

Launching Ceremony (Farsi Version) of  
"Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War"

10 August 2017



AISS-R-008-2017



[www.aiss.af](http://www.aiss.af)



[@AISS\\_Afg](https://twitter.com/AISS_Afg)



[@AISSAfghanistan](https://www.facebook.com/AISSAfghanistan)



**Launching Ceremony (Farsi Version) of**  
***"Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War"***

Written by Dr. C. Christine Fair

August 10, 2017

On August 10, 2017, the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies (AISS) organized the launching ceremony for the Farsi/Dari translation of the book "Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War". The author of the book is Dr. C Christine Fair, Associate Professor at the Center for Peace and Security Studies (CPASS), within Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. This book has been translated into Farsi/Dari by the department of publications of the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies (AISS). Its translator is Mr Khalid Kosrrow. The book reviews the wars of Pakistan with its eastern neighbor, India. The author explains the "strategic depth" of the Pakistani army and the policy that the army and the politicians have been pursuing for years in Afghanistan.

During this event Dr. C Christine Fair introduced the book and briefed the audiences of its contents via a Skype call. Mr. Mozamil Shinwari former Deputy Minister of Commerce and Industry/AISS research fellow and Mr Ferdaws Kawush Senior Analyst of 8am Newspaper provided their assessment of the book. The event was attended by representatives from the Afghan Government, Parliament, civil society, academia and media agencies. The event was followed by a Q/A session.

**Christine Fair:** In the book "Fighting to the End", my central question is why does Pakistan continue to pursue policies that have failed. Not only have these policies failed, they have actually endangered the state of Pakistan itself. The specific policy that I examine in the book generally focuses upon India. So, it's useful to recall that Pakistan started but failed to win three wars over Kashmir in 1947-48, 1965 and also 1999. It is also important to examine the fact that Pakistan has employed a strategy of coercion through Islamist terrorist proxies since 1947. This has failed to give Pakistan any more leverage over Kashmir. This strategy has also failed due to what I call the terrorist backlash that Pakistan is experiencing. There would be no Pakistani Taliban, if there had been no Afghan Taliban, had there been no "Jaish-e-Mohammed" etc. Pakistan likes to blame the Pakistani Taliban upon India and anyone else. In fact, this is due to the blowback of Pakistan's policies that it has pursued since 1947. So, we would expect that Pakistan would have changed these policies given that not only have they failed they have actually weakened the state's viability to a very considerable degree. Yet, I argue in the book that over the years Pakistan's revisionism has expanded. It is no longer just about Kashmir rather, it is about India's right in the international system. And Pakistan has positioned itself to be the only country capable of opposing Indian hegemony.

The essential conventional wisdom that you see here in Washington DC and it's really been around for decades is that Pakistan is a security seeking state. And if we can simply manage its security concerns then Pakistan will behave better in the international system. Now, in its most extreme form this idea has given rise to so called versions of "a grand bargain". An example of this was a piece written by Barnet Rubin and Ahmad Rashid in 2008. Of course, this was important because at the time Barnet Rubin was part of the staff to the especial representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrook. This idea says that if the United State can use its diplomatic pressure upon India to solve Kashmir, then Pakistan will be able to put down this Islamist proxies and can also be persuaded to put them down in Afghanistan as well. So, in

another word peace in Afghanistan can only be reached through peace in Kashmir. I argue in the book that this has motivated the US policies of appeasement; whether we look at the military alliances, the excessive conventional military assistance or the economic aid that we provided to Pakistan. However, I believe that this policy of appeasement is ineffective and dangerous. My argument is that Pakistan is not primarily a security seeking state instead, Pakistan is an ideological state. And I think this is one of the parallels between Pakistan and Israel. My argument is that by understanding the strategic culture of the Pakistan army, we can understand what drives Pakistan. And, what drives Pakistan is not a pursuit for security rather, a pursuit of trying to achieve its ideological goal. It's worth noting that this exercise could not be done for example for the United States or even for India. But, in Pakistan's case, the Pakistan army controls policy's policy.

