peace process to a narrow and sectarian project.

There is no doubt that several stakeholders are involved both in the conflict and the peace process in Afghanistan. The root of the second wave of the Taliban in the post-2001 period can be traced back to the external support they received from their international backers. Antonio Giustozzi

has documented and shown how the resurgence of the Taliban post 2004 was a result of a diversification in their external funding sources and international backers. With evidence, he states that Saudi Arabia, Persian Gulf countries, and Pakistan funded terrorist groups like the Taliban in Afghanistan to the tune of tens of millions of dollars.

Such external support has also led to further division among the Taliban factions. For instance, Saudi Arabia's direct provision of funds to the Miran Shah *Shura* had driven the Haqqani Network Taliban to act more independently from the Quetta *Shura*. Both the Peshawar and Miran Shah *shura*s declared autonomy from the Quetta *Shura* between 2007 and 2009. Hence, given how they have stakes in the Taliban's activities in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Arab states are potential spoilers to the peace process (Snow 2016).

Additionally, there are some actors who benefit more from the continuation of the conflict in Afghanistan than from a peaceful settlement of the conflict. An absolute majority (80.0%) of the respondents were of the opinion that Pakistan is benefiting from the conflict in Afghanistan. More than half the respondents (55.2%) also said criminal networks and drug dealers are benefiting (Table 99). However, respondents who referred to the Taliban as *Mujahideen* were significantly less inclined to say that Pakistan is benefiting from Afghanistan conflict and were more inclined to say that it is the West and the US who are benefiting (Table 100). Conversely, respondents who believed that peace talks are failed were significantly more likely to say that Pakistan is benefiting from the conflict in Afghanistan. Those who said the peace process has been successful were significantly more inclined to say that the West and the US are benefiting

from the conflict (Table 101). Similarly, when asked about the reasons for the failure of the peace process, a considerable number of respondents (34.5%) flagged negative intervention by neighbouring countries as the reason. Additionally, 17.3% of the respondents also flagged the Taliban's lack of intention to make peace 17.3% as the reason (Figure 11).

However, given how they have a stake in and influence on the Taliban, these actors can also play the role of a facilitator. It is in this context that an overwhelming number of respondents (71.0%) opined that neighbouring countries can play an effective role in Afghanistan's peace process (Table 102). By gender, female respondents (68.2%) were less inclined to say that neighbouring countries can play an effective role in the peace process, as compared to male respondents (73.3%) (Table 103). Given how more female respondents identified Afghanistan as the proper location to host peace talks as compared to other countries, we can conclude that females trust Afghanistan more than they trust other countries. Respondents who said peace is possible demonstrated a greater likelihood of opining that neighbouring countries can play an important role in the peace process, as compared to those who said it is impossible (Table 104).

On the effectiveness of countries and international organisations involved in the peace process in Afghanistan, the respondents ranked the US, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Pakistan, and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) respectively as more effective (Table 108). On the effectiveness of institutions, the respondents ranked the *Ulama Shura*, the media, the ethnic and *jihadi* leaders, and the *Loya Jirga* (Grand Assembly) as effective institutions (Table 107). These perceptions notwithstanding, most of these institutions

and countries can play the roles of both facilitator and spoiler. For instance, some of the *Ulama* have reinforced extremist claims instead of bringing both parties closer to an agreement.[21] However, they have the potential to play a constructive and symbolic role (Osman 2018, 25), as in the May 2018 trilateral *Ulama* conference of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Indonesia in Jakarta; the June 2018 *Ulama* conference in Kabul; and July 2018 international *Ulama* conference in Saudi Arabia. The same is true with the OIC. While the OIC does not have any particular program for Afghanistan, it can just play a symbolic role towards fostering peace in the country. It is interesting that regional countries such as Russia, Iran, India and China—whom former President Karzai named as prominent powers (DWGMF 2018) and who can play a constructive and effective role—have not been ranked by the respondents as effective as compared to the US, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

---

[21]The nation-wide conference of the *Ulama* in Herat reiterated the same claims of the Taliban as the conditions of peace. They argued that peace will not come if the international troops do not withdraw from Afghanistan (Hussaini 2018).

Conclusion

In a context where much of the analysis on peace in Afghanistan is focused on explaining the geopolitical interests and stakes of the Great Powers and Regional Powers with respect to peace and conflict in Afghanistan, very little attention has been paid to understanding and explaining the perceptions, attitudes and orientations of the common people of Afghanistan—who continue to live and suffer the terror, the Taliban, and conflict on a daily basis—with regard to peace. While everyone would like to represent the people or speak on their behalf, the knowledge of and information on the peoples' stances and attitudes is scant. The people of Afghanistan have been reduced to an invisible factor in the peace process.

This study examined and analysed the attitudes and perceptions of the people of Afghanistan in Afghanistan towards the peace process in the country and towards the Taliban at a critical juncture. First, in June 2018, both the Taliban and the government of Afghanistan honoured a ceasefire for the first time in the past 17 years of war. Second, the US has engaged in preparatory talks with the Taliban without any preconditions with the objective of achieving a negotiated settlement. This study aimed to go beyond the romanticised, oversimplified sentimental, rhetoric—that the 'people of Afghanistan want peace' and that 'peace is good'—to explore and understand the nuances of public perception with regard to peace and what it entails.

A key finding of this study is that the Taliban does not enjoy popularity among the people and that they are a discredited actor. The Taliban's lack of popularity is multi-dimensional. First, a majority of the

people characterise the Taliban either as terrorists or enemies of Afghanistan, or mercenaries. Second, an absolute majority of the people oppose the Taliban's policies and conduct. Third, people do not support the conditions laid down by the Taliban towards the peace process. Fourth, a majority of the people think that the Taliban are unable to govern effectively. The limited support that exists for the Taliban is from the following groups: geographically, people from the south and east of the country; ethnically, the Pashtuns; and in terms of education, people with a seminary education. Additionally, those who characterise the Taliban as dissatisfied brothers or *Mujahideen* too express opinions favourable towards the Taliban.

The findings of this study reveal a society deeply divided by some demographic indicators. Among the demographic variables, none compared with gender to the extent to which they determined political outlook. Much of the differences and disagreements on the issue of peace were between men and women. Attainment of education too has had an impact on the people's perceptions. By gender, women; by nationality, Tajiks and Hazaras; and by education, those who are more educated, were sceptical of the Taliban's intentions and character, and the consequences of a peace deal with them. Those with seminary education mostly expressed a positive view of the Taliban.

Besides nationality, gender, and levels of education, the most important factor that divided the opinions of the people regarding the peace process was the characterisation of the Taliban. This study presented the respondents with seven titles for the Taliban: enemies of Afghanistan; terrorists; mercenaries; insurgents; *Mujahideen*; dissatisfied brothers; and

political opposition. Those who considered the Taliban as *Mujahideen* and dissatisfied brothers tended more to support the Taliban's viewpoints and were in favour of providing concessions to the Taliban, as compared to those who considered the Taliban as terrorists, insurgents, enemies of Afghanistan, and mercenaries. Similarly, one-third of the respondents said both the ISKP and the Taliban are terrorists. Consider number of Pashtun respondents argued that the ISKP is a radical and international terrorist organisation compared to the Taliban.

Like in post-World War II Italy, Afghanistan's political culture is an alienated political culture. Almond and Verba argue that "Italians tend to look upon the government and politics as unpredictable and threatening forces and not as a social institution amendable to their influence" (Almond and Verba 1989, 312). The people of Afghanistan too demonstrated this characteristic. Critically, this study also found that there is a considerably low level of awareness among the people not only regarding the peace process but also about the positions/conditions of the Taliban, Afghanistan's government, and on the US's South Asia Strategy. People demonstrated less interest in following up on the updates about the peace process. They also ranked the authority and effectiveness of the people's role the lowest in comparison with many other parties. Four demographic variables have had an impact on the levels of awareness: gender, education, region, and nationality. Women, respondents in the central zone, less educated persons, and Hazaras had the lowest levels of awareness on the abovementioned issues in the peace process.

In many ways, the current peace process in Afghanistan resembles the state of stagnation in Sri Lanka's peace process in 2006. First, the

current trajectory of the process has marginalised a considerable number of actors, which in itself weakens the possibility of peace (Schirch 2011). In Sri Lanka, an ultra-centralised and clientelistic state excluded groups peripheral to the system and created a bipolar peace process between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Pirani and Kadirgamar 2006). One can observe the same process in Afghanistan. Second, both cases are similar when it comes to the lack of attention paid towards long-term peace-building processes. Like in Sri Lanka in 2006, in Afghanistan, the focus on a limited peace obtained through direct negotiations and a power-sharing agreement has disregarded the fundamental aspect of transformative peace, which necessarily entails addressing the structural dimensions of the conflict. The findings of this study illustrate that people are more in favour of peace-building approaches rather than short-term peace-making steps. While people are agreeable to negotiating with terrorists, they simultaneously highlight the importance of reconciliation.

Peace efforts of the past 17 years have resulted in failure. Indeed, all peace processes "fail" until they succeed. Hence, one might ask if there is any possibility to succeed in peace talks. Does the Taliban have the moral and political commitment to end their armed conflict and terrorist activities? That said, it is also important to understand the current status in order to diagnose the errors and problems. According to public perception, several factors are responsible for the failure of the peace process and the protracted conflict in Afghanistan:

1. The failed state structure and lack of rule of law, which has increased the state's inability to provide security and social

services to the people and has increased corruption. This factor has contributed to public dissatisfaction with the state apparatus.

2. The uneven political system, which has resulted in an imbalanced and unjust distribution of power in a multicultural country like Afghanistan.

3. Meddling by other states, particularly those from the region.

4. Islamic radicalism, which provides ideological support and endorsement for fundamentalist groups like the Taliban to operate.

5. Increased criminal activities such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, criminal economy.

6. Lack of intention on the part of the Taliban and the international community for achieving a peaceful solution to the conflict in Afghanistan.

As an overall approach to address the peace issue in Afghanistan, public perception favoured four key elements:

1. That the solution to the conflict in Afghanistan be achieved by peaceful means, particularly through peace negotiations and reconciliation efforts.

2. That political and military pressure be applied on the Taliban when they refuse to negotiate with the government of Afghanistan.

3. Negotiation with Pakistan and resolving irredentist claims on Pakistan's territories by Afghanistan.

4. That the presence of international forces is necessary for the peace process.

The prospect of peace with the Taliban is complex. Public opinion holds that the Taliban does not have any intention to make peace. Irrespective of whether the Taliban enjoys any prospect of winning the war, for an insurgent group, a stalemate is a sign of success. The latest fascination with the imprudent ceasefire and supposed likelihood of an eventual lasting peace with the Taliban on Arafa day on 20 June 2018 runs the risk of making wishful thinking the basis of nurturing hopes for peace with the Taliban. It has been said that there is no alternative to 'peace' and a 'peace process'. However, within this fancy sensational rhetoric, the common people observe the pronounced 'peace process with the Taliban' as being synonymous with 'war'. The failure to reach a negotiated settlement with the Taliban despite the government's continuous calls for peace over the past 17 years is illustrative of the multi-dimensional, fallacious notions of peace processes in Afghanistan.

First, is the attempt to negotiate the terms of and to strike an agreement on peace in the absence of the people. The Taliban as a party to the conflict assumes that it can negotiate with the US and decide the fate of the people of Afghanistan in the absence of the people. The same is true with the US. The US contacts with the Taliban throughout 2010 to 2013 which led to establishment of Qatar office as well as its recent decision to speak directly with the Taliban and negotiate their demand of participation in the government and the US's military presence in Afghanistan has raised the following questions: on whose behalf was the US is talking to the Taliban? Whose interests will a prospective deal with the Taliban serve? Any negotiation with the Taliban should be arranged in a format where all

constituencies of Afghanistan have a say in determining the outcome of peace talks.

The second fallacy is the attempt to achieve peace through appeasement. It should be clear that peace cannot be purchased by merely appeasing a group that aims to achieve its goals by violent means. Ironically, on the flipside, the people who have been suffering from the violence and mass atrocities of the Taliban have been blamed for being the spoilers of the peace.