The implication of this assessment is that appeasement strategies are actually dangerous for purely ideological states. It actually encourages further dangerous behaviors; because the state in question understands these dangerous behaviors will elicit further appeasement. Afghans understand this well. Pakistan has never been punished, for example, for all that it has done in Afghanistan. On the contrary, it continues to be rewarded. The United States continues to see Pakistan as a partner in peace in Afghanistan. In fact, Pakistan is not a promoter of peace in Afghanistan. It's actually a promoter of instability. So, what I argue in the book is that Pakistan has been able to create the instability principally through the use of Islamist terrorists under its expanding nuclear umbrella.

To understand some of the things that Pakistan does, we really need to go back to the time period of partition of India and Pakistan. It is really important to understand how the years before partition and the early years after partition, created in Pakistan a sense that the process was inherently unfair. The British established a security system that was intended to manage two imperial challenges. One was coming from the Russians in the North and the other was coming from the Chinese in the East. In the West, Afghanistan was supposed to be a buffer state between the Russian Empire and the British Empire. The British had also secured the federally administered tribal areas and a series of inner buffers to protect the core of the Raj. In fact, all of the major invasions into the South Asia came through that boundary with Afghanistan. So, from Pakistan's point of view, it inherited the most dangerous frontier that the British Raj had managed. But, it only inherited a fraction of the Empire's resources. This is true whether we look at the ministry of finance or the ministry of foreign affairs; it's also true if we look at the army. From Pakistan's point of view it was put into a situation that was very difficult for it to defend its legitimate security needs. Adding to all this, one of the first things that Pakistan did - on becoming an independent state - is the incursion of Kashmir that led to the first Kashmir war of 1947. So, by the time that you are in the 1950s, if you look at the map of Pakistan almost all of its borders are either contested or militarized. That's one of the reasons why Pakistan was very anxious to resolve its border with China, so it could have at least one reliable and friendly border. What makes the Pakistan army different from other armies - including Afghanistan's army, is that while ordinary armies defend the geographical frontiers of a state from outside threats, Pakistan's army also defends the ideological frontiers of the state. This is a very unusual task that Pakistan's army assigns itself. Many people believe that this goes back to the times of Zia ul- Haq; in fact it dates back to Mohammad Ayub Khan. One of the earliest pieces of writing that we have from him (Mohammad Ayub Khan) is an article in Foreign Affairs magazine published in the late seventies where he talks about the ideology of Pakistan and the role of the army in defending it. He also writes about this in his biography called "*Friends Not Masters*". So, understanding Pakistan's concerns about geography, we observe that the idea of strategic depth - that has affected Afghanistan so deeply - is also not new.

Pakistan inherited this from the British. I think the Afghans need to have a serious conversation rather a political conversation about what they think is the best strategy for dealing with its neighbors. However, from someone in my position who has looked at the evidence, Afghanistan has made a number of early missteps and these missteps are well-known; Afghanistan opposed Pakistan's admission to the United Nations. I think from Afghan side there was a misreading of international law. The rejection of Durand Line by Afghanistan was another misstep as this had support in international law. Further, Afghanistan has episodically engaged in things that have annoyed Pakistan; whether we are looking at the end of UFP, or we are looking at Baluchistan. In the 1950s there were some early military exchanges. While Pakistan said it involved Afghan military, Afghanistan said that these were irregulars, perhaps wearing the uniforms of regular military. By the time we get to the 1960s, Pakistan views Afghanistan as a secondary enemy to that of India. As Afghanistan draws closer to Russia, and as India draws closer to Russia as well, Pakistan begins to see Afghanistan as a client of both Russia and India. This further motivates Pakistan to engage in reckless and dangerous activities in Afghanistan. And remember, Pakistan was allied with the Americans through the Central Treaty Organization which was known as the Baghdad Pact.