The third fallacy is the false notion that there is a national and international consensus on peace in Afghanistan. While there is an agreement on the desirability of a peaceful solution to the conflict in Afghanistan in rhetoric, in practice there is a dissension. The major challenge for this has been the lack of consensus on the specific model of peace. As a result, the multiple peace models proposed by these groups could not result in a single unanimous outcome. The multiple peace models in Afghanistan's context include: power-sharing with the Taliban at the central level (pursued during president Karzai tenure); peace in exchange for territory for the Taliban (proposed by Hekmatyar); and peace with the Taliban in exchange for recognition of people's rights and democracy by the Taliban, and demobilisation and reintegration of the Taliban (proposed both by the civil society and the anti-Taliban constituency).

The findings of this study demonstrate that (1) public opinion is strongly in favour of peace with the Taliban in exchange for recognition of people's rights and democracy; (2) one-third of the respondents supported sharing power with the Taliban at the local level; and (3) more than one-

third of the respondents argued that the Taliban should be demobilised and reintegrated into society to pursue normal life. They did not support the peace deal with Hekmatyar as a model for peace with the Taliban. They also viewed the peace deal with Hekmatyar as a failed agreement. Concerning the location for holding peace talks, a majority of the people favoured Afghanistan as the location for the talks.

The fourth fallacy is the notion that the peace process is Afghanistan-led and Afghanistan-owned. While the government and people of Afghanistan do not have ownership of the war in the country, the notion of ownership of the peace process is premature and imprudent rhetoric. As Barnett Rubin argues, one "cannot have a US-led war process and an Afghan-led peace process."

The fifth fallacy is a false moral equivalency. All parties to the conflict portray themselves as morally righteous and in some cases as victims of the conflict. The Taliban has been successful in selling their claim of being victims to their foot soldiers as well as some experts who now talk about the Taliban's victimhood. The same is the case with the other parties to the conflict. If Noam Chomsky's response in 2003 to a question on whether the US is an 'innocent victim' (Chomsky 2003) is viewed in the context of Afghanistan and the Taliban and on whether the Taliban is a 'victim', one would not be incorrect in saying that one can think of the Taliban as an innocent victim solely if one adopts the convenient path of ignoring the actions of the Taliban and its allies, which are, after all, hardly a secret.

The final fallacy is the notion that an *ad hoc* peace deal with the Taliban is capable of bringing peace in Afghanistan. Ignoring calls for justice and long-term peace-building mechanisms will not lead Afghanistan towards a sustainable peace. Instead of adopting a short-term conflict settlement approach, the conflict in Afghanistan should be addressed through conflict transformation mechanisms that take long-term aspects into account.

Even as the government of Afghanistan and the international community fail to endorse the importance of peace-building approaches and addressing the flaws mentioned above, the Taliban has been successful in regrouping as an insurgent group, acquiring recognition as a political force, and finally convincing a Great Power—the US—to negotiate with them directly. It is essential to inquire as to how the Taliban, a radical insurgent group—which is a discredited actor in the eyes of the people and does not enjoy public support—managed to take an entire country hostage and set the tone and agenda for the Great Power.

The current peace process in Afghanistan is one that has been embarked upon in haste and is driven by a rush to sign a peace deal with the top leadership of the Taliban. Meanwhile, disproportionately less effort has been invested towards addressing the key underlying issues that cause and fuel the conflict, or towards undertaking systematic steps to foster and enhance public consensus with regard to the process. The findings of this study show that awareness among the people about different dimensions of the process is low and that they do not trust the key institutions and stakeholders of the peace process. Peace studies literature and history show that a majority of peace agreements fail because they do not have popular

support. It is therefore important to move away from the current approach of rushing for 'peace talks' and instead towards a 'comprehensive peace process.' A comprehensive peace process would entail broadening public consensus through the inclusion of diverse sections of civil society and multi-layered community engagements; management of spoilers and addressing their root causes; development of state apparatuses, their legitimacy and efficiency; and finally, moving away from the prevailing narrow agenda. It is essential to approach peace as a high moral rather than as an alternative to failed military strategies.

Annex 1: Tables

Table 2 Demographic Profile of the respondents

Age	Percentage
18-28 Years Old	53.3
29-39 Years Old	27.8
Over 39 Years Old	18.9
Total	100.0
Education	Percentage
Illiterate	14.1
Primary Education	13.8
High School Graduate or below	25.5
Bachelor and Higher	44.8
Seminary Education	1.9
Total	100.0
Gender	Percentage
Female	42.9
Male	57.1
Total	100.0
Marital Status	Percentage
Single	33.8
Married	63.8
Widow	2.0
Divorced	0.2
Other	0.3
Total	100.0
Occupation	Percentage
Artisan/Craftsman	2.7
Civil Activist	2.4
Civil Servant	13.1
Employee	6.9
Entrepreneur/ Self Employed	16.7
Housewife	10.3
Jobless	9.3

Labourer	3.5
Peasant	3.9
Student	15.8
Teacher	12.6
Other	2.8
Total	100.0

Nationality	Percentage
Uzbek	10.2
Tajik	32.4
Pashtun	36.6
Hazara	14.7
Others	6.1
Total	100.0

Table 3 Respondents provinces

Province	Percentage	Province	Percentage
Badakhshan	4.6	Kunduz	5.3
Badghis	1.7	Lagman	1.4
Baghlan	3.0	Logar	1.5
Balkh	6.0	Nemroz	0.5
Bamyan	1.8	Nangarhar	5.8
Daikundi	1.8	Nuristan	0.5
Farah	1.7	Paktika	1.5
Faryab	3.2	Panjshir	0.5
Ghazni	4.1	Parwan	2.2
Ghor	2.3	Samangan	1.3
Helmand	3.3	Sar-e Pul	1.8
Herat	7.1	Takhar	3.3
Kabul	14.9	Uruzgan	1.2
Kandahar	5.5	Wardak	2.0
Kapisa	1.5	Zabul	1.0
Khost	1.8	Jawzjan	1.9
Kunar	1.6	Paktia	2.4
Total		**100.0**	

Table 4 Respondents regions

Regions	Percentage	Regions	Percentage
North	30.4	Kabul	14.9
Central	15.5	West	12.8
East	15.1	South	11.5
Total			100.0

Table 5 Level of awareness regarding the peace process

	Percentage
Little Awareness	51.5
Much Awareness	33.9
No Awareness	14

Table 6 Level of awareness regarding the peace process; by gender

	Female	Male
No Awareness	15.9	13.4
Little Awareness	57.8	47.0
Much Awareness	26.4	39.6

Pearson chi2(2)=38.8514Sig.= 0.000

Table 7 Level of awareness regarding the peace process; by nationality

	No Awareness	Little Awareness	Much Awareness	Total
Uzbek	13.6	36.9	49.5	100.0
Tajik	17.0	51.8	31.3	100.0
Pashtun	11.3	50.2	38.5	100.0
Hazara	16.8	64.4	18.8	100.0
Others	16.1	53.2	30.7	100.0

Pearson chi2(8) =68.8544Sig.= 0.000

Table 8 Level of awareness regarding the conditions laid down by the Taliban for peace

	Percentage
No	44.1
To an Extent	29.6
Yes	26.3

Table 9 Level of awareness regarding the conditions laid down by the Taliban for peace; by gender

	Female	Male
No	48.2	41.0
To an Extent	31.0	28.6
Yes	20.8	30.4

Pearson chi2(2) =23.9219Sig.= 0.000

Table 10 Level of awareness regarding the conditions laid down by the Taliban for peace; by nationality

	Uzbek	Tajik	Pashtun	Hazara	Others
No	42.9	49.0	36.4	53.7	42.7
To an Extent	31.2	27.8	31.2	30.5	25.0
Yes	25.9	23.2	32.4	15.8	32.3

Pearson chi2(8) =49.3625Sig.= 0.000

Table 11 Perception regarding the conditions laid down by the Taliban

	Percentage
Foreign troops should leave Afghanistan	26.0
The Taliban has share in central government	16.8
Constitution amendment according to the Sharia law	16.1
Self-governance at local level	6.5
Government should accept Pakistan policies	5.2
Establishment of ceasefire	3.6

Table 12 Level of awareness regarding the conditions laid down by the government

	Percentage
Yes	37.7
No	34.3
To an Extent	28.1

Table 13 Level of awareness regarding the conditions laid down by the government; by nationality

	Uzbek	Tajik	Pashtun	Hazara	Others
Yes	36.9	31.1	47.9	26.8	38.7
No	37.9	41.5	26.3	35.6	33.1
To an Extent	25.2	27.3	25.8	37.6	28.2

Table 14 Perception regarding the conditions laid down by the government for peace

	Percentage
The Taliban should accept the constitution of Afghanistan	44.2
They should terminate their relations with Pakistan	38.6
They should end anti-government activities	37.4
They should end relations with al-Qaida terrorist groups	35.9
Establishment of ceasefire	13.7

Table 15 Level of awareness regarding the US's South Asia strategy

	Female	Male	Total
No	63.6	46.5	53.9
To an Extent	24.4	25.7	25.1
Yes	12.0	27.8	21.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(2) = 86.2549Sig. = 0.000

Table 16 Level of awareness regarding the US's South Asia strategy; by nationality

	Uzbek	Tajik	Pashtun	Hazara	Others
No	36.1	55.9	50.9	66.1	61.3
To an Extent	37.6	25.3	24.6	21.1	16.1
Yes	26.3	18.8	24.6	12.8	22.6

Pearson chi2(8) =60.4947Sig.= 0.000

Table 17 Appropriate description for the Taliban; by nationality

	Uzbek	Tajik	Pashtun	Hazara
Mercenaries	10.2	17.4	6.4	23.0
Mujahideen	3.9	1.8	4.6	2.0
Political Opposition	11.2	18.1	28.5	9.1
Dissatisfied Brothers	22.3	14.8	36.2	9.5
Enemies of Afghanistan	22.3	20.1	12.6	22.0
Insurgents	14.1	12.4	5.3	7.1
Terrorists	16.0	15.1	6.4	27.0
Do not Know	0.0	0.3	0.1	0.3

Table 18 Appropriate description for the Taliban; by the level of acceptability of their behaviour

	Very Little	Little	Much	Very Much
Mercenaries	8.3	11.5	4.8	8.6
Mujahideen	1.9	4.7	14.3	17.2
Political Opposition	25.4	26.2	29.3	17.2
Dissatisfied Brothers	24.1	24.0	32.7	34.5
Enemies of Afghanistan	17.1	17.1	9.5	6.9
Insurgents	10.5	9.4	4.1	12.1
Terrorists	12.4	6.9	5.4	3.5
Do not Know	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.0

Table 19 Comparison of the Taliban with ISKP

Comparison of the Taliban with ISKP	Percentage
Both are terrorists	39.9
ISKP is more radical than the Taliban	24.8
ISKP is a form of the Taliban	13.8
ISKP is an international organisation but the Taliban is national	21.5

Table 20 Comparison of the Taliban and ISKP; by nationality

	Uzbek	Tajik	Pashtun	Hazara	Others
Both are terrorist	45.2	42.0	32.7	47.3	45.2
ISIS is more radical than the Taliban	23.3	23.8	26.9	23.5	23.4
ISIS is a form of the Taliban	18.0	17.6	9.7	12.8	14.5
ISIS is an international organization but the Taliban is national	13.6	16.6	30.8	16.4	16.9

Table 21 Acceptability of the Taliban's policies and conduct

	Percentage
None	58.2
Little	16.0
Very Little	15.7
Much Acceptable	7.3
Very Much Acceptable	2.9

Table 22 Acceptability of the Taliban's policies and conduct; by region

	North	Central	East	Kabul	West	South
None	60.8	50.8	41.0	76.4	64.5	53.4
Little	15.0	20.4	23.0	9.6	13.1	14.7
Very Little	15.9	15.7	23.6	8.0	21.2	8.6
Much Acceptable	5.7	8.3	11.5	1.7	1.2	18.5
Very Much Acceptable	2.6	4.8	1.0	4.3	0.0	4.7

Pearson chi2(20) = 195.2442Sig.= 0.000

Table 23 Acceptability of the Taliban's policies and conduct; by the character of the Taliban

	Mercenaries	Mujahedeen	Political Opposition	Dissatisfied Brothers	Enemies of Afghanistan	Do not Know	Insurgents	Terrorists
None	71.9	17.5	45.2	52.0	64.9	50.0	58.5	74.6
Little	13.9	23.8	21.2	16.7	15.2	25.0	16.4	7.9
Very Little	9.7	9.5	20.2	16.5	14.9	25.0	18.0	13.9
Much Acceptable	2.6	33.3	10.9	10.4	3.9	0.0	3.3	2.9
Very Much Acceptable	1.9	15.9	2.5	4.3	1.1	0.0	3.8	0.7

Pearson chi2(28)= 241.6658Sig= 0.000

Table 24 Perception regarding the Taliban's ability to govern effectively

	Percentage
No	73.2
Do not Know	19.2
Yes	7.6

Table 25 Perception regarding the Taliban's ability to govern effectively; by education

	Illiterate	Primary Education	High School Graduate or Below	Bachelor or Above	Seminary Education
No	69.8	70.4	71.1	78.1	54.1
Do not Know	22.4	19.0	21.4	16.0	24.3
Yes	7.8	10.6	7.5	5.8	21.6

Pearson chi2(8) =30.3960Sig.= 0.000

Table 26 Acceptability of the conditions laid down by the Taliban

	Percentage
No	39.8
Not Sure	36.3
Yes	23.9

Table 27 Acceptability of the conditions laid down by the Taliban; by nationality

	Uzbek	**Tajik**	**Pashtun**	**Hazara**	**Others**
No	36.9	44.1	33.1	49	38.7
Not Sure	42.7	37.6	31.6	41.3	36.3
Yes	20.4	18.3	35.4	9.7	25

Pearson chi2(8) = 102.8922Sig.= 0.000

Table 28 Acceptability of the Taliban; by the level of satisfaction from HPC

	Highly Dissatisfied	**Dissatisfied**	**Satisfied**	**Highly Satisfied**
No	45.4	42.0	35.5	24.8
Not Sure	33.2	38.2	35.7	32.7
Yes	21.4	19.7	28.7	42.6

Pearson chi2(6) =42.6316Sig.= 0.000

Table 29 Perception regarding the current peace process; by gender

	Female	**Male**
Failed	65.6	61.6
Partly Successful	<u>16.5</u>	<u>25.0</u>
Do not Know	14.0	9.2
Successful	3.9	4.2

Pearson chi2(3) =28.7560Sig. = 0.000

Table 30 Perception regarding the level of failure of the peace process; by nationality

	Uzbek	**Tajik**	**Pashtun**	**Hazara**	**Others**
Failed	73.3	70.7	49.3	73.5	67.7
Partly Successful	15.5	19.9	28.5	12.4	17.7
Do not Know	8.3	6.9	15.1	13.1	11.3
Successful	2.9	2.6	7.2	1.0	3.2

Pearson chi2(12) = 122.6786Sig.= 0.000

Table 31 Perception regarding the level of failure of the peace process;by zone

	North	Central	East	Kabul	West	South
Failed	71.5	69.4	37.7	77.4	70.7	40.5
Partly Successful	16.6	15.6	31.8	12	20.8	40.5
Do not Know	8.9	10.2	24.6	7.3	7.3	10.8
Successful	2.9	4.8	5.9	3.3	1.2	8.2

Pearson chi2(15) = 229.5909Sig. = 0.000

Table 32 Level of failure of the peace process; by effectiveness of HPC

	Not Effective at All	Not Effective	Neutral	Effective	Very Effective	Do not Know
Failed	75.3	57.7	66.1	61.9	57.9	<u>55.2</u>
Partly Successful	14.4	23.8	22.5	24.5	21.4	22.4
Do not Know	6.8	11.5	8.4	10.5	17.1	16.4
Successful	3.5	6.9	3.0	3.1	3.6	6.0

Pearson chi2(15) =61.5293Sig.= 0.000

Table 33 Perception regarding the level of failure of the peace process; by the perception regarding the level of possibility of peace

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Disagree
Failed	75.0	76.5	60.3	61.5
Partly Successful	6.8	13.7	25.0	21.1
Do not Know	15.9	8.3	10.8	11.8
Successful	2.3	1.5	3.9	5.5

Pearson chi2(9) =47.4099Sig. = 0.000

Table 34 Perception regarding the government of Afghanistan's weakness in the peace process

	Percentage
Government is corrupt	54.1
Government couldn't force Taliban to make peace	37.8
Government couldn't make national consensus	32.0
Government does not have legitimacy	29.8
Government couldn't make international consensus	24.8

Table 35 Chances of the Taliban's success in the war and the government's weakness

	No	Yes	Do not Know
Government is corrupt	51.9	62.9	57.8
Government couldn't force the Taliban to make peace	38.9	32.9	36.1
Government couldn't make national consensus	33.2	25.9	30.5
Government does not have legitimacy	27.3	43.4	33.0
Government couldn't make international consensus	25.2	23.1	24.2

Pearson chi2(31) =63.0364Sig. = 0.001

Table 36 Perception regarding whether the international community intends to make peace

	Percentage
No	42.1
Yes	25.1
Do not Know	32.8

Table 37 The reasons for the lack of intention in the international community to make peace

	Percentage
The US achieves its objectives through conflict	32.1
Making peace is not important to the US	21.7
The issue of the Taliban is a regional matter	9.1
The Taliban are terrorists	8.1

Table 38 The reasons for the lack of intention in the international community to make peace; by the result of the peace process

	Failed	Partly Successful	Successful	Do not know
US. achieves its objectives through conflict	35.2	30.1	22.9	21.5
Making peace is not important to the US	23.6	19.9	9.6	18.9
The issue of the Taliban is a regional matter	8.8	11.3	4.8	7.9
The Taliban are terrorists	8.7	6.7	6.0	8.8

Pearson chi2(45) =65.9132Sig. = 0.023

Table 39 Perception regarding whether the government of Afghanistan has the intention to make peace

	Percentage
No	11.1
Do not Know	15.5
Yes	73.4

Table 40 Perception regarding whether the Taliban has the intention to make peace

	Percentage
No	49.7
Do not Know	29.1
Yes	21.2

Table 41 Perception regarding whether the Taliban has the intention to make peace; by gender

	Female	Male
No	55.1	45.7
Do not Know	29.5	28.7
Yes	15.4	25.6
Pearson chi2(2) =33.2315Sig.= 0.000		

Table 42 Perception regarding whether the Taliban has the intention to make peace; by nationality

	Uzbek	Tajik	Pashtun	Hazara	Others
No	56.3	56.8	36.9	61.1	50.8
Do not Know	31.1	26.6	30.9	29.5	25.8
Yes	12.6	16.6	32.2	9.4	23.4
Pearson chi2(8) = 118.8887Sig.= 0.000					

Table 43 Perception regarding whether the Taliban has the intention to make peace; by education

	Illiterate	Primary Education	High School Graduate or below	Bachelor or Above	Seminary Education
No	46.3	45.6	44.7	56.1	40.5
Do not Know	28.5	28.5	31.3	27.4	24.3
Yes	25.3	25.9	24	16.6	35.1
Pearson chi2(8) =33.0564Sig.= 0.000					

Table 44 Chances of the Taliban's success in the war

	Percentage
No	69.4
Do not Know	23.5
Yes	7.1

Table 45 Perception regarding the chances of the Taliban's success in the war; by acceptability of their behaviour

	Very Little	Little	Much Acceptable	Very Much Acceptable	None
No	62.6	68.1	57.1	58.6	73.8
Do not Know	33	25.4	19.7	12.1	21.5
Yes	4.4	6.5	23.1	29.3	4.7

Pearson chi2(8) = 135.9688Sig = 0.000

Table 46 Perception regarding the possibility of peace with the Taliban

	Percentage
Strongly Disagree	6.5
Disagree	10.1
Agree	48.4
Strongly Agree	35.0

Table 47 Perception regarding the possibility of peace with the Taliban; by the appropriate description for the Taliban

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Mercenaries	9.3	16.0	45.5	29.1
Mujahideen	1.6	6.4	44.4	47.6
Political Opposition	2.3	5.8	49.8	42.2
Dissatisfied Brothers	2.4	5.2	48.9	43.5
Enemies of Afghanistan	9.1	11.1	48.3	31.5
Do not Know	0.0	0.0	25.0	75.0
Insurgents	6.6	10.9	55.7	26.8
Terrorists	14.3	17.1	44.6	23.9

Pearson chi2(45) =62.9122Sig. = 0.001

Table 48 Perception regarding the possibility of peace with the Taliban; by the level of change in security dynamics post the Hekmatyar deal

	None	Little	A Lot
Agree	46.6	51.3	47.6
Strongly Agree	31.9	34.6	39.9
Disagree	12.8	8.9	7.6
Strongly Disagree	8.7	5.1	4.8
Pearson chi2(6) =24.7390Sig.= 0.000			

Table 49 People's intention to make peace with the Taliban

	Female	Male	Total
Yes	72.0	86.6	80.3
No	28.0	13.4	19.7
Pearson chi2(1) =66.3778sig = 0.000			

Table 50 People's intention to make peace with the Taliban; by region

	North	Central	East	Kabul	West	South
Yes	77.6	79.9	94.1	64.8	78.0	93.0
No	22.4	20.1	5.9	35.2	22.0	7.0
Pearson chi2(10) = 147.5371Sig.= 0.000						

Table 51 Level of satisfaction and happiness about peace with the Taliban

	Percentage
Very Much	42.0
Much	30.2
Little	13.5
Not at All	8.4
Very Little	6.0

Table 52 Level of satisfaction and happiness about peace with the Taliban; by region

	North	Central	East	Kabul	West	South
Very Much	41.3	40.1	58.4	26.2	39.4	47.8
Much	32.7	32.8	26.9	23.9	27.4	35.8
Little	11.7	11.8	9.5	19.9	18.1	12.1
Not at All	7.8	10.5	1.3	18.6	9.7	1.7
Very Little	6.5	4.8	3.9	11.3	5.4	2.6

Pearson chi2(15) = 119.3008Sig.= 0.000

Table 53 Effective approaches to deal with the Taliban

	Percentage
Reconciliation	56.3
Peace Negotiation	37.6
Military Confrontation and Suppression	24.5
Mediation of Third Party	17.0

Table 54 Approaches to follow as the Taliban reject peace

	Female	Male	Total
Continued military action	42.4	39.7	40.9
Continuation of peace efforts	29.1	31.6	30.5
Enhancing pressure on the Taliban	20.7	18.3	19.3
Increasing of sanctions of the UN	7.8	9.5	8.8

Pearson chi2(4) =12.7224Sig = 0.013

Table 55 Possible steps for ending the conflict in Afghanistan at the international level

	Percentage
Direct negotiation with Pakistan and addressing their concerns including the Durand Border of Afghanistan	43.9
Enhancing pressure on the Taliban through international organizations	41.6
Withdrawal of international forces	33.3
Engaging the neighbouring countries and constructing a regional consensus	32.8
Militarily defeating the Taliban with the help of international forces	17.6

Table 56 How much do the international forces help the peace process

	Female	Male	Total
Some	27.8	21.4	24.1
Not at All Helpful	18.6	24.0	21.7
Very Much	22.8	19.7	21.0
Little	19.6	20.4	20.0
Very Little	11.2	14.4	13.0

Table 57 How much do the international forces help the peace process; by nationality

	Uzbek	Tajik	Pashtun	Hazara	Others
Some	22.8	22.5	23.5	32.6	19.4
Not at All Helpful	12.1	19.1	29.8	12.8	25
Very Much	32.5	19.9	18.1	22.8	21.8
Little	18.4	23.9	15.1	23.8	21.8
Very Little	14.1	14.7	13.5	8.1	12.1
Pearson chi2(16) =96.2954Sig.= 0.000					

Table 58 How much do the international forces help the peace process; by region

	North	Central	East	Kabul	West	South
Some	22.8	22.9	18.4	26.0	25.1	33.6
Not at All Helpful	15.1	21.3	40.3	21.0	14.3	24.6
Very Much	26.3	19.1	12.8	17.7	20.8	25.0
Little	20.5	25.5	14.4	23.0	23.6	11.2
Very Little	15.3	11.1	14.1	12.3	16.2	5.6
Pearson chi2(20) = 141.4140Sig.= 0.000						

Table 59 Perception regarding the effectiveness of the presence of international forces; by the chances of the Taliban's success in the war

	No	Yes	Do not Know
Some	24.8	16.8	24.4
Not at All Helpful	18.9	31.5	27.3
Very Much	23.7	18.2	14.1
Little	19.4	17.5	22.7
Very Little	13.2	16.1	11.6
Pearson chi2(8) =42.3946Sig. = 0.000			