One of the things that Pakistan did to manipulate Afghan affairs was that it supported Jamaat-e-Islami in Afghanistan because it was a very reliable partner of the army in Pakistan and all over the place. They also used Jamaat-e-Islami in East Pakistan. Of course in the end it did work out to Pakistan's advantage and to some extent narrowly to Afghanistan's advantage because the Jamaat-e-Islami took root in Kabul University. Almost all of the major Mujahedeen that fought against the Soviets came out of this Jamaat-e-Islami background. However, the origin of that was really coming from Pakistan trying to find some ally in Afghanistan that would act as an Islamizing vector, but would do so at the behest of Pakistan. Turning to the East, one of the things that came out of the partition process is that Pakistan views India as a Hindu country. Even though India has a much more sophisticated narrative about itself, Pakistan views India as Hindu, opposed to Pakistan's Muslim ideological foundations. And one of the derivatives of this is that India is in fact opposed to the very existence of Pakistan and it seeks to subjugate it if not annihilate the state itself. And, this was reinforced by the 1971 War. A conclusion that one can draw from this understanding that Pakistan has of India, is that it's Pakistan's army that must resist India, right at all costs. This is really important. If you look at the way Pakistan understands its military confrontations with India, it has never won them - not a single one militarily. In fact it has been defeated in each occasion. But, Pakistan doesn't view defeat simply through the outcome of numbers of soldiers taken as prisoners of war or territory lost. Pakistan views defeat as that day when Pakistan can no longer challenge India. In this way Pakistan can even justify to itself that it won the 1971 war. Pakistan's defense literature says that even after losing half of the country and half of its population, Pakistan still is the only country in South Asia that can challenge India "strategically". The army also set the parameters for what peace with India could look like and not surprisingly the parameters that it set for peace are actually impossible. Essentially the Pakistani army says that it must have Kashmir. And the army also says India has to recognize Pakistan as an equal. India is never going to recognize Pakistan as an equal, any more than Pakistan is going to recognize Afghanistan as an equal, because they are not equal. And, what the Pakistan's army has done is creating conflict. Pakistan's army benefits materially from this conflict. After all if there were no conflict, the Pakistan army would not be able to justify its enormous resources and its privileged place in Pakistan's Politics, including the ability to intervene with whatever impulse it has. So, what Pakistan has developed is essentially a whole body of different non-state actors, most of which are Islamists and it's able to act with impunity under the umbrella of Pakistan's nuclear umbrella. So what this means is that when there is a terrorist attack in India, India is constrained, because it can't punish it militarily. The United States is

drawn in to basically de-escalate the conflict because it is afraid of a war that could escalate. And finally Pakistan's nuclear weapon and terrorists mean that the United States will always be very hesitant to hold Pakistan into account for its behaviors and certainly will be very apprehensive about cutting Pakistan off on US subsidies. The reason being a) it is afraid of a nuclear war and b) it is equally afraid of terrorists acquiring nuclear materials. So, as I argue in the book the only way for the international community to deal with Pakistan is to actually deal with Pakistan's nuclear bluff. This is a complicated argument. But, as long as we are willing to accept that Pakistan is too dangerous for us to punish, Pakistan is going to continue doing what it does; whether it's in Afghanistan or whether it's in India. And the international community is going to keep rewarding it for being so dangerous, whether it's through bilateral payments such as what the Americans do or whether it's the IMF bailouts which have America's support.

### **Question and Answer Session:**

Question 1: How can we improve relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan?

Christine Fair: The answer to this question is not going to be very popular. Most countries that are friendly with each other have resolved their border issues. One thing that Pakistan wants more than anything from Afghanistan is the resolution of the border. I would encourage Afghans to have a serious political discussion. I think Afghanistan needs to have conversations amongst itself. What does Pakistan need to do for Afghanistan in order to come into a process that will eventually convert the Durand Line into a border? Why do I say this? Right now Afghanistan wants the international community to hold Pakistan accountable for violating Afghanistan's sovereignty. For Afghanistan to make that claim, Afghanistan has to say where Afghanistan's border begins and ends. You can't hold Pakistan for cross-border terrorism while saying that this thing is not a border. I think this is the one thing that Afghanistan has as a point of leverage. It is the most important thing that Afghanistan has that Pakistan wants. Rather than being afraid of using this resource, Afghanistan should use this for potential peace. There are so many reasons why you should have your borders identified and demarcated. You can regularize those borders. I'm unimpressed by the argument that Pashtuns live on both sides. In the United States all along that border with Canada we have a very similar issue. We don't necessarily call them tribes, we call them families. This is not insurmountable. In fact if you look at European borders, you see very similar situation. It's entirely possible to have families and communities divided by a border but not actually divided at all. Regularizing trade is one important thing that Afghan government should think about.

Question 2: You talked about the ideological aspect of Pakistan's establishment, but how come Bangladesh - as a Muslim country, got separated?

Christine Fair: if you go and look at the Lahore Declaration of 1940 which Pakistan calls the Pakistan Declaration – even though it never mentions the word Pakistan or partition, you actually see that Jinnah called for the creation of separate Muslim states. Bangladeshi nationalists would say that it was very early for them to become an independent state, separate from Pakistan. So one of the strands of Bangladeshi nationalism is that it was a staged process to become independent. They understood that by supporting the Pakistan movement, they would eventually become independent. I think that is a historic reading of their own history. But I think the real explanation is that Jinnah was not a democrat and every decision he made, made it very difficult for East Pakistan to remain a part of Pakistan. He made Urdu the national language, even though Bengali language was the majority language. This meant that Bengalis were excluded from the government; even though they were majority of the population and also the best educated in Pakistan. Then when Pakistan became militarized with the first military coup, Bangladeshis

were also excluded from that. The *Martial Race* theory ensured that the Bengalis were not in the army as well. So, they were excluded from the government and from the military. As the Bengalis began politically mobilizing around the Awami League, Ayub Khan as well-known did whatever he could to mitigate their political power. So, from the Bengali point of view, they were deliberately being excluded from all of the corridors of power. And they were also being economically exploited. It's a complicated history. But essentially what had happened for Bengalis is that they no longer had to fight for recognition as a Muslim entity; they instead had to fight for political recognition as an ethnic entity. If you following Bangladeshi affairs today, you see that Bangladesh is swinging back in the direction of Pakistan. Now that their ethnic identity is no longer in question, what Bangladeshis are now fighting over is how Muslim are they gone be and what role Islam is gone play in the state.

After the Q/A session two Afghan panelists, Mr. Mozamel Shinwari, former Deputy Minister of Commerce and Mr. Ferdows Kawush, Senior Analyst of 8am daily, also spoke about their own interpretation of the book.

Ferdows Kawush: Our knowledge on Pakistan is, to a large extent, outdated, undocumented and even without a logical basis—it is not based on researched data. This vacuum has also found its way into our policies toward Pakistan; At times, one particular government would address Pakistan as the enemy. However, the next one coming to power would chant friendship with Pakistan. We see this vacuum both in our media analysis and in our academic institutions and universities as well. The translation of Christine Fair's book is a great work in this regard, and it can fill, to some extent, this vacuum—our knowledge on Pakistan. In our media analysis and even in our academic centers, we observe analysts suggesting that if we give Pakistan a set of concessions—for example, if we let 20% of our security forces be trained in Pakistan, Pakistan may bring changes in its policies toward Afghanistan. However, upon reading Christine Fair's book one realizes that these ideas have no basis. Christine Fair very clearly says that Pakistan is rather a school of thought to be a mere state. And Pakistan is more an ideology and a thought to be a country. Pakistan, basically, is product of an ideology. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Liaqat Ali Khan, Sekandar Mirza and other founders of Pakistan invented an ideology, which principally was established on an identical narrative from Islam. They declared that Muslims and Hindus cannot, peacefully, live together, so each should have their own countries. The foundation of this ideology is based on identical differences, hostility and hatred; and when it is like this, the possibility for Pakistan and India to have a peaceful relationship is reduced. And as Christine Fair explains in her book, even if India hands over Kashmir to Pakistan, Pakistan may claim another Indian state tomorrow and then claim another state, and this war will continue. It is also said, in the book, that Pakistan has an Indian-oriented policy—both toward Afghanistan and other neighboring countries. The book cites General Ayub Khan, who says, "The Indians were encouraging Afghan Royal Family to claim the land of Pakistan saying that, sooner or later, there would be no Pakistan, and Afghanistan should gain the territory." It means that almost the same policy has been followed since 1960. According to Christine Fair, Pakistan is seeking have more influence on its territory in order to take a stand against the Indian identity. She rejects the views of Barnet Rubin and Ahmad Rashid, who say that if the international community intervenes in Kashmir, Pakistan may give concessions to Afghanistan. Based on ideological argument, Christine Fair says that Pakistan is a revisionist state and will never give up its ideology at any cost. Pakistan's army also defends the ideological borders, besides being committed to defending the territory of Pakistan. The ideological borders of Pakistan is the Islamic identity. The Pakistani army thinks that Pakistan is the peak of Islamic identity. Pakistan's army believes that India is the eternal enemy of Pakistan. The Pakistani army thinks that based on the eternal