*Table 60 Perception regarding the effectiveness of the presence of international forces;
by the level of education*

	Illiterate	Primary Education	High School Graduate or Below	Bachelor or Above
Some	20.6	21.9	26.7	24.6
Not at All Helpful	29.2	24.1	18.1	21.2
Very Much	18.9	21.5	20.4	21.7
Little	16.7	20.8	21.6	20.0
Very Little	14.6	11.7	13.2	12.5

Pearson chi2(16) =27.7781Sig. = 0.034

*Table 61 Perception regarding the effectiveness of the presence of international forces;
by the appropriate description for the Taliban*

	Not at All	Very Little	Little	Some	Very Much
Mercenaries	19.8	12.7	22.0	26.9	18.7
Mujahideen	31.8	17.5	22.2	15.9	12.7
Political Opposition	22.5	12.4	21.0	23.5	20.7
Dissatisfied Brothers	28.9	15.7	17.0	18.5	20.0
Enemies of Afghanistan	19.1	12.4	20.4	27.9	20.2
Do notKnow	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Insurgents	17.5	7.1	29.5	23.0	23.0
Terrorists	13.6	12.9	15.1	30.5	28.0

Pearson chi2(28) =88.6776Sig. = 0.000

Table 62 Level of agreement with the US's South Asia strategy

	Percentage
Not sure	45.6
No	28.5
Yes	25.9

*Table 63 Level of agreement with the US's South Asia strategy; by the chances of the
Taliban's success in the war*

	No	Yes	Do not Know
Not sure	43.2	31.2	57.2
No	28.0	46.4	24.3
Yes	28.8	22.5	18.5

Pearson chi2(4) =53.0598Sig. = 0.000

Table 64 Level of agreement with the US's South Asia strategy; by the importance of the role of women in the peace process

	Not Important at All	Very Little	Little	Important	Very Important	Do not Know
Not sure	45.1	54.8	44.4	43.8	44.5	25.0
No	39.4	24.4	33.9	23.8	27.0	25.0
Yes	15.5	20.7	21.7	32.4	28.5	50.0

Pearson chi2(10) =49.5046Sig. = 0.000

Table 65 Level of agreement with regard to giving concessions to the Taliban

	Percentage
To an Extent Agree	40.7
Disagree	28.1
Strongly Disagree	17.0
Strongly Agree	14.3

Table 66 Concessions to the Taliban

	Percentage
Giving them a share in the local governance	30.3
Amnesty should be offered to the Taliban	20.1
Appoint them leaders in the government	18.4
Giving them money and property	15.9
Amending the laws and policies according to their view	9.9
No privilege at all	6.5

Table 67 Level of agreement with regard to giving concessions to the Taliban; by gender

	Female	Male
To an Extent Agree	36.5	43.8
Disagree	34.5	23.4
Strongly Disagree	19.4	15.1
Strongly Agree	9.6	17.7

Pearson chi2(1) =47.2607Sig. = 0.000

Table 68 Level of agreement with regard to giving concessions to the Taliban; by nationality

	Uzbek	Tajik	Pashtun	Hazara	Others
To an Extent Agree	42.7	35.3	49.1	31	34.1
Disagree	20.9	31	22.2	39.7	36.6
Strongly Disagree	16.5	21.5	10.7	22.2	19.5
Strongly Agree	19.9	12.2	18	7.1	9.8

Pearson chi2(4) =99.1680Sig. = 0.000

Table 69 Conditions laid down by the people for peace with the Taliban

	Percentage
They must respect human rights, citizen rights and women rights	59.5
They must relinquish violence and killings	54.2
They should respect Afghanistan Constitution	49.0
Peace talks must be transparent	39.7
Establishment of ceasefire	31.3
No condition at all	10.4

Table 70 Conditions laid down by the people for peace with the Taliban; by gender

	Female	Male
They must respect human, citizen and women rights	67.8	53.3
They must relinquish violence and killings	63.2	47.5
They should respect Afghanistan Constitution	49.5	48.7
Peace talks must be transparent	37.1	41.7
Establishment of ceasefire	25.7	35.6
No condition at all	7.5	12.6
Pearson chi2(51) = 187.1762Sig.= 0.000		

Table 71 Conditions laid down by the people for peace with the Taliban; by the level of importance of the role of women in the peace process

	Not Important at All	Very Little	Little	Important	Very Important	Do not Know
They must respect human, citizen and women rights	45.7	53.0	57.1	65.2	64.4	0.0
They must relinquish violence and killings	53.9	47.9	56.0	55.9	58.5	0.0
They should respect Afghanistan Constitution	37.4	52.5	59.7	55.5	52.8	75.0
Peace talks must be transparent	31.7	34.2	40.3	36.4	38.8	25.0
Establishment of ceasefire	25.2	35.2	33.2	27.9	26.8	25.0
No condition at all	20.0	10.0	9.4	5.7	5.9	0.0
Pearson chi2(230)= 339.8457Sig.= 0.000						

Table 72 Conditions laid down by the people for peace with the Taliban; by level of awareness of the conditions laid down by the Taliban

	No	To an Extent	Yes
They must respect human, citizen and women rights	57.3	60.3	62.4
They must relinquish violence and killings	54.2	51.8	57.0
They should respect Afg. Constitution	39.9	54.8	57.9
Peace talks must be transparent	36.8	39.8	44.5
Establishment of ceasefire	29.6	30.0	35.7
No condition at all	13.2	9.2	7.1

Pearson chi2(102)= 161.0365Sig.= 0.000

Table 73 Level of acceptance of the conditions for peace laid down by the government of Afghanistan

	Percentage
Yes	65.6
Not Sure	25.7
No	8.7

Table 74 Perceptions regarding the conditions laid down by the government of Afghanistan for peace talks

	Percentage
The Taliban ends relations with Pakistan	47.2
The Taliban should accept the constitution	46.3
The Taliban ends relations with terrorist groups	41.9
The Taliban ends anti-government activities	40.2
Ceasefire	17.7

Table 75 Level of importance of the role of women in the peace process

	Percentage
Important	29.9
Very Important	27.1
Little	18.8
Not Important at All	12.3
Very Little	11.7
Do not Know	0.2

Table 76 Level of importance of the role of women in the peace process; by education

	Illiterate	Primary Education	High School Graduate or below	Bachelor or Above	Seminary Education
Important	28.9	34.1	28.6	29.2	12.1
Very Important	21.5	23.8	23.2	32.0	24.2
Little	19.9	17.2	21.2	17.8	27.3
Not Important at All	14.2	14.6	13.5	10.0	30.3
Very Little	15.0	10.0	13.3	10.8	6.1
Do not Know	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.0
Pearson chi2(20) =43.7907Sig.= 0.002					

Table 77 Effect of the Hekmatyar peace deal on the improvement in the security situation; by nationality

	Uzbek	Tajik	Pashtun	Hazara	Others
None	59.8	61.4	34.6	60	58.5
Little	24.7	25.1	39	26.9	26.8
A lot	15.5	13.5	26.4	13.1	14.6
Pearson chi2(8)= 124.8197Sig.= 0.000					

Table 78 Effect of the Hekmatyar peace deal on the improvement in the security situation; by region

	North	Central	East	Kabul	West	South
None	60.1	51.6	40.0	57.8	56.9	25.9
Little	26.4	29.6	38.7	28.2	35.1	30.6
A lot	13.5	18.8	21.3	14.0	8.1	43.5
Pearson chi2(10) = 163.7070Sig.= 0.000						

Table 79 Peace with Hekmatyar was a good decision

	Female	Male	Total
Agree	37.2	41.3	39.5
Disagree	22.2	20.5	21.2
Strongly Disagree	18.1	13.4	15.4
Do not Know	15.8	11.8	13.5
Strongly Agree	6.8	13.1	10.4

Table 80 The peace deal with Hekmatyar could be a model for peace with the Taliban

	Female	Male	Total
Agree	34.2	38.7	36.8
Disagree	23.7	21.3	22.3
Do not Know	18.2	16.3	17.1
Strongly Disagree	18.0	13.1	15.2
Strongly Agree	6.0	10.5	8.6
Pearson chi2(4) =24.6866Sig = 0.000			

Table 81 Peace with Hekmatyar was a good decision; by nationality

	Uzbek	Tajik	Pashtun	Hazara	Others
Agree	30.1	31.8	57.4	21.5	29.3
Disagree	16.0	29.5	11.2	30.9	31.7
Strongly Disagree	20.4	16.8	6.5	28.9	24.4
Do notKnow	24.3	14.0	10.3	13.1	9.8
Strongly Agree	9.2	7.9	14.7	5.7	4.9
Pearson chi2(36) = 329.6481Sig.= 0.000					

Table 82 The peace deal with Hekmatyar could be a model for peace with the Taliban; by nationality

	Uzbek	Tajik	Pashtun	Hazara	Others	Total
Agree	26.7	33.4	49.1	24.8	26.6	36.8
Disagree	19.9	26.9	15.2	29.2	27.4	22.3
Do not Know	21.4	14.8	19.0	13.1	20.2	17.1
Strongly Disagree	19.4	17.3	7.4	26.5	16.9	15.2
Strongly Agree	12.6	7.6	9.2	6.4	8.9	8.6
Pearson chi2(16)= 159.2677Sig.= 0.000						

Table 83 The peace deal with Hekmatyar could be a model for peace with the Taliban; by level of acceptability of the Taliban's conduct

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Do not Know
None	68.2	60.2	56.0	51.1	55.0
Little	14.3	15.5	17.2	14.9	15.9
Very Little	10.7	16.2	15.9	14.9	19.6
Much Acceptable	5.2	6.0	8.1	13.2	6.1
Very Much Acceptable	1.6	2.2	2.8	5.7	3.5
Pearson chi2(16)=38.5702Sig.= 0.001					

Table 84 The peace deal with Hekmatyar could be a model for peace with the Taliban;
by the character of the Taliban

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Do not Know
Dissatisfied Brothers	16.2	13.8	28.6	26.4	26.3
Political Opposition	11.0	18.7	21.8	27.0	20.2
Enemies of Afghanistan	18.2	19.2	15.7	17.8	21.1
Terrorists	22.7	16.7	10.0	8.0	13.6
Mercenaries	19.2	18.3	10.6	10.3	9.0
Insurgents	9.7	11.1	8.9	5.2	8.1
Mujahideen	2.9	2.2	4.1	4.6	1.7
Do not Know	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.6	0.0
Pearson chi2(28)= 133.9687Sig.= 0.000					

Table 85 Best country to host negotiations; by nationality

	Uzbek	Tajik	Pashtun	Hazara	Others
Afghanistan	56.3	56.3	55.6	59.6	54.8
Saudi Arabia	18.0	13.1	21.3	7.4	14.5
Qatar	8.3	11.0	13.9	8.4	10.5
Pakistan	14.1	15.0	5.4	16.2	11.3
Pearson chi2(96) = 214.7616Sig. = 0.000					

Table 86 Best country to host negotiations; by the perception regarding the Taliban's
intention to make peace

	No	Yes	Do not Know
Afghanistan	61.2	47.4	54.9
Saudi Arabia	12.0	19.3	19.9
Qatar	9.6	15.8	11.1
Pakistan	11.0	13.5	10.2
Pearson chi2(48) =81.9286Sig.= 0.002			

Table 87 Perception regarding establishing an office for the Taliban in Afghanistan

	Percentage
Agree	34.1
Disagree	21.3
Strongly Disagree	16.7
Strongly Agree	16.4
Do not Know	11.5

Table 88 Perception regarding establishing an office for the Taliban in Afghanistan; by gender

	Female	Male
Agree	29.0	37.9
Disagree	24.2	19.2
Strongly Disagree	21.2	13.4
Strongly Agree	12.5	19.4
Do not Know	13.1	10.2
Pearson chi2(4) =52.8654Sig. = 0.000		

Table 89 Perception regarding establishing an office for the Taliban in Afghanistan; by region

	North	Central	East	Kabul	West	South
Agree	29.8	20.1	43.3	34.6	41.3	43.5
Disagree	20.7	31.8	18.0	25.2	21.2	8.2
Strongly Disagree	19.8	29.0	5.2	18.6	16.6	4.7
Strongly Agree	16.1	7.0	25.9	12.3	7.7	32.8
Do not Know	13.7	12.1	7.5	9.3	13.1	10.8
Pearson chi2(20) = 249.5222Sig. = 0.000						

Table 90 Perception regarding establishing an office for the Taliban in Afghanistan; by nationality

	Uzbek	Tajik	Pashtun	Hazara	Others
Agree	33.0	32.2	43.2	20.8	23.4
Disagree	17.0	25.3	17.8	22.8	24.2
Strongly Disagree	16.0	19.1	6.5	35.2	21.8
Strongly Agree	20.9	10.4	23.8	8.7	16.1
Do not Know	13.1	13.0	8.8	12.4	14.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Pearson chi2(16) = 221.7159Sig.= 0.000					

Table 91 Possibility of peace with the Taliban and establishing an office for them in Afghanistan

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Agree	22	15.7	36.3	38.5
Disagree	23.5	27	21.6	18.9
Strongly Disagree	36.4	34.3	13.3	12.8
Strongly Agree	4.5	12.7	16.1	20.1
Do not Know	13.6	10.3	12.7	9.7
Pearson chi2(20) = 249.5222Sig. = 0.000				

Table 92 Best country to host negotiations; by the characterization the Taliban

	Afghanistan	Pakistan	Qatar	Saudi Arabia
Mercenaries	69.1	13.7	8.8	8.4
Mujahideen	36.7	21.7	16.7	25.0
Political Opposition	52.3	11.2	16.4	20.1
Dissatisfied Brothers	60.5	8.1	10.8	20.6
Enemies of Afghanistan	58.6	12.8	11.0	17.7
Do not Know	75.0	0.0	0.0	25.0
Insurgents	61.5	12.6	13.8	12.1
Terrorists	63.5	14.5	9.8	12.2
Pearson chi2(168) = 223.4235Sig. = 0.003				

Table 93 Shortcomings of the HPC

	Percentage
Lacks competence and independence	46.5
Foreigners intervention in the affairs of council	43.1
Lacks public support	38.8
Existence of corruption in the council	37.5
Lack of knowledge on the techniques of negotiations and mediations	23.5
Do not Know	5.4

Table 94 Satisfaction from HPC; by gender

	Female	Male
Not Satisfied	39.9	33.4
Satisfied	33.2	33.4
Highly Dissatisfied	23.8	26.5
Highly Satisfied	3.1	6.8
Pearson chi2(5) =73.8056Sig. = 0.000		

Table 95 Satisfaction with the HPC; by nationality

	Uzbek	Tajik	Pashtun	Hazara	Others
Not Satisfied	41.7	37.6	32.4	39.5	36.6
Satisfied	23.3	32.5	38.6	28.9	30.1
Highly Dissatisfied	27.8	25.4	23.2	27.6	28.5
Highly Satisfied	7.2	4.5	5.8	4.1	4.9
Pearson chi2(12) =25.5436Sig. = 0.012					

Table 96 Satisfaction with the HPC; by level of education

	Illiterate	Primary Education	High School Graduate or below	Bachelor or Above	Seminary Education
Not Satisfied	30.8	28.4	36.9	39.8	25.7
Satisfied	42.6	39	31.7	29.8	25.7
Highly Dissatisfied	22.4	26.5	24.6	26.3	37.1
Highly Satisfied	4.2	6.1	6.9	4.1	11.4
Pearson chi2(12) =35.6017Sig.= 0.000					

Table 97 Failure of the peace process and the level of dissatisfaction with the HPC

	Failed	Partly Successful	Successful	Do not Know
Not Satisfied	41.0	25.1	18.3	37.1
Satisfied	26.0	55.2	43.9	29.4
Highly Dissatisfied	30.2	10.7	15.9	28.5
Highly Satisfied	2.8	9.0	22.0	5.0
Pearson chi2(9) = 231.1193Sig. = 0.000				

Table 98 Satisfaction with the HPC; by the effect of the Hekmatyar peace deal

	None	Little	A Lot
Not Satisfied	39.2	38.1	25.2
Satisfied	27.2	34.3	47.9
Highly Dissatisfied	30.0	24.2	13.6
Highly Satisfied	3.6	3.4	13.3
Pearson chi2(6) = 127.6947Sig.= 0.000			

Table 99 Beneficiary of the conflict in Afghanistan

	Percentage

Pakistan		80.0
Criminal Networks and Drug Dealers		55.2
The West and US		53.3
Iran		43.3
Illegal Armed Groups		38.9
High Ranking Government Officials		23.9

Table 100 Beneficiary of the conflict in Afghanistan; by the characterization of the Taliban

	Mercenaries	Mujahideen	Political Opposition	Dissatisfied Brothers	Enemies of Afghanistan	Do not Know	Insurgents	Terrorists
Pakistan	79.1	69.8	80.1	78.7	83.1	75.0	81.4	80.7
Criminal Networks and Drug	48.9	44.4	61.1	58.5	51.7	50.0	54.6	55.7
The West and US.	55.6	66.7	54.0	59.6	42.8	50.0	48.1	52.1
Iran	39.9	39.7	49.7	49.8	37.3	50.0	41.0	37.1
Illegal Armed Groups	31.3	34.9	43.7	40.7	38.1	25.0	36.6	40.4
High Ranking Government	23.9	20.6	26.8	23.9	18.8	0.0	23.0	28.2
Pearson chi2(399) = 499.0771Sig.= 0.000								

Table 101 Beneficiary of the conflict in Afghanistan; by whether or not the peace process has been successful

	Failed	**Partly Successful**	**Successful**	**Do not Know**
Pakistan	80.7	80.1	65.1	81.6
Criminal Networks and Drug	54.0	60.2	50.6	54.4
The West and US.	52.5	55.3	62.7	50.4
Iran	40.8	49.3	48.2	44.3
Illegal Armed Groups	38.0	40.5	36.1	42.1
High Ranking Government	24.9	20.4	21.7	26.3
Pearson chi2(171) = 204.7350Sig.= 0.040				

Table 102 The extent to which neighbouring countries can play an effective role

	Percentage
Much	39.8

Very Much	31.2
Little	16.1
None	6.8
Very Little	6.0

Table 103 The extent to which neighbouring countries can play an effective role; by gender

	Female	Male
Much	42.3	37.8
Very Much	25.9	35.5
Little	17.0	15.4
None	8.0	5.8
Very Little	6.7	5.5
Pearson chi2(57)= 150.6827Sig.= 0.000		

Table 104 The extent to which neighbouring countries can play an effective role; by the possibility of peace

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Much	36.9	35.5	44.4	35.3
Very Much	28.5	29.5	27.8	37.1
Little	15.4	17.0	16.4	15.8
None	10.8	10.5	6.2	5.6
Very Little	8.5	7.5	5.2	6.2
Pearson chi2(12)=32.3056Sig.= 0.001				

Table 105 Approaches to reintegrate the Taliban with the society

Approaches to reintegrate the Taliban with society	Percentage
They should put their weapons away and go back to normal life	44.3
They should put their weapons away and join Islamic institutions and Madrasas	20.9
They should put their weapons away and establish a political party	20.5
They should integrate into provincial and national governments and security forces	13.3

Table 106 Approaches to reintegrate the Taliban with the society; by gender

	Female	Male
They should put their weapons away and go back to normal life	48.0	41.6

They should put their weapons away and join Islamic institutions and Madrasas	26.9	16.5
They should put their weapons away and establish a political party	13.9	25.4
They should integrate into provincial and national governments and security forces	10.3	15.6

Pearson chi2(5) =72.9531Sig. = 0.000

Table 107 Effectiveness of institutions in the peace process (summary statistics)

	Obs.	Mean	Var.	SD.	Min.	Max	Sum.
Ulama *Shura*	1946	3.52	1.90	1.38	1	5	6859
Media	1911	3.40	1.81	1.35	1	5	6494
Ethnic and Former Jahadi Leaders	1953	3.28	1.78	1.33	1	5	6399
National Grand Jirga	1893	2.99	2.00	1.41	1	5	5669
High Peace Council	1889	2.95	2.07	1.44	1	5	5575
Civil Society Activists	1908	2.86	1.78	1.33	1	5	5463
National *Shura*	1890	2.82	1.84	1.36	1	5	5329
Political Parties	1941	2.76	1.53	1.24	1	5	5357
Provincial *Shura*	1903	2.56	1.84	1.36	1	5	4873

Table 108 Effectiveness of countries in peace process (summary statistics)

	Obs.	Mean	Var.	SD.	Min.	Max	Sum.
The US	1939	3.56	2.50	1.58	1	5	6904
OIC	1892	3.55	1.67	1.29	1	5	6723
Pakistan	1958	3.35	2.48	1.57	1	5	6569
UNAMA	1816	3.29	1.78	1.33	1	5	5973
Saudi Arabia	1901	3.25	1.75	1.32	1	5	6182
Russia	1851	3.20	1.99	1.41	1	5	5924
Iran	1902	2.97	1.83	1.35	1	5	5651
Qatar	1861	2.92	1.59	1.26	1	5	5440
China	1866	2.90	1.76	1.33	1	5	5420
UAE	1840	2.89	1.66	1.29	1	5	5318
Turkey	1855	2.86	1.58	1.26	1	5	5299
India	1877	2.76	1.63	1.28	1	5	5185
Indonesia	1731	2.35	1.77	1.33	1	5	4075

Table 109 Factors associated with perceptions regarding the possibility of peace talks, using OLS regression analysis

People Who are More Likely to Say that Peace Talks with the Taliban is Possible are More Likely to:
Be aware of the peace process.
Be satisfied with HPC in negotiation with the Taliban.
Say that the Taliban cannot win the war against government.
Agree that privileges should be given to the Taliban for peace deal.
Accept the Taliban conditions for peace with government.
Say that the Taliban have the intention to make peace with government.
Say that government has the intention to make peace with the Taliban.
Be male citizens.

Table 110 Factors associated with opinions regarding giving privileges to the Taliban for peace, using OLS regression analysis

People Who are More Likely to Say that Privileges Should be Given to the Taliban for Making Peace are More Likely to:
Say that peace is possible with the Taliban.
Be satisfied with peace deal with the Taliban.
Be satisfied with the Taliban behaviour and policies.
Say the Taliban can succeed in war against government.
Accept the Taliban conditions for peace.
Be satisfied with HPC.
Say that HezbIslami peace deal had positive impact on their area security.
Be male.
Be Pashtun and not Hazara.

Table 111 Regression model; Peace Process Awareness

Number of obs		=	1,970.00					
F(9, 1960)		=	42.27					
Prob > F		=	0.00					
R-squared		=	0.16					
Adj R-squared		=	0.16					
Root MSE		=	1.23					
Peace Process Awareness	q1	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
North	reg11	0.109	0.092	1.190	0.234	-0.071	0.290
Central	reg12	-0.033	0.103	-0.310	0.753	-0.235	0.170
East	reg13	0.469	0.104	4.500	0.000	0.265	0.674
Kabul	reg14	-0.226	0.106	-2.130	0.033	-0.435	-0.018
South	reg16	0.530	0.113	4.680	0.000	0.308	0.752
Female	gens1	-0.185	0.058	-3.210	0.001	-0.298	-0.072
Education	edu	0.290	0.027	10.820	0.000	0.238	0.343
Age	age	0.003	0.003	1.110	0.268	-0.002	0.009
	_cons	2.031	0.166	12.250	0.000	1.706	2.356

Table 112 Regression Model; Impact of the Hezb-e-Islami peace deal on the security

Number of obs		=	1,853.00					
F(13, 1839)		=	21.38					
Prob > F		=	0.00					
R-squared		=	0.13					
Adj R-squared		=	0.13					
Root MSE		=	1.43					
HezbIslami Peace Deal Security Impact	q35	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Female	gens1	-0.01	0.07	-0.22	0.83	-0.15	0.12
Education	edu	0.06	0.03	1.88	0.06	0.00	0.12
Uzbek	ethnic1	0.06	0.18	0.34	0.73	-0.30	0.42
Tajik	ethnic2	-0.03	0.14	-0.22	0.82	-0.32	0.25
Pashtun	ethnic3	0.41	0.15	2.84	0.01	0.13	0.70
Hazara	ethnic4	-0.04	0.16	-0.24	0.81	-0.35	0.28
Taliban Chance To Succeed in War	q12	-0.17	0.02	-7.91	0.00	-0.21	-0.13
Peace Possibility	q4	0.08	0.04	2.00	0.05	0.00	0.16
North	reg11	-1.05	0.14	-7.65	0.00	-1.32	-0.78
Central	reg12	-0.81	0.14	-5.84	0.00	-1.08	-0.54
East	reg13	-0.86	0.13	-6.81	0.00	-1.11	-0.61
Kabul	reg14	-0.91	0.14	-6.59	0.00	-1.18	-0.64
South	reg16	-1.13	0.14	-7.92	0.00	-1.41	-0.85
	_cons	3.23	0.25	12.81	0.00	2.74	3.73

Annex 2: Figures

*Figure 4Level of awareness on the peace process; by education*

*Figure 5 Appropriate description for the Taliban*

Figure 6 Appropriate description for the Taliban; by levels of acceptability of their behaviour


*Figure 7Appropriate description for the Taliban; by gender*

Figure 8 Perceptions towards peace process results

*Figure 9Intention to make peace with the Taliban; by gender*

Figure 10 Perceptions towards peace process failure; by education level

Figure 11 Respondents reasons on why peace efforts failed

Figure 12Perceptions towards peace possibility; by gender

*Figure 13Perception towards peace process failure; by peace possibility*

Figure 14 Appropriate approach against the Taliban; by nationality

* Other ethno-national groups include Baloch, Turkmen, Pashayi, Nuristani, Qizilbash, and the other categories.