narrative it will be Pakistan who will fight against India and change it to an Islamic country. The Pakistani army is looking for strategic depth in Afghanistan and Central Asia. These are the issues that are discussed, in details, in this book and are highly based on academic standards. The author has analyzed all Pakistani army journals, the memoirs of Pakistani Generals, and all the speeches of the Generals. I think that reading of this book is necessary for our academicians, analysts, politicians and our government officials.

Question: Given the overall policy of Pakistan which is an ideological one, how can the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan be defined?

Mr. Kawish's answer: Pakistan, as it is explained in the book, has its own policies. But in Afghanistan, the solution is to strengthen the government. Until the government is not strong and strengthened, the Taliban and Pakistan's alliance will be effective and will undermine Afghanistan. First the government needs to be empowered. Later, issues like border conflicts could be discussed.

The facilitator of the program asked this question from the next speaker of the program, Mr. Shinwari. Does Afghanistan have the same ideological definition of its relationship with Pakistan, or does it have other components in this regard?

Mr. Mozamel Shinwari: Pakistan is one of the main problems in Afghanistan and understanding Pakistan is essentially important to us. Unless we have enough information on Pakistan, we cannot solve our problem with Pakistan. But we had, recently, trilateral talks with Iran and India. The Indians believe that ideology is not anymore an issue for Pakistan, especially after Bangladesh's separation. According to Indian strategists, now Pakistan is seeking to gain regional power. The second issue is some movements in Pakistan; especially the Baluchs' movement who are fighting for their independence and the refugees in Sindh, who have their own special terms and conditions. These issues are weakening the ideological approach of Pakistan. It is said that Lahore or Pakistan's Agreement was that the two countries should be formed on the basis of religious matter between Hindus and Muslims. But most of the analysts believe that Lahore's Agreement was not in that way, and it was all about the Muslims in India that were becoming more powerful day-by-day. Another issue is the location of Pakistan. Along with India, the border of Pakistan is not clear and it is called the control line, not the border. We have also the Durand Line with Pakistan. Pakistan claims that the United Nations officially recognized the both borders, but they still doubt that a day may come that Pakistan may no longer exist on the map. The budget of Pakistan's government is another issue of concern. A major portion of this budget is allocated to the army. The money could have been spent on education and/or health. They have to have three to four small battles with India in the border, and they will have a massive war every ten to fifteen years as we have witnessed. The history has proved that if Pakistan does not have its army, India would dissolve and destroy Pakistan. So, the same issue is applicable with Afghanistan—supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan. They support the Taliban in Afghanistan to frighten Pakistani people to accept the military government.

Facilitator: Do you think that Pakistan could, in long term, preserve its territory, authority and its stability by supporting Pakistani ideology?

Mr. Shinwari's answer: I don't think so, because the number of Islamic countries have increased in the region. If we were talking, in the past, about the Soviet Union, there are now Central Asian countries where Muslims are available. At the same time, there is Bangladesh in the region. I don't know if Pakistan still insists on ideological approach. Pakistan is, now, seeking to gain regional power, especially in Central Asia through Afghanistan—both economically and through regional connectivity. Pakistan, currently, is

not investing on South Asia, but is working on Central Asia. In economic organizations—for example, from World Bank and etc.—Pakistan is now lobbying to exit from South Asia and enter in Central Asia. They are trying to deter Afghanistan from reaching to India, and isolate South Asia and India from Central Asia and Afghanistan.