*Figure 15 Approaches to follow against the Taliban; by the level of success of peace process*

*Figure 16Proposed solutions for ending conflict; by nationality*

*Figure 17Use of force on the Taliban; by gender*

*Figure 18Enhancing pressure on the Taliban; by dissatisfaction with their behaviour*

Figure 19Appropriate approach against the Taliban; by impact of HezbIslami peace deal on security

Figure 20 Peace process result, by impact of peace deal with HezbIslami on security


Figure 21 The Change in security conditions post-Hekmatyar peace deal in respective areas

*Figure 22Best place for peace talks; by possibility of the Taliban success in war*

Figure 23Approaches to integrate the Taliban in society; by the characterization of the Taliban

Figure 24 Best country to host negotiation

*Figure 25 Level of Satisfaction from HPC*

Annex 3: Questionnaire

Questionnaire Number (   )   Name of the Interviewer (   )

Province (   )   Date (/   / 2018)

Dear Citizen,

The current questionnaire is prepared by the Department of Peace Studies, Afghanistan Institute for Strategic Studies. It aims to collect the perspectives and perceptions of the people of Afghanistan with regard to the peace processes with the Taliban. Your opinion is valuable for us and it will offer us a big help. We appreciate and value your cooperation.Please circle the option that you opt for. Thank you!

☐   I give my consent for answering this questionnaire

1. To what extent you are aware of the peace processes with Taliban?(Circle one answer)

    a) Very Much   b) Much   c) little   d)Very Little   e) No Awareness

2. Which one(s) of the following approaches is/are the effective towards the Taliban? (You can select multiple answers)

    a) Reconciliation;[22]
    b) Peace Negotiations;[23]
    c) Military Confrontation and Suppression;
    d) Mediation of third party;[24]
    e) Other……………

---

[22] Reconciliation is a process through which the perpetrators make a confession and ask for forgiveness.
[23]Negotiation indicates a political talk between two parties. As a result of bargaining and concession the parties may come to a settlement.
[24]Mediation is a conflict resolution method that a third party to the conflict, bring the main parties to the conflict into a negotiation table.

3. In your opinion, what does government of Afghanistan should do for ending the conflict in Afghanistan at the international level? (You can select multiple answers)

    a) Direct negotiation with Pakistan and addressing their concerns include the Durand Borders;

    b) Withdrawal of International forces;

    c) Engaging the neighbouring countries and constructing a regional consensus;

    d) Enhancing pressure on Taliban through international organizations;

    e) Militarily defeating the Taliban with the help of international forces;

    f) Other options:

        ……………………………………………………………………

4. Do you think reconciliation with the Taliban is possible?

    a) Strongly Agree

    b) Agree

    c) Disagree

    d) Strongly Disagree

5. How much satisfied or happy do you feel about the peace with Taliban? (circle on answer)

        a) Very Much   b) Much   c) little   d)Very Little   e) Not at all

6. How do you rate the authority of below institutions to do negotiation with Taliban? (one indicates no competence and five indicates maximum competence)

No	Institutions	Scores	Know	Dont
1	High Peace Council	1 2 3 4 5		
2	Government of Afghanistan	1 2 3 4 5		
3	International Community, Especially the US	1 2 3 4 5		
4	Islamic Community	1 2 3 4 5		
5	Political Parties	1 2 3 4 5		
6	People of Afghanistan	1 2 3 4 5		

7. What is the best possible approach to reintegrate the Taliban with society? (Circle one answer)

   a) They should put their weapons away and join Islamic institutions and Madrasas;
   b) They should put their weapons away and establish a political party;
   c) They should put their weapons away and go back to normal life;
   d) They should integrate into provincial and national governments and security forces;
   e) Other options …………………

8. In your opinion, what is the appropriate description for the Taliban? (Circle one answer)

   a) Dissatisfied Brothers;   Afghanistan;
   b) Political Opposition;   f) Terrorists;
   c) Mujahedeen;   g) Mercenaries;
   d) Insurgents;   h) Other options:
   e) Enemies of

9. In your opinion, what has been the result of the peace efforts with Taliban so far? (Circle one answer)

   a) Successful   c) Failed
   b) Partly successful   d) I don't know

9.1. In case, the peace efforts are failed, what are the main reasons? (You can select multiple answers)

   a) Lack of transparency of peace efforts;
   b) Weakness of the government of Afghanistan;
   c) Ineffectiveness of HPC;
   d) Negative interventions of neighbouring countries in the peace efforts;
   e) Negative interventions of the West;
   f) Exclusion of the citizens of Afghanistan from the peace efforts;
   g) Presence of International Forces in Afghanistan;
   h) Lack of will for peace among Taliban;
   i) Other options: …………………………………………………

10. What are/is the important weakness (es) of the government in the peace process with Taliban? (You can select multiple answers)

   a) Government is corrupt;
   b) Government does not have legitimacy;
   c) Government was not able to force Taliban to make a peace deal;
   d) Government could not construct a national consensus with regard to negotiation;
   e) Government could not construct an international/ regional consensus with regard to negotiation.

11. In your opinion, what is/are the main defect(s) of High Peace Council in mediation between government and Taliban? (You can select multiple answers)

    a) Lacks public support;

    b) Lacks competence and independence;

    c) Foreigners intervention in the affairs of Council;

    d) Lack of knowledge on the techniques of negotiations and mediation;

    e) Existence of corruption in the council;

    f) I don't know

    g) Other issues …………………………………

12. In your opinion, to what extent the overall policies and behaviours of Taliban are acceptable? (Circle one answer)

    a) Very much acceptable   d) Very little

    b) Much acceptable   e) None

    c) Little

13. Do Taliban have a chance to succeed in war with the government of Afghanistan? (Circle one answer)

    a) Yes, they have   c) I don't know

    b) No, they don't have

14. In your opinion, if Taliban succeed in war with the government of Afghanistan, will they be able to govern the country effectively? (Circle one answer)

    a) Yes   c) Do not know

    b) No

15. Do you think Taliban have the intention of making peace with the government of Afghanistan? (Circle one answer)

    a) Yes

    b) No

    c) Do not know

15.1. If yes, in your opinion, why does the Taliban want to make peace with the government of Afghanistan? (You can select multiple answers)

  a) Because Taliban are not able to succeed in war with the government of Afghanistan and they do not have any other option but peace;

  b) Maybe through peace with government they want to fight against ISIS (Islamic state in Iraq and Syria/ Daesh);

  c) Because they want the wish of the people of Afghanistan;

  d) Because the foreign supporters of Taliban want negotiation;

  e) Because Taliban do not have enough support from the people of Afghanistan;

  f) Other options: ……………………………………………………

15.2. If not, in your opinion, why do they not have the intention of making peace with the government of Afghanistan? (You can select multiple answers)

  a) Because the government negotiates from the weak position;

  b) Because the government is corrupted and does not have political legitimacy;

  c) Because Foreign Forces remain in Afghanistan.

  d) Because the Taliban have enough financial and logistical support and they are hopeful to be victorious in the war with the government;

  e) Because the foreign supporters of the Taliban do not have any intention to make peace with the government of Afghanistan;

  f) Because the Taliban have enough support from the people of Afghanistan;

  g) Other options: ……………………………………………………

16. What do you think about giving privileges (concessions) to the Taliban to reach a peace agreement? (Circle one answer)

  a) Strongly agree   c) Disagree

  b) To an extent Agree   d) Strongly disagree

16.1. In case you agree, which privileges would help the peace process? (You can select multiple answers)

   a) To give them a share in the local governance;

   b) To give money and property to those of them who make peace;

   c) To amend the laws and policies according to their views;

   d) To appoint their leaders in the central government;

   e) A general amnesty should be offered to Taliban;

   f) They should not have any of the above privileges;

   g) Other options: ……………………………………………

17. Do you think the government of Afghanistan have intention to make peace with the Taliban? (Circle one answer)

   a) Yes   c) I Do not know

   b) No

17.1. If yes, why does the government want to have peace with the Taliban? (You can select multiple answers)

   a) Because peace can enhance national unity in Afghanistan;

   b) Because peace with the Taliban can strengthen the position of the government towards the Pakistan;

   c) Because without having peace with the Taliban, the government does not have enough political legitimacy;

   d) Because the government does not have enough military power so they have to make peace with the Taliban;

   e) Peace with the Taliban is an international community project, the government have to act on it;

   f) Other options, please explain: …………

17.2. If not, why does the government not have intention to make peace with the Taliban? (You can select multiple answers)

    a) Because the government is more powerful, and they are hopeful to become victorious in the fight with the Taliban

    b) Because the International supporters of the government do not have the intention to make peace with the Taliban

    c) Because the Taliban and the Government are together

    d) Because the Taliban do not have any intention to make peace with the government of Afghanistan

    e) Because the government have enough support from the people so there is no need to make peace with the Taliban

    f) Other options, please explain: ……………………………

18. Does the international community including the U.S. have the intention to make peace with the Taliban?

    a) Yes   c) Do not know

    b) No

18.1. If yes, why do the international community and the U.S want to make peace with the Taliban? (You can select multiple answers)

    a) Because military victory is not possible against them;

    b) Because Taliban is a popular movement in Afghanistan, international community cannot ignore them;

    c) The most important purpose of the U.S and International community is making peace in Afghanistan;

    d) Because making peace with the Taliban is the will of the government of Afghanistan;

    e) Because without having peace with the Taliban, the interest of the U.S in the region would be in danger;

    f) Other options: ……………………………………………………

18.2. If not, why does the International community and the U.S not have the intention to make peace with the Taliban? (You can select multiple answers)

    a) Because making peace is not important to the U.S.;

    b) Because the U.S. want to achieve their objectives through conflict;

    c) Because the issue of the Taliban is a regional matter and it is not possible to resolve it from out of the region.

    d) Because Taliban are terrorists;

    e) Other options: ……………………………………………

19. Do you personally have the intention to make peace with the Taliban? (Circle one answer)

    a) Yes

    b) No

19.1. If not, why do you not have intention to make peace with the Taliban? (You can select multiple answers)

    a) Because Taliban are the enemy of Afghanistan and they should be defeated;

    b) Because their crime is not forgivable;

    c) Because military victory is more important than peace;

    d) Because my decision on peace with the Taliban does not have any importance;

    e) In my opinion, peace with the Taliban will not be good for Afghanistan;

    f) Other options ……………………………………………

19.2. If yes, why you are supporting the peace process with the Taliban? (You can select multiple answers)

    a) By making peace with the Taliban, I support the strategy of the government;

    b) I personally do not have any problem with the Taliban;

    c) They are a part of the community;

    d) Fighting with them is not useful;

    e) There is no other option but, to make peace;

    f) Other options: ……………………………………………………

20. What are your conditions for the peace with Taliban? (You can select multiple answers)

    a) Taliban must respect the Constitution of Afghanistan;

    b) Taliban must respect human right, citizen rights and women rights;

    c) The peace talk must be transparent;

    d) Taliban must relinquish violence and killings;

    e) Establishment of ceasefire;

    f) No condition at all;

    g) Other options: ……………………………………………………

21. Do you have any information about the conditions of the Taliban for peace with the government?

    a) Yes   c) To an extent

    b) No

21.1. If yes, what is/are the important condition(s) of the Taliban to have peace with the government? (You can select multiple answers)

    a) The Taliban has a share in the central government;

    b) To amended the constitution in accordance to the Islamic law or Sharia;

    c) Foreign troops should leave Afghanistan;

    d) The government of Afghanistan should accept the policies of

Pakistan

e) Self-governance at the local level;

f) Establishment of ceasefire;

g) Other options: ………………………………………………

22. Do you accept the conditions of the Taliban for peace agreement? (Circle one answer)

    a) Yes   c) Not sure

    b) No

22.1. If yes, which ones do you accept? (You can select multiple answers)

    a) Taliban have a share in the central government;

    b) The constitution should be amended in accordance to the Islamic law or Sharia;

    c) Foreign troops should leave Afghanistan;

    d) The government of Afghanistan should accept the policies of Pakistan;

23. Do you have any information about the conditions of the government of Afghanistan for peace with the Taliban? (Circle one answer)

    a) Yes   c) To an extent

    b) No

23.1. If yes, what is/are the important condition(s) of the government of Afghanistan for peace with the Taliban? (You can select multiple answers)

    a) Taliban should accept the constitution of Afghanistan;

    b) They should terminate their relations with Pakistan;

    c) They should end their relations with Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups;

    d) They should end anti-government activities;

    e) Establishment of ceasefire;

    f) Other options: ………………………………………

24. Do you accept the conditions of the government of Afghanistan to have peace with the Taliban? (Circle one answer)

    a) Yes   c) Not sure

    b) No

24.1. If yes, which one do you accept? (You can select multiple answers)

    a) Taliban should accept the constitution of Afghanistan;

    b) They should terminate their relations with Pakistan;

    c) They should end their relations with AL-Qaeda and other terrorist groups;

    d) They should end anti-government activities;

    e) Ceasefire;

25. How important is the role of women in the peace process?

    a) Very important   b) important   c) Little d) Very little e) Not at all important

26. Do you have any information about the new strategy of the U.S on the Taliban?

    a) Yes   c) To an extent

    b) No

26.1   If yes, what is the stand of the strategy towards the Taliban?

    a) The US wants to have peace with Taliban.

    b) The US wants to fight the Taliban until they are eliminated.

    c) The US have no more issues with the Taliban but they want to fight against ISIS.

    d) The US wants to win the fight against Taliban and peace is a secondary option for the them

    e) Other options: …………………………………………

27. Do you agree with the new policy of the United State towards the Taliban?
(Circle one answer)

    a) Yes   c) Not sure

    b) No

28. In your opinion, is there any difference between ISIS and the Taliban?
(Circle one answer)

    a) Both are terrorist;

    b) ISIS is more radical than Taliban;

    c) ISIS is a form of Taliban;

    d) ISIS is an international organization but Taliban is national;

29. In your opinion, how much does the presence of international troops help the peace process in Afghanistan? (Circle one answer)

    a) Very much   b) some   c) Little   d) Very little   e) Not at all helpful

30. In your opinion, who is/are gaining more benefit from conflict in Afghanistan? (You can select multiple answers)

    a) The West and the US;   e) Illegal Armed Groups;

    b) Pakistan;   f) High ranking

    c) Iran;   government officials;

    d) Criminal Networks and   g) Other options…
        Drug Dealers;

31. To what extent are you satisfied with the work of High Peace Council?
(Circle one answer)

    a) Highly satisfied   c) Not satisfied

    b) Satisfied   d) Highly dissatisfied

32. In your opinion, which country is the best place for hosting the peace negotiations with Taliban? (Circle one answer)

    a) Pakistan;   d) Afghanistan;

    b) Qatar;   e) Other options: …

    c) Saudi Arabia;

33. To what extent neighbouring countries can play an efficient role in the peace process in Afghanistan? (Circle one answer)

    a) Very much   d) Very Little

    b) Much   e) None

    c) Little

34. In case Taliban rejects the peace process, which approach should be followed against them? (Circle one answer)

    a) Continued military action and suppression;

    b) Continuation of peace efforts;

    c) Enhancing pressure on Taliban through international community;

    d) Increasing Sanctions of the UN and other International Organizations;

    e) Other options: ……………………………………………………

35. To what extent has the peace deal with HezbIslami brought security in your areas? (Circle one answer)

    a) A lot

    b) Some

    c) Little

    d) Very little

    e) None

36. Please score the following institution based on their effectiveness in the peace process with Taliban from one to five (one indicates No effectiveness and five indicates Very effective).

No	Institutions	Scores					Don't Know
1	High Peace Council	1	2	3	4	5	
2	Political Parties	1	2	3	4	5	
3	Ethnic and former Jahadi Leaders	1	2	3	4	5	
4	Civil Society Activists	1	2	3	4	5	
5	National Grand Jirga	1	2	3	4	5	
6	National Shura	1	2	3	4	5	
7	Provincial Shura						
8	UlamaShura	1	2	3	4	5	
9	Media	1	2	3	4	5	

37. Please score the following countries and organizations based on their effectiveness in the peace process with Taliban from one to five (one indicates No effectiveness and five indicates Very effective).

No	Countries	Scores					Don't Know
1	The US	1	2	3	4	5	
2	India	1	2	3	4	5	
3	Pakistan	1	2	3	4	5	
4	China	1	2	3	4	5	
5	Iran	1	2	3	4	5	
6	Russia	1	2	3	4	5	
7	Saudi Arabia	1	2	3	4	5	
8	Turkey	1	2	3	4	5	
9	Qatar	1	2	3	4	5	
10	UAE	1	2	3	4	5	
11	Indonesia	1	2	3	4	5	
12	UNAMA	1	2	3	4	5	
13	OIC	1	2	3	4	5	

38. Please specify your agreement or disagreement on the following phrases in the chart below.

No	Items	Strongly	Disagree	To an Extent Agree	Strongly agree	Do not know
1	Peace with Taliban can help in destroying the other terrorist groups					
2	The high ranking officials at the government do not have consensus on peace process.					
3	Peace with Taliban can strengthen national unity in the country.					
4	Peace deal with GulbuddinHekmatyar could be a model for the peace with Taliban.					
5	Peace deal with GulbuddinHekmatyar was a good decision.					
6	Peace with Taliban is an internal issue and needs a national consensus.					
7	Peace with Taliban is an international issue and needs an international consensus.					
8	Peace with Taliban is not possible.					
9	Establishing an office for Taliban inside Afghanistan is a good decision.					
10	The government should negotiate with ISIS as well.					

Personal Information

Variables	Indicators
Gender	1. Female 2. Male
Marital Status	1. Single 2. Married 3. Widow 4. Divorced 5. other
Nationality	1. Uzbek 2. Baloch 3. Tajik 4. Turkmen 5. Pashtun 6. Pashayi 7. Noristani 8. Qezelbash 9. Hazara 10. Others
Occupation	
Place of living	1. City 2. Village
Age	
Education	1. Illiterate 2. Primary Education 3. High School Graduate or below 4. Bachelor Student or BA 5. Masters or Above 6. 6. Seminary Education
Monthly Income	
Phone Number	

Reference

Ackerman, Spencer. 2018. "Inside the Secret Taliban's Talks to End America's Longest War." *Daily Beast*, August 2. https://www.thedailybeast.com/inside-the-secret-taliban-talks-to-end-americas-longest-war

Ahmad, Jibran and Abdul Qadir Sediqi. 2018. "Very Positive Signals' after US, Taliban Talks: Sources." *Reuters*, July 29. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-usa/very-positive-signals-after-us-taliban-talks-sources-idUSKBN1KJ0ML

Ahmad, Shahab ud Din. 2018. "Afghanistan on the Brink: Can Taliban Negotiate with Kabul" *Herald*, April 20. https://herald.dawn.com/news/1398520

Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba. 1989. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. New Delhi: Sage.

Ashley, Richard K. and R.B.J. Walker. 1990. "Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissident Thought in International Studies." *International Studies Quarterly* 34 (3): 259–268.

Barfield, Thomas. 2010. *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Cameron, David 2001. "A Role for Federalism in Afghanistan after the Taliban." Federations, Special Issue on Afghanistan.

Chomsky, Noam. 2003. "On the Bombings." *Attack On America,* January 7. https://www.attackonamerica.net/911-attacks/noamchomsky/

Clark, Kate. 2018. "Eid Ceasefire: Allows Afghans to Imagine their Country at Peace." *Afghanistan Analyst Network*, June 19. https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-eid-ceasefire-allowing-afghans-to-imagine-their-country-at-peace/

Coll, Steve. 2018. *Directorate S: The CIA and America's Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan*. New York: Penguin Press.

Conciliation Resources and the Alliance for Peacebuilding. 2017. *Public Support for Peacebuilding and Dialogue with Armed Groups in the UK, US and Germany*. London: Conciliation Resources.

Dawn. 2001. "Taliban Agree to Surrender Kandahar: Power Transfer Begins Today." *Dawn*, December 7. https://www.dawn.com/news/9630

Delawar, Samad. 2018. "*Nazarsanji Hasht-e-Subh: badbemi mardum nesbad ba imkan sulh ba Taliban*" [Hasht-e-Subh's Survey: People's Pessimism with Regard to Peace with the Taliban]. *Hasht-e-Subh*, March 25. https://8am.af/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/8am-2834.pdf

Der Derain, James. 1990. "The (S)pace of International Relations: Simulation, Surveillance and Speed." *International Studies Quarterly* 34 (3): 259–268.

DWGMF (Deutsche Welle Global Media Forum). 2018. "DW Global Media Forum: Hamid Karzai Address." *Deutsche Welle*, June 16. https://www.dw.com/en/dw-global-media-forum-hamid-karzai-address/av-44188617

DWGMF. 2018. Deutsche Welle Global Media Forum 2018: Peace with the Taliban. YouTube video, 50:08 mins. Accessed 7 July 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XZlySeHBEOo

DoS (Department of State). 2018. "Foreign Terrorist Organizations." Accessed 7 August 2018. https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm

Donati, Jessica and Dion Nissenbaum. 2018. "US Envoy and Taliban Officials Meet to Discuss Afghan Peace Talks." *The Wall Street Journal*, July 25. https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-envoy-taliban-officials-meet-to-discuss-afghan-peace-talks-1532547118

Donati, Jessica and Habib Totakhil. 2016. "Afghan Government Secretly Fosters Taliban Splinter Groups." *The Wall Street Journal*, May 22. https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-afghanistan-a-secret-plan-pays-off-the-taliban-1463964545

Farid, Naheed Ahmadi. 2018. "Pathology of Peace Dilemma in Afghanistan." In *Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist*, edited by Rajeshwari Krishnamurthy, 6–12. New Delhi: Linda Brady Hawke.

Farivar, Masood. 2017. "Why isn't Afghan Taliban on US List of Foreign Terror Groups." *Voice of America*, February 20. https://www.voanews.com/a/afghan-taliban-us-list-foreign-terror-groups/3732453.html

Gebauer, Matthias and Holger Stark. 2007. "Secret Negotiations with the Islamists Proved Fruitless." *Spiegel Online*, August 20. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/taliban-talks-secret-negotiations-with-the-islamists-proved-fruitless-a-500809-2.html

Giustozzi, Antonio. 2007. *Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan*. London: Hurst.

Giustozzi, Antonio. 2018. "Do the Taliban Have any Appetite for Reconciliation." Centre for Research and Policy Analysis, March 20. https://www.af-crpa.org/single-post/2018/03/20/Do-the-Taliban-Have-any-Appetite-for-Reconciliation-with-Kabul-Antonio-Giustozzi

Giustozzi, Antonio. 2017. "Why did Saudi Arabia and Qatar, Allies of the US, continue to Fund the Taliban after the 2001 War?" *Scroll*, December 22. https://scroll.in/article/862284/why-did-saudi-arabia-and-qatar-allies-of-the-us-continue-to-fund-the-taliban-after-the-2001-war

Giustozzi, Antonio. 2017. "Taliban and Islamic State: Enemies or Brothers in Jihad?" Centre for Research and Policy Analysis, December 15. https://www.af-crpa.org/single-post/2017/12/15/Enemies-or-Jihad-Brothers-Relations-Between-Taliban-and-Islamic-State

Herbolzheimer, Vicenç Fisas. 2009. *Peace Process Models: Comparative Study 1995–2005*. Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya.