Mr. Kawish's answer: The experience of nearly seventy years has shown that Pakistani problems are rising day-by-day. Pakistan lost some of its territory in the 1970s and lost its security after supporting armed Islamist groups. As you are aware that prior to 1947, Pakistani ideology was not supported in four states Pashtunistan, Balochistan, Sindh and Punjab of Pakistan. Muslim League's members were not casting their votes in these four states. Only, the small parties that were supported by the Congress Party were securing seats in the Parliament. However, all these conditions helped to pave the way for the formation of Pakistan. The Urdu-speaking feudal lords and barons helped Muhammad Ali Jinnah. They are still not integrated very well in the society. For instance, even today a Punjabi kid is not allowed to speak Punjabi—Punjab is the largest state of Pakistan and is considered as the pillar of this country. There are such problems, and at the same time there are separatists as well in Pakistan which is a problem. To fight and overcome these problems, Pakistan relied on Islamism, which was a bad policy in my opinion.

In Afghanistan, the first step to be taken is to strengthen the government. As long as the government is not strengthened in Afghanistan and Pakistan has a security and ideological zone in major part of our geography, we cannot deal from a semi-equal position with Pakistan.

Facilitator: Does the current government have the ability to define the relationship between two the countries?

Mr. Kawish's answer: The current government has a lot of problems. In 2014, we tried to design and follow a friendly policy with Pakistan, but it failed. Even Mr. Ghani said, in a press conference, that "I don't know what exactly Pakistan wants from us. The reason was also that we didn't have the enough knowledge on Pakistan. Before designing any kind of policy toward Pakistan, we should first know this country.

Facilitator: On the basis of the speakers' speeches, we come to a conclusion that if the ideological policy of Pakistan is destructive and the Afghan government doesn't have the capability of defining bilateral relations, the people of both countries will be the victims of the wrong policies.

Mr. Kawish's answer: I think that Afghanistan, currently, is the victim, and Pakistan supports the Taliban and has launched an undeclared war against Afghanistan; and Afghanistan doesn't have any other way but to resist. First we should strengthen and support the government, then increase our knowledge on Pakistan, at the end we could deal effusively with Pakistan.

Question: If we go back in history, there were wars in our region before the existence of Pakistan, too. We fought three times with the Great Britain. After the formation of Pakistan, we observe these problems again. The first question is that if Pakistan is an ideological country, are the laws in Pakistan influenced by Islamic jurisprudence? The second question is why does Pakistan have problems with Afghanistan as our country has defended Islam from the very beginning?

Comment and question: Pakistan was founded by the English and is a strong state. If we take a realistic approach, we can utilize many issues of Pakistan—e.g. the issue of Baluchs and cross border trade—as leverages in our foreign policy. How can we be ensured if we recognize Durand Line as the official border, Pakistan will end its interference in Afghanistan? There are no guarantees in this regard. We should take

a realistic approach in a sense that in the case of interference, we should reciprocate. If they use military power, we should again reciprocate. Realistic approaches have always been the guide for politicians around the world.

Comment and question: Evidence proves that Pakistan acts in a utilitarian manner rather than ideological one in its policy-making. The Pakistanis accepted Benazir Bhutto, who was also known as the mother of the Taliban, in the post of Prime Minister while they were against girls' education in Afghanistan. Secondly, we always have our assessments of Pakistan's policies but the question is: what is to be done? Do we have a clear foreign policy as a state or our foreign policy is only driven by the conversations and dialogues in the conferences?

Comment: As a state, we know the People of Pakistan very well. This would be an exaggeration if we say we don't know them very well. Over the past 60 years, our governments have tried several times to resolve its disputes with Pakistan but their efforts have been doomed. We should keep in mind that whatever is in this book are the views of the author. Our understanding of Pakistan should not be reliant on one book only. It would be great if we publish various books from various perspectives so we can deepen and broaden our understanding of this country.