Hirose, K., K. Imai and J. Lyall. 2017. "Can Civilian Attitudes Predict Insurgent Violence? Ideology and Insurgent Tactical Choice in Civil War." *Journal of Peace Research* 54 (1): 47–63.

HPC (High Peace Council). 2017. *Making Peace and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan: Peace and Reconciliation in Afghanistan: Strategic Plan (1 June 2017 – 31 December 2020)*. Kabul: Executive Secretariat for Peace and Reconciliation Process.

Huntington, Samuel. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Hussaini, Said Hassan. 2018. *"Agar Kharijiha Narawand Entikabatra Tarem Mekunim"* [If the International Forces do not Withdraw, We Will Boycott Elections]. *8Subh*, April 18. https://8am.af/clerics-in-herat-if-we-do-not-go-abroad-we-will-boycott-the-election/

Ibrahimi, Yaqub. 2018. *Modalities of Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan: A Negotiated Settlement Scenario*. Kabul: Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies.

Jackson, Ashley. 2018. *Life Under the Taliban Shadow Government*. Kabul: Overseas Development Institute.

Jones, Seth. 2018. "Why Taliban isn't Winning in Afghanistan." *Foreign Affairs*, January 3. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2018-01-03/why-taliban-isnt-winning-afghanistan

Karimi, Hussaini Ali and Ghulam Reza Ebrahimi. 2016. *Afghan People's Attitude and Perceptions toward Peace Talks between the Government and the Taliban: Survey Results in 15 Provinces of Afghanistan*. Kabul: Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies.

Kassenova, Nargis. 2014. *Relations between Afghanistan and Central Asian State Post 2014: Incentives, Constrains and Prospects*. Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Keene, Kathleen. 2011. "Overview of Current Reconciliation/Reintegration Initiatives." UNAMA Policy Planning Unit (PPU).

Kissinger, Henry. 1969. "The Viet Nam Negotiations." *Foreign Affairs* 47 (2): 211–234.

Koskinas, Ioannis. 2015. "Reconciliation Foolosophy II." *Foreign Policy*, September 8. https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/08/reconciliation-foolosophy-ii/

Knowlton, Brian and International Herlad Tribune. 2001. "Rumsfeld Rejects Plan to Allow Mullah Omar 'To Live in Dignity': Taliban Fighters Agree to Surrender Kandahar." *The New York Times*, December   7. https://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/07/news/rumsfeld-rejects-planto-allow-mullah-omar-to-live-in-dignity-taliban.html

Maass, Citha D. 2006. "National Reconciliation in Afghanistan: Conflict History and the Search for an Afghan Approach." *Internationales Asienforum* 37 (1–2): 5–35.

Mashal, Mujib and Schmitt Eric. 2018. "White House Orders Direct Taliban Talks to Jump-Start Afghan Negotiation." *The New York Times*,   July   15. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/15/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-direct-negotiations.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=first-column-region®ion=top-news&WT.nav=top-news

MFARF (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation). 2017. "Press Release on Regional Consultations on Afghanistan in Moscow."   Accessed   11   June   2018. http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news//asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2726953

MFARF. 2018. "Comment by the Information and Press Department on Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's Upcoming Visit to New York." Accessed   15   January   2018. http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news//asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3020100

Mir, Haroun. 2018. "The Dilemma of Representation in Afghan Peace Negotiation." *Atimes*, August 6. http://www.atimes.com/the-dilemma-of-representation-in-afghan-peace-negotiations/

Moosakhil, Zabiullah. 2015. "Amrullah Saleh: ISIS in Afghanistan 'Psychological Warfare." *Khaama Press*, April 15. https://www.khaama.com/amrullah-saleh-isis-in-afghanistan-psychological-warfare-3179/

Moradian, Davood. 2016. "Afghan Peace Process: Desperation versus Strength." *Aljazeera*, February 22. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/02/afghan-peace-process-desperation-strength-160215113838413.html

NBC. 2007. "Karzai Offers Taliban Government Office." *NBC News*, September 29. http://www.nbcnews.com/id/21045198/ns/world_news-south_and_central_asia/t/karzai-offers-taliban-government-office/#.W6hjuy-B2fU

Neda, Freshta. 2018. "*Survey: 93 dar sad Afghanha khahan atashbas dayme ba Taliban and*" [Survey: 93% of Afghanistanis are in Favour of Permanent Ceasefire with the Taliban]. *Azadi Radio*, August 18. https://da.azadiradio.com/a/29440706.html

OP (Office of the President). 2018a. "President Ghani's Remarks at the Second Conference of Kabul Process-Kabul." Office of the President, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, February 28. https://president.gov.af/en/News/00090

OP. 2018b. "Press Release, Office of the President, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan." Office of the President, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, January 28. https://president.gov.af/en/press-release/press-release-16/

OP. 2018c. "Press Release, Office of the President, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan." Office of the President, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, January 28. https://president.gov.af/fa/2018/01/28/

Osman, Borhan. 2015. "The Murree Peace Talk: Divisive Peace Talk Further Complicated by Mullah Omar's Death." *Afghanistan Analyst Network*, August 5. https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-murree-process-divisive-peace-talks-further-complicated-by-mullah-omars-death/

Osman, Borhan and Anand Gopal. 2016. *Taliban View on A Future State*. New York: Centre on International Cooperation.

Osman, Borhan. 2018. *A Negotiated End to the Afghan Conflict: The Taliban Perceptive*. Washington: United State Institute for Peace.

Osman, Borhan. 2018. "The US Needs to Talk to the Taliban in Afghanistan." *The New York Times,* March 19. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/opinion/america-afghanistan-taliban-talks.html

Pirani, Cenan and Kadirgamar Ahilan. 2006. "Internationalization of Sri Lankan Peace Process and Governance: A Review of Strategic Conflict Assessment." *Economic and Political Weekly* 41 (18): 1789–1795.

Pugwash. 2018. "Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs." *Pugwash*. Accessed 24 July 2018. https://pugwash.org/tag/afghanistan/

Ramani, Samuel. 2018. "Why has Russia Invited the Taliban to Moscow?" *The Diplomat*, July 21. https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/why-has-russia-invited-the-taliban-to-moscow/

Rubin, Barnett R. 2007. "Saving Afghanistan." *Foreign Affairs* 86 (1): 57–78.

Ruttig, Thomas. 2012. "Qatar, Islamabad, Chantilly, Ashgabad: Taleban Talks Season Again?" *Afghanistan Analyst Network*, December 31. https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/qatar-islamabad-chantilly-ashgabad-taleban-talks-season-again-amended/

Safi, Khalilullah and Thomas Ruttig. 2018. "Understanding Hurdles to Afghan Peace Talks: Are the Taleban a Political Party?" *Afghanistan Analyst Network*, June 27. https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/understanding-hurdles-to-afghan-peace-talks-are-the-taleban-a-political-party/

Sajjad, Tazreena. 2010. *Peace at All Costs? Reintegration and Reconciliation in Afghanistan*. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.

Saleh, Amrullah. 2014. "*pas azsada takht waistadagi" [After a Century of Invasion and Resistance]*. Kabul: The Green Trend of Afghanistan.

Saleh, Amrullah. 2018. Twitter Post, April 22. https://twitter.com/amrullahsaleh2/status/988286524755267584?lang=en

Schetter, Conard. 2005. "Ethnicity and Political Construction in Afghanistan," ZEF Working Paper Series, No. 3, Accessed on 1 July 2014. http://nbnresolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0202-2008091124

Schirch, Lisa. 2011. "Designing a Comprehensive Peace Process for Afghanistan", *United State Institute for Peace*, Peaceworks No. 75.

Shahrani, M. Nazif. 2001. 'Not 'Who?' but 'How?': Governing Afghanistan after the Conflict.' *Federations*, Special Issue on Afghanistan.

Shahrani, M. Nazif. 2003. "The Challenge of Post-Taliban Governance.' *ISIM Newsletter* no. 12: 22–23.

Shahrani, M. Nazif. 2018. "Conflict and Peace in Afghanistan: A Northern, Non-Pashtun Perspective." *Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives* no. 27: 41–47.

Sharifi, Shoaib and Louise Adamou. 2018. "Taliban Threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC Finds." *BBC News*, January 31. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-42863116

SIGAR (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan). 2018. "Quarterly Report to the United States Congress." *SIGAR,* April 30. https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2018-04-30qr.pdf

Snow, Shawn. 2016. "Spoilers and Peace in Afghanistan: Negotiating with the Taliban." *The Diplomat*, October 18. https://thediplomat.com/2016/10/spoilers-and-peace-in-afghanistan-negotiating-with-the-taliban/

Spanta, Rangin Dadfar. 2017. *Seyasat Afghanistan: Rawayat az Darun* [Afghanistan Politics: A Narration from Within]. Kabul: Aazem.

Stedman, Stephen John. 2000. "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes." In *International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War*, edited by Stern, Paul C. and Daniel Druckman, Washington: National Academies Press.

The Foreigner. 2015. "Norway Taliban-Afghan Government Move Interesting, Says Analyst." *The Foreigner*, March 26. https://theforeigner.no/pages/news/norway-taliban-afghan-government-move-interesting-says-analyst/

Tolonews. 2018. Head of Taliban Delegation Mawlawi Abdul Rauf Talks on Turkey Peace Negotiations. YouTube video, 07:35 mins. Accessed 14 January 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g2EAXOyUB-c

Toros, Harmonie. 2008. "'We Don't Negotiate with Terrorists!': Legitimacy and Complexity in Terrorist Conflicts." *Security Dialogue* 39 (4): 407–426.

VoJ (Voice of Jihad). 2018a. "Letter of the Islamic Emirate to the American People!" *Voice of Jihad*, February 14. https://alemarah-english.com/?p=25640

VoJ. 2018b. "Statement of Islamic Emirate regarding end of three day Eid ceasefire," *Voice of Jihad*, June 17. https://alemarah-english.com/?p=30455

Wafayezada, Mohammad Qasim and Ghulam Reza Ebrahimi. 2017. *Four Decades of Efforts for Peace and Reconciliation in Afghanistan*. Kabul: Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies.

Wormer, Nils. 2012. "Exploratory Talks and Peace Initiative in Afghanistan: Actors, Demands and Germany's Role as Mediator." *Germen Institute for International and Security Affairs*, SWP. Comments 44.

Yousafzai, Sami, Jon Boona, and Sune Engel Rasmussen. 2016. "Taliban and Afghanistan Restart Secret Talks in Qatar." *The Guardian,* October 18. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/18/taliban-afghanistan-secret-talks-qatar

Yousafzai, Sami. 2018. "New Appointment Reflect Power Struggle within Taliban." *Pajhwok*, February 1. https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/02/01/new-appointments-reflect-power-struggle-within-taliban

About the Author

Omar Sadr is Senior Researcher at Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies (AISS), and Assistant Professor at University of Afghanistan, Kabul, Afghanistan. His primary research interests are laid in the intersection of culture and politics. He earned a doctorate from South Asian University (SAU), New Delhi, India (2013-2018). His doctoral thesis was on 'Negotiating Cultural Diversity in Afghanistan.' Prior to that, he had worked as Academic Assistant at the National Centre for Policy Research (NCPR), Kabul University. He has written about politics, history, and culture in a number of local and international publications. Some of his recent publications are:

 'Mahmud Tarzi: Intellectual and Reformist', in Dev N Pathak and Sanjeev Kumar H.M. (eds.), *Modern South Asian Thinkers,* Delhi: Sage, 2018.

 'Afghanistan: the Vulnerabilities of Minorities', in Sajjad Hassan (ed.) *South Asia State of Minorities Report- 2016: Mapping the Terrain,* Delhi: Books for Change, 2016.

'Rethinking Stability for Afghanistan: Socializing Great Powers in a Multilateral Order', in Rajen Harshe and Dhananjay Tripathi (eds.), *Afghanistan Post-2014: Power Configurations and Evaluating Trajectories*, London and New Delhi: Routledge, 2015.

انستیتوت مطالعات استراتژیک افغانستان
Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies

Peace studies IV