Question: How are Pakistan's ties with the West defined?

Mr. Kawush's conclusion of the discussions: Pakistan is founded on an identity-based narrative of Islam. Sharia is not that serious a discussion there. Neither Jinnah was not a Sharia scholar. They lived a liberal life and drank excessively. But they had an identity-based reading of Islam and said that they were Muslims and the Indians were Hindus and that they could not live together. Their role model was Emperor Aurangzeb. When Aurangzeb rose to power, he waged a war against the Hindus and the Shias. He even killed his father, sister and brother. In the history of India, we have others like Jalaluddin Akbar and Jahangir Shah who translated Hindu's books into Persian and had them translated into other languages as well. These Muslim rulers globalized Hinduism. I mean, there was so much tolerance among the early Muslim rulers. However, when Aurangzeb sat on the throne, he issued a *fatwa* to expand his realm. General Musharraf, the tenth President of Pakistan, lived a life that was not based on Sharia provisions by any means. However, in the interviews, he speaks as though he is an Islamist and portrays any harm to Pakistan as harm to Islam. Another issue raised here was Pakistan's relations with the West. I think Afghanistan's relations with the West was shaped by strategic ties and a series of accidents not by a set of values. When Pakistan was established, there was a supposition that it would prevent the Russian and Indian communist parties from becoming united. In other words, Pakistan's ties with the West was shaped by a strategic necessity. In post 9/11 again this relation re-emerged by some accidents.

For a deeper understanding of Pakistan, I recommend that we translate former Pakistani President Ayub Khan's biography as well.

Conclusion of Shinwari: Until Zia-ul-Haq's rule, Pakistan's laws were those it had inherited from the British. During Zia's rule Islamic Sharia was incorporated in Pakistan's laws. Articles 62 and 63 of Pakistan's Constitution talk entirely about Islamic issues but there are controversies regarding their implementation. Regarding the issue of Baluchistan and trade as leverages in our relations with Pakistan, I can say that in the past it was part of the government's agenda and we had some progress but I don't know if the government still pursues that. The issue of trade was politicized but we didn't intend to do so. When they created transit problems for us, our trade with Pakistan decreased and it automatically turned into a

political leverage. We have problems in defining our foreign policy. In the past, the Ambassador we sent to Pakistan did not know Urdu, Pashto and English languages. Thus, our Ambassador had problems in communicating with the Pakistanis. There is an issue with our Ministry of Foreign Affairs who believe that our competent diplomats should be sent to the US. It is believed that we do not send our competent diplomats to Iran and Pakistan. There a dire need for us to send competent diplomats to Iran and Pakistan so we can take better advantage of our relations with them. Our foreign policy is more reactive not proactive.

Another issue is Central Asia. Pakistan needs energy, both electricity and gas. Even the Taliban has announced their support of the TAPI Project. Our government has stopped energy transit through Afghanistan and that is not a wise decision. We should try to increase Pakistan's transit dependency on Afghanistan so we can use it as a leverage in the future.

Announcer: As a time when there is no strong state in Afghanistan and Pakistan has based its policies on destabilizing Afghanistan, what should be done for more convergence and for creating a strong state in Afghanistan?

Kawush's answer: Well, we should continue our dialogue and should argue with the Pakistanis that their current approach is not wise. In addition to that, we should continue our conventional and unconventional resistance against proxy terrorism. There is no other way.

Shinwari's answer: We witness in the world that economic relations shape political relations. We can be a huge market for Pakistan, and there is also an opportunity for joint ventures. We can work jointly in mines and industries sectors. As long as we fail to attract Pakistan and their support for Pakistani investment, we cannot become sure of our security. Attracting Pakistan through incentives for Pakistani investors, business-to-business relations and better relations regarding transit will become possible. Particularly, we should work on the huge projects from Central Asia to Pakistan. This issue can give us an upper hand in trade and transit.

To conclude, the Chairman of AISS thanked the translator, editors and publisher of the book and asked the officials at the security ministries and policy-making agencies in the government to read this book. It is worth mentioning that the AISS has donated copies of this book to the above mentioned agencies.